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There is a constant stream of headlines in the news about fraud schemes swindling people 
out of their hard-earned money.  When analyzing these schemes, it can be difficult to see 
why these scams work so well time after time.  Often, the potential payoff to the victim is 
farfetched or even impossible to a third party looking at the situation after the fact.  Why 
would someone comply with a fraudulent request with such an implausible benefit to 
themselves or maybe even seemingly no benefit? One of the tools utilized by 
unscrupulous scam artists is the social norm of reciprocity. Simply stated, the social norm 
of reciprocity is that we feel obligated to repay those who have provided a favor to us. 
This dissertation will investigate reciprocity and its power to influence people to comply 
with requests, where there are clear red flags they should run or at least ask clarifying 
questions to avoid being taken advantage of. 
 






Imagine you are trading in your car at a car dealership.  The woman behind the 
desk offers you a free “homemade” cookie when you sit down to discuss the value of 
your trade-in.  You look down to see a store brand cookie container in the garbage can 
and believe the cookie you received was from this package, but you do not say anything.  
The woman offers you less than you thought you would get, but you accept her offer 
without asking any questions or conducting any other research to verify the value of your 
trade-in.  After you drive home in your new car, you question how much you received for 
your old car. You check the internet and call some other dealerships to discover you 
received 30% less than what you could have gotten from other dealers.  Why did you 
accept her offer when there were signs of her being untrustworthy? Did the “free 
homemade cookie” influence your decision to accept the initial offer and not ask any 
questions? 
Reciprocity is used ethically every day to influence behavior and is the lubricant 
for exchange of goods and services.  There is nothing untoward about being offered a free 
sample at the grocery store, even though it can influence a customer’s buying behavior. 
While reciprocity can be used ethically to shape behavior, there are also countless stories 
where reciprocity is used in nefarious ways as a key component in people falling victim 
to scams and swindles.  The concept of reciprocity is why you have heard of the phase, 
“there is no such thing as a free lunch.” 
Why do gifts work to influence people’s behavior even if it is to their detriment? 




unethically, with seemingly no upside, just because they received a gift? Can the power 
of an unsolicited favor keep people from even asking clarifying questions, even when 
they know something is not quite right? FINRA Investor Education Foundation aims to 
protect potential investors against fraud. They recognize reciprocity as a tactic used by 
unscrupulous fraudsters as a way to gain compliance and recommend the simple 
protective step of asking questions (Kieffer & Mottola, 2017).   Are there boundaries to 
the power of reciprocity, in that someone will refuse to act against their self-interest even 
when faced with the pro-social norm?   
This paper will aim to consolidate what is known about reciprocity even when 
this norm is contrary to consumers’ interests.  It will explore how current theoretical 
models explain the dark side of reciprocity.  The dissertation will seek to identify gaps in 
these theories that do not adequately capture why someone would comply with a 
fraudulent request with no benefit to themselves. Lasty, the study will investigate if these 
decision models adequately explain why someone would be convinced to behave 
unethically, putting themselves in legal jeopardy, with no apparent incentive.  
Normative Models 
One possible reason why people follow the norm of reciprocity even when doing 
so is contrary to their interests is that people are being rational when they follow the norm 
of reciprocity. Normative models state that we make rational decisions to maximize our 
benefit. For example, a situation could have minimal risk or vulnerability compared to 
the potential benefit to a consumer. Even if the benefit is farfetched or improbable, a 




the initial favor and potential benefit is worth the risk of being taken advantage of.  
Another consideration that needs to be taken into account is the definition of benefit.  
Someone could be making a rational decision to achieve their goal and the goal may not 
necessarily be based on self-interest. 
This section will review the literature on whether following the norm of 
reciprocity might be a rational decision based on a normative decision process. 
Normative decision models contend we are rational beings and will make 
decisions that are optimal and will result in the most good. Goodness can be described as 
achieving our goal or alternatively, “what achieves our goals best, on the whole” (Baron, 
2000).  The decision to reciprocate can help a decision maker achieve their goal. 
Rational decision-making theory has its roots in the work of Pierre de Fermat and 
Blaise Pascal’s probability functions where they developed the concept of calculating 
probabilities for chance events (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006;  Edwards, 1982).  In 
1660, Pascal went on to show that the consequences of being wrong can outweigh the 
likelihood of being wrong with his “wager” on the existence of God (Buchanan & 
O’Connell, 2006).  This work led to the first rational decision model, expected value 
theory, which states that a choice should equal the probability weighted average of 
possible values for a variable (McFall, 2015).  An individual could weigh the different 
ways in which to reciprocate and choose the option with the highest probability of 
achieving their goal. 
In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli drew on expected value theory to develop expected 




account for risk and assign a subjective value to desires and fears of each possible 
outcome (Baron, 2000). This allows decision makers to select the option with the greatest 
subjective expected utility, allowing for risk aversion (McFall, 2015). Ramsey (1926) 
added to the utility theory literature by contending personal beliefs account for part the 
subjective probability equation. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) used expected 
utility theory to develop game theory, in which individuals would maximize rewards 
based on objective probabilities.  Savage (1954) extended Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s work to include subjective probabilities.  In a reciprocity context, 
expected utility theory suggests an individual would calculate the expected value that 
comes from reciprocating.  This calculation is made by multiplying the probability of 
achieving their goal from reciprocating by that the value of achieving their goal. This 
expected value is then compared to the expected value from not reciprocating.   The 
option that has the highest expected value would then be chosen. 
Simon (1955, 1956) contributed to the decision making literature with his concept 
of bounded rationality, which says that rational choice does not require maximizing 
utility.  Rather, Simon states individuals often times do not have the ability to process all 
the information and optimal choices are not necessarily required to reach their goal.  In 
other words, decision makers will make a decision that satisfies their goal, as opposed to 
maximizing utility.  Simon further states that alternatives are evaluated sequentially until 
one meets the minimum threshold, unlike other rational models, such as Becker’s (1976) 
rational choice theory, that suggest all alternatives are considered prior to a choice being 




the options available, but instead move forward with the first option they believe will 
help them achieve their goal. 
Ben-Haim (2006) extends the work of Simon’s bounded rationality with info gap 
decision theory.  Info gap decision theory takes into account what the decision maker 
doesn’t know or can’t know as opposed to the limits of human information processing 
like Simon’s bounded rationality.  Ben-Haim’s theory says decision makers consider their 
goals, options, and boundaries of their knowledge. The decision maker considers how 
wrong their knowledge can be for option alternatives and still achieve their goal. The 
robustness for how wrong the decision maker can be, with the goal still being met, is the 
determinant for the decision (Schwartz, Ben-Haim & Dacso, 2011).   
Traditional normative models contend decisions are made by weighing the costs, 
benefits, and alternatives in order to maximize the decision maker’s benefit.  How then 
can these models explain why people follow the norm of reciprocity even when doing so 
is contrary to their interests?  One possible explanation lies in how the decision maker’s 
benefit and interests are defined.  Baron (2000) stated rational decisions are made in 
order to achieve our goals best, on the whole.   Perhaps these two concepts can be 
squared if the decision maker’s goal is one of fairness or inequality aversion and not 
maximizing their resources. There is very strong evidence from numerous experiments 
that refutes that people’s goal can only be grounded in self-interest (Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Fehr & Gachter, 1998; Halali, Bereby-Meyer 
and Meiran, 2014).  The evidence suggests that people can be motivated to reciprocate by 




Further, traditional rational choice theory (Becker, 1976) may seem to only take 
outcomes into account, regardless of whether the decision is selfish or altruistic.  The 
other party’s intentions behind their decision could also be a determining factor in how 
the outcome is evaluated and determine how to reciprocate (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006).  
Punishing another party, at an expense to oneself, is a form of negative reciprocity 
(Fehr & Gachter, 1998; Halali et al., 2014).  Although this pattern would not fit 
traditional self-interest normative models, it would fit a normative model when the goal is 
that of fairness.  There have been numerous studies that have shown people’s willingness 
to sacrifice their own wellbeing to achieve fairness or to punish those who behave 
unfairly in simple laboratory games starting with Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze’s 
(1982) ultimatum game.  The ultimatum game is played by two players dividing a certain 
sum of money between themselves.  The first player (proposer) starts with the entire sum 
of money and makes an offer, in which the second player (responder) can accept or 
reject. If the offer is accepted the money is divided according to the offer. If the offer is 
rejected, neither party gets any money (Rand Tarnita, Ohtsuki & Nowak, 2013). A 
rational self-interested proposer is expected to offer the minimum they believe the 
responder will accept.  The rational self-interested responder is expected to take anything 
greater than zero.  
There have been many experiments (e.g., Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 2006; Gachter, 2004; Guth, Schmittberger & Schwarze,1982; Kaheneman, 
Kenetsch & Thaler, 1986; Nowak, Page and Sigmund, 2000; Rand et al., 2013; Wallace, 
Cesarini, Lichtenstein & Johannesson, 2007) that use the ultimatum game paradigm with 




results that diverge from the expected rational self-interested models.  One, many 
responders reject low, but nonzero offers. Proposals that are greater than zero and less 
than 20 percent of the total are rejected 40 to 60 percent of the time. Two, many 
proposers offer more than the minimum amount to avoid rejection.  The vast majority of 
proposers offer between 40 and 50 percent of the total amount to the responder. These 
results demonstrate that both the proposer and responder are not acting in a self-interest 
wealth maximization rational manner. They each have other oriented considerations for 
fairness and reciprocity. 
The results for the ultimatum game can be interpreted as the responder’s goal is 
not one of wealth maximization but fairness (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Fehr, 2000; Guth, 
Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982;).  The decision to reject the low offer can be viewed as 
a rational decision in order to achieve their goal of fairness or inequality aversion (Bolton 
and Ockenfels, 2000).  Fehr (2000) suggests there are two types of people, self-interested 
types and reciprocal types.  There are circumstances that refute the traditional self-
interest theory. For example, when there is a strong incentive for people to free ride, a 
self-interest model would suggest nobody would cooperate (Fehr & Gachter, 1998).  
However, if there is an opportunity to punish free riding behavior, reciprocal types will 
strongly punish the free rider even when the punishment comes at a high cost to the 
punisher (Fehr & Gachter, 1998).   This threat of punishment encourages potential free 
riders to cooperate.  Fehr & Gachter (1998) concluded there are two categories most 
people fall into; reciprocal types and selfish types. They based these two categories based 
on the results of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), Gachter and Falk (1997), Miller 




Irlenbusch and Renner (2000).  These studies utilized one-shot games where between 
40% and 60% of the participants exhibited reciprocal behavior.  There were also between 
20% and 30% of the participants who behaved only in a selfish manner.  The vast 
majority of the participants fell into exclusively either the reciprocal or selfish category 
(Fehr & Gachter, 1998).  
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) contend people 
reciprocate not only to for self-centered reasons but also to reduce inequality. Both 
studies explained the pattern of other oriented fairness results as rational through a utility 
function.  Incorporated in this utility function is a person’s pecuniary payoff as well as 
their payoff relative to others (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Fehr & Schmidt’s (1999) model 
not only incorporates increases in utility when material resources increase for an 
individual but also decreases in overall utility with the inequality of allocation of 
resources. Other oriented fairness is not a universal trait. Their utility function also 
contains a selfish variable, in which it’s possible for a person to not care about inequality 
when they are only self-centered (Gachter, 2004).   
Falk and Fischbacher’s (2006) theory of reciprocity also explains reciprocity 
decisions as rational but differs from that of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) in that other’s underlying intentions are incorporated in the model, not 
just the consequences of the action. Reduction of inequality is not the driving factor to 
reciprocate. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) show identical offers are perceived and 
reciprocated differently depending on the underlying intention of the offer. The main 
determinant of the respondent’s rewarding and punishing behavior is based on perceived 




Falk and Fischbacher’s (2006) evaluated perceived kindness of proposers in the in 
an ultimatum game scenario via a questionnaire study.  The 111 participants were asked 
to imagine themselves as responders in the ultimatum game.   They had to rate how kind 
or unkind the proposer was, on a scale of -100 to +100, when they offered them different 
proportions from a total sum of 10 Swiss Francs. The first task asked responders to rate 
the kindness of the proposer for all 11 possible combinations of dividing the 10 Swiss 
Francs. The options ranged from keeping 10 francs and giving 0 to giving 10 francs and 
keeping 0.  The results showed that kindness perceptions monotonically increased as the 
offer increased.  Giving away all 10 francs had an average kindness rating of  +72.2 and 
keeping all 10 francs was rated at -95.4.   The results also showed that an offer of 5 francs 
was considered an equitable share and the reference point for a fair versus unfair offer.  
Offers that were less than 5 were negative and perceived as unkind while offers of 5 or 
greater were positive and rated as kind.  
The other tasks in the survey were identical in nature to the first task, just 
differing in that the choice sets available to the proposer consisted of a smaller number of 
options, e.g., the proposer could only offer 2, 5 or 8 francs.  There were nine different 
choice sets the participants had to rate the kindness of proposer.  The magnitude of the 
kindness ratings changed considerably based on the choice set available to the proposer.  
For example, when the choice set only gave the proposer the options of giving 0, 1 or 2 
francs away, responders rated their kindness at -88.8, -56.4 and -9.1 respectively.  When 
all 11 options were available to the proposer, responders rated their kindness of giving 
away 0, 1 and 2 francs as –95.4, -84.5 and -71.9 respectively.  Falk and Fischbacher 




perceived kindness but rather the fairness intention, determined by the choices available 
to the proposer.  Further, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) say that when the responder has no 
alternative in choosing how many francs to give away, they cannot signal any intention 
and the perceived kindness is not zero.  This is evidence that both outcomes and 
intentions of the proposer are important in reciprocity decisions. 
Falk and Fischbacher’s (2006) have shown similar findings of consideration for 
the perceived kindness of the proposer in the ultimatum game, gift-exchange game, 
reduced best-shot game, competitive market games, dictator game, sequential prisoner’s 
dilemma, and centipede game. In each of these games, participants have the ability to act 
selfishly resulting in a greater monetary payoff for themselves, although this was not 
always the case. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) demonstrated in these games that kindness 
is derived from the consequences and the intention of the action.  The same consequences 
were interpreted and reciprocated differently, based on the underlying intention. When 
the intention of the action was perceived as being kind, participants were more likely 
reciprocate, even if that was to their own detriment.  Further, participants were not 
reciprocating only if their actions reduced inequity, in fact the reciprocation could lead to 
greater inequity when the original giver’s actions were viewed as kind. 
Another line of research suggests reciprocal behavior has its roots in evolution. 
Fehr, Fischbacher and Gachter (2002) coin the term “strong reciprocity” where 
individuals are likely to volatility help others, when treated fairly, and punish cheaters, 
even if this behavior does not benefit them individually.  Fehr et al. (2002) also 
demonstrated that strong reciprocators also tend to punish someone when they treat a 




humans more likely, even if it is costly to the giver (e.g., food sharing and collective 
action).  This results in the group being better suited to survive and pass on their genes to 
future generations.  
Purkayastha (2004) investigated reciprocal behavior in the context of gift giving.  
Like, Fehr et al. (2002), Purkayastha contends reciprocal behavior, such as gift giving, is 
rational and has evolved as an evolutionary process. Gift giving can lead to trust and 
cooperation among group members, creating greater wellbeing and increasing chances of 
reproductive success, even if the result seemingly does not make sense at the individual 
level.  When a person receives a gift, even if the good is useless to the receiver, the gift’s 
symbolic value creates an obligation for the recipient to reciprocate. The recipient 
appreciates the symbolic value of the gift.  The recipient’s return gift need not match the 
monetary value of the original gift.  Purkayastha argues the total value of the return gift 
needs to be equal to the original gift’s monetary and symbolic value. The return gift value 
is also comprised of monetary and symbolic value. This combination of symbolic value 
and substantive value allows for an easier exchange of gifts back and forth, resulting in 
greater cooperation, trust, resources and ultimately better chances or reproductive 
success.  
Purkayastha (2004) postulates that this reciprocal behavior maps onto the public 
goods literature.  Public goods in this context can be thought of as the collective good.  A 
gift is similar to a private contribution to the public good. When a person gives someone 
else a gift it can be interpreted as a contribution to the public good.  The recipient then 
reciprocates to the public good be giving a gift to the original giver.  The larger group 




Griskevicius & Kenrick (2013) also argue reciprocation is rational decision based 
on an evolution perspective.  They contend a fundamental evolutionary motive of 
behavior is making friends. Friends can create groups that allow them to teach skills to 
each other, provide support and accomplish tasks that cannot be completed by one 
individual.  This group dynamic allows the for cultivation of more resources, increasing 
their chances for reproductive success. People will make a rational decision to reciprocate 
in order to create or keep friendships. Individuals will reciprocate a favor by spending 
resources on a gift to give the favor giver. Giving up these resources for the benefit of 
another can seemingly be against their individual interest, but rational if their goal is to 
make and keep friends and ultimately create a system of shared resources and support to 
increase the chances of reproductive success.  
Ethical Decision Making 
An additional possible reason why people follow the norm of reciprocity, even 
when doing so is contrary to their interests, is that people’s behavior is being influenced 
by ethics, more specifically people will reciprocate because they follow an ethical 
standard to repay a favor even when doing so violates other ethical standards. This 
section will review the literature on whether following the norm of reciprocity might be 
based on an ethical decision, which makes a person vulnerable to violating other ethical 
standards and puts them in jeopardy of being taken advantage of when they follow the 
norm. 
Gintis, Henrich, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr (2008) define the term strong reciprocity 




disposed, even at personal cost, and a willingness to punish those who violate cooperative 
norms, even when punishing is personally costly” (p. 3).  Ginits et al. assert that ethical 
behavior is not necessarily a path towards personal gain. Instead, humans behave 
ethically and morally because we enjoy acting ethically and are uncomfortable when 
acting unethically. The authors explain this behavior from an evolutionary perspective in 
that as homo sapiens were emerging, groups with altruist members were more likely to 
survive than groups comprised of selfish members. Losses at the individual level from 
altruistic behavior were more than made up for by the overall group’s performance.  This 
has embedded a pattern of reciprocal behavior in humans today to behave ethically by 
helping others, even at the cost of one’s own personal gain.  
Price (2008) contends that reciprocating positive behavior has its roots in 
evolution, although his explanation is very different than that of Ginits et al. (2008).  
Price argues that prosocial ethical behavior is a maladaptive response to current social 
situations. Our hunter-gatherer ancestors did not encounter many strangers and our brains 
have not advanced to distinguish between strangers and close acquaintances, so we treat 
everyone we encounter as if they are a close contact or family member when deciding to 
repay a favor.  Along this line of logic, Price also argues individuals behave ethically in 
anonymous situations because our caveman ancestors did not have many experiences 
with being anonymous.  This could create conditions that make someone susceptible to 
being taken advantage of by following the norm of reciprocity because repaying favors to 
close contacts and friends is the ethical to do.  
Early theorists such as Bronisalw Malinowski, Marchel Mauss and Claude Levi-




creating a pattern of reciprocity (Komter, 1996).  They believed gifts and favors are the 
“moral cement” of society (Komter, 1996). Building on the notion of ethical and moral 
obligations in a business context are shareholder theory and stakeholder theory. 
Shareholder theory suggests managers at a corporation have an ethical responsibility to 
maximize shareholders’ profits above anything else (Friedman, 1970; Tangpong & Pesek 
2007). Shareholders are the owners of the company, and they provide the employment to 
the manager, setting up a reciprocal obligation.  This goal of maximizing shareholder 
value is the guiding principle, above anything else, even when this decision has otherwise 
ethically questionable consequences, by other ethical standards, on other stakeholders, 
such as vendors, customers, partner companies and employees. 
A competing theory to shareholder theory is stakeholder theory, which argues 
managers make decisions based on the interest of all stakeholders including shareholders, 
customers, employees, and suppliers (Tangpong, Li & Hung, 2016). The norm of 
reciprocity is viewed as the foundation for stakeholder theory and reciprocity is a moral 
norm in our society (Sama & Shoaf, 2008; Tangpong et al., 2016). Managers are tasked 
with balancing the interests of all parties when making business decisions, often leading 
to ethical dilemmas (Evan & Freeman, 1988; Tangpong & Pesek 2007). Ironically, the 
moral forces that shape the norm of reciprocity can play a role in determining the course 
of action managers take when weighing the interests of the different stakeholders, 
potentially leading to decisions that are ethically questionable by other standards or even 
illegal putting themselves in jeopardy (Tangpong et al., 2016). The moral obligation 
created by the norm of reciprocity can compromise or override other ethical 




Tangpong et al. (2016) conducted an experiment on the relationship between the 
moral obligation created by reciprocity and its influence on questionable decisions and 
unacceptable behavior when viewed in the context of other ethical standards.  They 
hypothesized under the conditions of reciprocity; the original receiver is more likely to 
engage in ethically questionable behavior when requested from the original giver.  The 
266 participants partook in a role-playing scenario by reading vignettes based on an 
antitrust lawsuit between two large software companies. In the scenario, company W is 
considering a mutually beneficial relationship with Company X.  Company Y already has 
a business relationship with Company W. Company X and Company Y are competitors.  
A top official from Company Y approaches an official from Company W and asks that 
they not form a partnership with Company X.  The participants were asked to assume the 
role as the official at Company W, where they had to make a Yes or No decision to 
comply with the request. Agreeing with this request would be a violation of anti-trust 
laws and unethical. This creates a conflict of competing ethical standards; one to repay a 
favor and the other to treat all parties fairly and not violate anti-trust laws.    
Tangpong et al. (2016) randomly assigned participants to four different 
conditions: control, reciprocity, environmental uncertainty, and reciprocity x 
environmental uncertainty. Participants in the reciprocity condition read additional 
information that their company has an established give and take relationship with 
Company Y. The two companies have attempted to repay what the other has provided 
and have not harmed each other. If you agree to Company Y’s request to not partner with 
Company X, Company Y will provide greater support in the future. The environmental 




rapidly due to customer preferences and evolving technology. The reciprocity x 
environmental uncertainty condition combined the previous two messages. The control 
condition simply asked if you would enter into the deal with Company X or find a 
different company to replace Company X.  
Tangpong et al.’s (2016) results showed individuals in the reciprocity condition 
were more likely to comply with the unlawful request than the control condition because 
by doing so they were following the ethical standard of repaying a favor.  Participants in 
the environmental uncertainty condition were not more likely to comply with the request 
than the control condition.  The group with the highest rate of compliance with the 
unethical request was the reciprocity x environmental uncertainty condition.  The authors 
explained that environmental uncertainty is a moderator that strengthens reciprocity’s 
impact on unethical request compliance.  
Umphress, Bingham and Mitchell (2010) also investigated the malevolent effects 
of reciprocity in a business context but differ from Tangpong et al. (2016) in that they 
considered positive feelings about reciprocity a moderator for strengthening the 
relationship between employees who identify strongly with their company and unethical 
pro-organizational behavior (UPB). The authors defined UFB as containing two 
elements.  Fist, UFB is “either illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community” 
(Jones, 1991, p. 367). Second, UFB is pro-organizational behavior that is not requested 
by superiors nor is it in the job description (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Umphress et al., 
2010).  This again sets up a conflict between two ethical standards.  Individuals who have 




employment and group belonging by participating in UFB versus doing the right thing for 
the greater society.  
Umphress et al. (2010) argue employees who have strong reciprocity beliefs and 
who identify with the company have a greater tendency to act in favor of the ethical 
standard of “repaying” their employer by committing UFB that benefits the company 
rather than behave ethically for society.  Again, we see a paradoxical ethical pattern 
caused by reciprocity; some employees feel ethical pressure to act in the company’s 
interest because the company provides them with employment, even when the act is 
unethical potentially putting their livelihood in jeopardy. 
According to social identity theory, someone’s identity is shaped by their 
membership in social groups (Tajfel, 1982; Umphress et al., 2010). A person’s employer 
can be considered a social group. An individual will view their social group’s success and 
failures as their own. (Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Umphress et al., 2010).  Additionally, 
social exchange theory would suggest employees will regulate their behavior to align 
with the company in order to maintain their self-image of being part of the organization 
(Hogg, Terry & White, 1995). Also, Clark and Mills (1979) demonstrated individuals 
have different levels of how much they subscribe to reciprocity beliefs. Individuals with 
high levels of reciprocity belief feel more compelled to reciprocate to others, including 
their employer (Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage & Rohdieck, 2004). This strong belief in 
reciprocity can be the ethical standard people use to make decisions even though it often 




Umphress et al. (2010) conducted two experiments that tested the relationship 
between UPB, strong feelings of organization identification and strong reciprocity 
beliefs.  The first study had 224 participants answer three survey measures to determine 
organizational identification (Mael & Ashforth, 1992), positive reciprocity (Eisenberger 
et al., 2004) and willingness to engage in UPB (Umphress et al., 2010). The results did 
not show a relationship between organizational identification and UPB.  Although, the 
results did yield a significant interaction effect between organizational identification x 
positive reciprocity beliefs in predicting UPB.  Individuals who had a strong 
organizational identification and strong positive reciprocity beliefs were more likely to 
engage in UPB. The results were not significant for individuals with weak reciprocity 
beliefs.  These results suggest the ethical standard to reciprocate can override other 
ethical standards in some people.  
Umphress et al. (2010) second experiment utilized the same survey measures as 
the first study but did so at two points in time. This time delay in this experiment was to 
ensure participants’ responses were not influenced by common method bias. 148 
participants completed the organizational and reciprocity beliefs surveys first and then 
the UPB measure four weeks later.  The pattern of results was identical to that of the first 
study.  Umphress et al.’s (2010) work demonstrates the problematic effects of combining 
strong organizational identification and strong beliefs in reciprocity.  Under these 
conditions an employee feels the ethical duty to reciprocate value to company in 
exchange for their employment, even if it compromises other ethical standards. This sets 




including the law, judge their actions by ethical standards other than the obligation to 
reciprocate.   
The intersection of ethics and reciprocity is not just in the business world.  
Politics is ripe with corruption stories that are the result of gifts, money and favors being 
bestowed on politicians in return for favorable legislation for the favor giver (Susman, 
2008). This exchange is not always a direct bribe asking for a quid-pro-quo. The favor 
can be the result of a longer-term relationship where the lobbyist has built up relationship 
capital with the lawmaker over time.  This puts the lawmaker in an ethical dilemma when 
they are put in a place to make policy decisions in favor of the lobbyist due to the norm 
of reciprocity versus what is best for their constituents.   The reciprocation of the 
lobbyist’s favors may have wide ranging and costly ramifications to the public (Susman, 
2008). 
Nearly seventy years ago, Senator Paul Douglas (1952) addressed the potential 
ethical problem of gifts and favors in politics.  Douglas’ message still rings true today: 
Today the corruption of public officials by private interests takes a more subtle 
form. The enticer does not generally pay money directly to the public representative. He 
tries instead by a series of favors to put the public official under such a feeling of 
personal obligation that the latter gradually loses his sense of mission to the public and 
comes to feel that his first loyalties are to his private benefactors and patrons. What 
happens is a gradual shifting of a man’s loyalties from the community to those who have 
been doing him favors. His final decisions are, therefore, made in response to his private 




the official will claim, and may indeed believe, that there is no causal connection between 
the factors he has received and the decisions which he makes (p. 15). 
Butterfield, Treviño, and Weaver (2000) contend moral awareness is the first step 
needed to influence people to behavior ethically. There are many decisions that people 
face that do not come with bright red flags that indicate an ethical dilemma. The authors 
demonstrated that the salience of moral or ethical norms via moral language can trigger a 
moral schema leading to more ethical behavior.  
Social Normative Decision Models 
Another possible reason why people follow the norm of reciprocity even when 
doing so is contrary to their interests is that people are using a normative decision process 
based on social interaction. More specifically individuals may be concerned about 
making the choice that is in line with others’ expectations or behavior, irrespective of the 
monetary, ethical or health consequences downstream. The “right” decision, in this 
context, is either based on social expectations of what others believe is the right thing to 
do, known as injunctive appeals or based on how others are behaving, known as 
descriptive appeals (Cialdini, 2007; Jacobson, Mortensen & Cialdini, 2011, White & 
Simpson, 2013). The decision is not based on self-interest or morals. There is a subtle, 
but important, distinction from the injunctive and descriptive norms discussed in this 
section and the ethical standards in the previous section.  The injunctive and descriptive 
norms are based on the perception of others’ expectations, and behavior and not 
necessarily what the decision maker internally believes is right. Both injunctive and 




at the time of behavior (Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990; Kallgren , Reno & Cialdini, 
2000). The focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al, 1990) posits there are often 
competing norms present in a given situation that could influence behavior. One specific 
norm will only shape behavior, when the situation activates that specific norm.   
Injunctive norms have been more successful in producing prosocial behavior in a wider 
range of settings than descriptive norms (Reno, Cialdini & Kallgren, 1993).  
Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) state humans are motivated to create and maintain 
relationships. We will actively monitor and engage in behaviors that others approve of in 
order to gain social approval. This is in line with the focus theory of normative conduct, 
that when the expectation for social approval is salient, the injunctive norm to align with 
other’s expectations. Attending to the expectations of how others think we should act, as 
opposed to our own impulses, takes cognitive effort and self-regulation (Baumeister, 
Dewall, Ciarocco & Twenge, 2005; Jacobson, Mortensen & Cialdini, 2011; Morris, 
Hong, Chiu & Liu, 2015).  This viewpoint would be in line with the notion that people do 
not follow injunctive norms due to heuristics and instead involve strategic considerations 
requiring cognitive effort (Morris et al., 2015). One of the ways to and attend to these 
injunctive norms to gain social approval, in order to build bonds with others, is through 
the reciprocating favors.  
The power of pro-social behavior of acting in a way that others expect, 
specifically the need to repay a favor, can cause someone to be blind to downstream 
unethical or fraudulent consequences. It is not the ultimate outcome that is considered 
when making the decision, but rather how the immediate action of repayment is 




they trust another person because they believe they must give them the benefit of the 
doubt when it comes to their trustworthiness, even if they privately believe human nature 
is to lie and cheat (Dunning, Anderson, Schlosser, Ehlebracht & Fetchenhauer, 2014). 
People will go along just to get along due to injunctive norms; even when it should be 
clear they are involved in a scam.  
Asch (1951) found participants avoided social disapproval when they conformed 
to incorrect majority answers when they had to state them publicly. Research on self-
discrepancy theory suggests people will feel guilt, anxiety and agitation when they 
envision themselves not living up to social obligations (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Shah & 
Friedman, 1997; Roney & Sorrentino, 1995). Individuals will behave in ways in order to 
not experience this agitation. A common social obligation is to reciprocate favors. This 
section will review the literature on whether following the norm of reciprocity might be 
due to a normative decision process based on the need to adhere to injunctive norms, in 
line with the focus theory of normative conduct.  
The power of reciprocity appealing to injunctive norms is even present when the 
beneficiary of the initial favor is not the target being asked to comply, but rather a cause 
or in general.  Goldstein, Griskevicius and Cialdini (2011) conducted a study on hotel 
towel reuse rates.  They measured towel reuse rates using three different messages on 
signs hanging on the towel racks.  The first was sign was about saving the environment 
and reusing the towel (standard), the second was that the hotel had already made a 
donation to an environmental charity on their behalf and asked them to repay the favor by 
reusing the towel (reciprocity by proxy) and the third sign promised to make a donation 




where guests could have potentially reused their towel. The results showed there was no 
difference in towel reuse between the standard sign (35.1%) and incentive by proxy sign 
(30.7%).  However, towel reuse rate was significantly higher for the reciprocity by proxy 
sign (45.2%). than both of the other signs. 
Goldstein et al. (2011) conducted a follow up study with 263 new participants. 
The participants each saw one of the three towel reuse signs from the previous study and 
then answered questions about the hotel management’s trustworthiness; hotel 
management’s caring about protecting environment, their sense of obligation to reuse the 
towels, and the extent to which they personally endorsed the norm of reciprocity.  The 
results demonstrated no difference in the perceived trustworthiness or concern for the 
environment by hotel management as a function of which sign the participants had seen. 
Participants who viewed the reciprocity by proxy sign reported a greater sense of 
obligation to the hotel’s management to reuse their towel than the participants who saw 
the other signs.  Also, participants in the reciprocity by proxy condition, personal 
endorsement of the reciprocity norm was significantly correlated with their sense of 
obligation to reuse the towel.  The other two groups’ endorsements of reciprocity were 
not correlated with their sense of obligation to reuse the towel.  Goldstein et al. (2011) 
contend the results demonstrate behavior was driven not by appeals to save the 
environment, but rather in order to repay the favor of the donation made on their behalf.  
The act of the favor activated the injunctive norm that others have an expectation for 
them to repay the favor by hanging up their towel. 
 Bockenholt and van der Heijden (2007) analyzed what caused people to 




perceived beliefs of their friends and family, considered social control and not 
government regulations. Cialdini (2007) contends this is a prime example of injunctive 
norms at work in the decision process.  The expected disapproval of their close 
acquaintances for not abiding by the insurance regulations drove the decision to comply. 
Duning et al. (2014) investigated the role of injunctive norms within the trust 
game.  The trust game is the same paradigm utilized by Halali et al. (2014) and developed 
by Berg, et al. (1995).  Dunning et al. investigated trust and injunctive norms and not 
reciprocity explicitly, although parallels can be drawn to reciprocity.  Their work should 
be drawn upon in future reciprocity research. 
According to Dunning et al. (2014) people trust strangers much more than what a 
typical economist would deem as rational, although their explanation is not because 
people are using heuristics.  The authors contend individuals are being rational, but the 
decisions are not about the best financial outcome, instead individuals are considering 
what others think they should do. This is not an ethical decision to do what is right vs 
wrong but driven by adhering to others’ expectations.  In addition, behaving in ways that 
are congruent with how they should behave, people are able to avoid feelings of guilt and 
anxiety.  
Dunning et al. (2014) provided evidence of their assertions in which the 
participants took on the role of the first mover in the trust game.  The first experiment had 
38 participants answer a series questions in three different scenarios. The first scenario 
asked participants how many winning balls would have to be in an urn, containing 100 




framed as them being the original giver in a trust game scenario.  They could either keep 
$5 or give it to the receiver in which it would be quadrupled to $20.  The receiver could 
then give $10 back or keep the $20 for themselves. Participants indicated what they 
“wanted” to do and what they “should” do in this situation using a seven-point scale with 
the higher poles being want to give or should give and the low being want to keep and 
should keep. Next, they rated how giving the $5 would make them feel along 14 
emotions and repeated the same rating for keeping the money. Participants also estimated 
the percentage of receivers would return $10 versus keep all the money.  The last 
scenario asked participants if they would rather receive $5 or gamble on a coin flip where 
they would receive $10 if they won and nothing if they lost. 
The results of Dunning et al. (2014) demonstrated people trusted too much in 
relation to their expectations about other’s trustworthiness. Seventy-one percent of 
participants decided to give their $5 to other person on the trust game while predicting 
only 52.5% of receivers would return $10.  In contrast, participants required 63.8% of the 
balls in the urn to be winners to gamble $5 to win $10.  The authors also discounted 
descriptive norms as an explanation for this pattern of behavior as participants thought 
only 48.6% of other participants would trust the givers to return money.  Descriptive 
norms are modeling your behavior off how others behave (Kallgren , Reno & Cialdini, 
2000). Further evidence for injunctive norms being the driving force of behavior were the 
“want” and “should” ratings for giving/ keeping the money.   Participants were 
indifferent in “wanting” to trust the receiver with a rating at the midpoint (M = 3.97) 
while the average participant indicated they should trust the other person (M = 5.50).  An 




trusting for emotions associated with content and then agitation.  Participants were more 
content when trusting versus not trusting although agitation was a better predictor of 
trusting behavior. Participants experienced more agitation when thinking about not 
trusting versus trusting the receiver.  These findings should be tested in a reciprocity 
context.  Feelings of “should trust” are more predictive of behavior than “want to trust”.  
When an individual does a favor for someone else, and then asks for some form of 
repayment, the norm of reciprocity says the receiver is obliged to repay the favor.  The 
original giver creates conditions where the original receiver feels as if they “should trust” 
the giver and repay the favor, even if they may not “want to” reciprocate.  
The act of refusing a request can be a norm violation resulting in agitation for the 
refuser (Ackerman & Kenrick, 2008; Anderson & Dunning, 2014). Flynn and Lake 
(2008) explored the likelihood of others to comply with requests from a social cost 
perspective from both the help seeker and help giver’s perspective.  They found that help-
seekers often do not take into consideration the pressure put on the potential helper to not 
violate the norm of benevolence by refusing the request for help (Brown & Levinson, 
1987; Flynn & Lake, 2008). This discounting of the helper’s feelings results in an 
underestimation in the likelihood potential helpers comply with requests. These 
conclusions raise interesting questions regarding the power of reciprocity and the 
conditions in which it is easiest to employ by the original favor giver?  Does providing a 
favor first make it easier to ask for a return favor? Does the original favor giver see it 
harder for the norm of benevolence harder to violate in the refusing the request? Does an 




words, reciprocity might be a moderator for adherence to the injunctive norm of 
benevolence.   
In one experiment, Flynn and Lake (2008) randomly assigned 63 participants to 
either the help seeker or help giver roles.  Participants read four different helping 
scenarios from the perceptive of their respective role (e.g., asking a roommate to provide 
feedback on a paper vs. having your roommate ask you for feedback). Next, they 
answered questions including three about the discomfort the potential helper would feel if 
they refused to comply with the request. The results showed the participants in the help 
giver role rated the social cost of saying no significantly higher than those in the help 
seeker role.  The authors contented this is evidence for higher than expected compliance 
rates with potential help givers. The injunctive norm/ social cost of saying no, drove them 
to say yes. One could contend the reason an individual will comply with a request, in a 
reciprocity scenario, is due to the injunctive norm. The social expectation to say “yes” 
and the social cost of saying “no” to repay a favor, is what drives an individual to 
comply.  
Flynn and Lake (2008) ran an additional experiment that shed light on injunctive 
norms and compliance.  The next study was conceptually the same to the previous 
experiment, but also included a social cost variable by direct versus indirect requests for 
help (e.g., A woman needs help carrying a stroller down the subway stairs by catching 
your eye vs explicitly asking for help). The results showed the potential helpers complied 
with the requests more when asked directly than when asked indirectly. An opposite 
pattern was observed when help seekers predicted compliance of the potential helper, 




is even more evidence that potential helpers pay more attention to the social cost/ 
injunctive norms of saying no than those who ask the favor.  The social pressure to 
comply with the request is more intense for direct requests than indirect requests. As in 
the previous experiments conducted by Flynn and Lake (2008), the results of this study 
points to the power of injunctive norms and the pressure it puts people under to say “yes” 
when asked for a favor.  The question remains if adding the element of reciprocity to this 
context would increase the compliance rates when someone is asked directly to repay a 
favor.  
Rationale 
The literature review outlined many theories that could explain why a person 
would reciprocate a favor, even when doing so is against their self- interest.  Possible 
explanations for this type of behavior were categorized into three categories: normative 
models, ethical decisions and social normative decision models. These models were 
applied in specific contexts of reciprocity and are not universal.  The aim of this 
dissertation is to shed light on which theory receives the most support for why someone 
would move forward with an agreement that is clearly not to their benefit, just because 
they received an unsolicited favor.  
Normative models suggest people are rational actors and will make decisions that 
result in the most good for themselves.  People’s interpretation of goodness can be 
contextual and not necessarily based on maximizing utility or financial outcomes.  The 
research reviewed in this paper contends people’s goal when deciding to reciprocate 




realize their goal. These explanations are plausible in the contexts of their respective 
experiments. While the findings are informative, they fall short of offering a universal 
explanation of reciprocal behavior at the cost of their self-interest. These studies did not 
offer the opportunity for dialogue between the favor giver and receiver, that is typical in 
consumer situations. Some of the studies utilized simulated games, without a real person 
on the other side. The underlying theory of punishing someone in the name of fairness via 
negative reciprocity, at your own expense, cannot be applied to someone who has been 
given a favor and then asked to agree to something they know is disadvantageous to 
them. There may be other theoretical explanations why someone would move forward 
with a disadvantageous agreement, after receiving a favor. 
The second section of the literature review reviewed studies on ethical decision 
making and how it can lead to someone to act against their own interests when faced with 
reciprocity.  In certain circumstances, people will make decisions based on ethical and 
moral grounds, irrespective of the consequences or their detriment.  It is possible that 
when someone receives help or a favor, they will feel an ethical obligation to reciprocate. 
Some have argued the norm of reciprocity stems from evolution.  We feel an ethical 
responsibility to help others because groups whose members helped each other and were 
not selfish survived and passed those traits onto future generations. There are ample 
examples of the intersection of ethics and reciprocity in our daily lives. The situation 
where someone feels indebted to someone else due to a favor can present an ethical 
dilemma.  There is ethical pressure to return the favor, even though the act of returning 
the favor can be unethical, putting the favor returner in potential jeopardy. This 




limits and boundary conditions in which someone would violate their ethics because they 
received an unsolicited favor. 
The final category covered in the literature review was social normative decision 
models and reciprocity.   Injunctive norms say people will behave in ways that others 
think they ought to.  In the context of reciprocity, others have an expectation favors will 
be repaid.  This could lead to someone satisfying this expectation by reciprocating 
behavior that is against their self-interest. There is currently a gap in the literature with no 
published studies, to the author’s knowledge, that investigate injunctive norms and direct 
reciprocity that results in the return favor being detrimental to the second mover. This 
dissertation will attempt to fill this gap. 
The theories and studies outlined in the literature review shed light on what is 
known about why people act against their self-interest in the context of reciprocity. This 
dissertation contributes to the decision making and consumer behavior literature by 
exploring the gaps that exist about reciprocating behavior that is detrimental to the 
reciprocator. Several questions will be explored in this dissertation. Why would someone 
not ask clarifying questions, when they are faced with a request that is clearly fraudulent 
and/or disadvantageous to them?  Does trust level of the original favor giver impact 
reciprocal behavior? What are the boundary conditions in which someone would violate 
their ethics because they received a favor? These questions are important to explore in 
order to develop a better understanding about the dark side of reciprocity. Further 
understating could help create interventions for people to make better decisions including 





In experiment 1, participants were asked to sign a bogus consent form, which 
states they owe a $10 research fee for taking part in the experiment.  Half of the 
participants received an unsolicited gift consisting of a can of Diet Coke and small bag of 
pretzels (favor condition) when they arrive at the lab.  The other half did not receive any 
gift (no favor condition). Any questions a participant asked were  inconspicuously written 
down by the researcher. The researcher also recorded if the participants sign the bogus 
consent form. The participant then answered questions about the bogus consent form 
process and attitude towards the researcher. Following the predictions of the norm of 
reciprocity, focus theory of normative conduct and salient injunctive norms, the 
following hypotheses were developed. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I: Participants assigned to the favor condition will sign the bogus consent 
from, with the $10 research fee, more often than participants assigned to no favor 
condition. 
 
This hypothesis was based on the well-established norm of reciprocity that people 
feel an obligation to repay a favor to those that provided a favor to them (Gouldner, 
1960). Favors generate a sense of obligation in the receiver (Goranson & Berkowitz, 
1966).  Cialdini (2009) has demonstrated that this obligation will make it more likely for 
a favor receiver to say “yes” to a request from a favor giver.  The predicted results are 
contrary to what traditional normative models, such as Becker’s (1976) rational choice 
theory, would predict. In this experiment, the researcher is asking for compliance from 





Hypothesis II: Participants assigned to the favor condition will be less likely to ask 
questions about the $10 research fee than participants assigned to no favor condition. 
 
Hypothesis III: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the 
researcher as cooperative, the more likely they will be to sign the bogus consent form 
with the $10 research fee.  
 
Hypothesis IV: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the 
researcher as cooperative, the less likely they will be to question the bogus consent form 
with the $10 research fee. 
 
 Hypotheses II, III and IV were developed based on previous research that 
injunctive norms influence behavior due to social expectations (Jacobson, Mortensen & 
Cialdini, 2011; White & Simpson, 2013). Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) demonstrated 
people are motivated to create and maintain relationships and will consciously adapt their 
behavior to gain social approval.   
The premise of focus theory of normative conduct is that when an expectation for 
social approval is salient, individual will adjust their behavior to align with others’ 
expectations (Cialdini et al, 1990). The expectation in this case is to be cooperative and 
not question a request of the researcher who just provided a favor to the individual. There 
would be a social cost to being viewed as uncooperative by questioning the researcher’s 
request, which influences people to comply with a request that is disadvantageous to 
them without asking any questions.   
 
Hypothesis V: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to be 
perceived as cooperative will sign the bogus consent form with the $10 research fee more 
than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as 
cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is expected that there will be a 
magnification of receiving a favor effects in participants who believe it is important to be 
perceived as cooperative relative to participants who do not believe it is important to be 





Hypothesis VI: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to 
be perceived as cooperative will question the bogus consent form with the $10 research 
fee less than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be 
perceived as cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is expected that there 
will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in participants who believe it is 
important to be perceived as cooperative relative to participants who do not believe it is 
important to be perceived as cooperative. 
 
Hypotheses V and VI were developed based on the focus theory of normative 
conduct and the norm of reciprocity. An injunctive norm must be salient to change 
behavior (Cialdini et al., 1990; Kallgren et al., 2000). Attending to injunctive norms takes 
cognitive effort. which can lead to ignoring downstream consequences (Jacobson et al., 
2011; Morris et al., 2015). When there is a salient expectation to be viewed as 
cooperative, it will magnify the effects of the norm of reciprocity.  In this case, 
participants who receive a favor and rate being perceived as cooperative as important will 
repay the favor by not questioning and moving forward with a disadvantageous 
agreement more than participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as 
cooperative and repay the favor. 
 
Hypothesis VII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher are no more 
likely to sign the bogus consent from, with the $10 research fee, than participants who 
have a low level of trust in the researcher.  
 
Hypothesis VIII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher are not less 
likely question the $10 research fee, than participants who have a low level of trust in the 
researcher.   
 
 
Hypotheses VII and VIII are consistent with the focus theory of normative 
conduct, self-discrepancy theory and the norm of reciprocity.  The focus theory of 
normative conduct says people will behave in pro-social ways that others around them 




when someone does a favor for someone else there is an expectation that favor will be 
returned.  Dunning et al. (2014) showed people will outwardly behave in ways that show 
they trust others, when in fact, they privately feel they should not. Asch (1951) found 
people will conform their public behavior to fit others’ expectations to avoid social 
disapproval, even when they knew what they were saying out loud was false.  
Self-discrepancy theory demonstrates people will feel agitated and anxious when 
they do not live up to social obligations and will alter their behavior to avoid these 
feelings (Higgins, 1987; Higgins et al., 1997; Roney and Sorrentino, 1995). Based on the 
previous research on the theory normative conduct, self-discrepancy theory and the norm 
of reciprocity participants who do not trust the researcher will not question the $10 
research fee or refuse to sign the disadvantageous agreement more frequently than 
participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher.  Figure 1 is a chart that 
displays the types of models that experiment 1 attempts to support and refute. 
Figure 1 
Experiment 1’s Hypotheses’ Models of Interest 
Note. These are the hypotheses’ predictions, not results 
Method  
Participants 
Models Supported Models Refuted 
   
Social Normative  




There were 123 undergraduate student participants (79 female; mean age 19.9 
years) from a large Midwestern private university who completed the study in exchange 
for course credit.  They were recruited from an experimental management system hosted 
and administered by the psychology department of that university.   
Study design 
The experiment utilized a 2 (Reciprocity: favor, no favor) × 1 (Research fee: 
$10.00) between-subjects design. 
Procedure 
The experimental data collection was conducted in the Psychology Department 
laboratories of a supervising faculty member of the large Midwestern private university.  
Participants believed they were taking part in a “consumer decision survey study” as 
stated in the psychology department’s experimental management registration system 
when they signed up. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental 
conditions.  Upon arriving, the researcher said, "Thank you for coming in. Please have a 
seat.  Hold on one second while I grab something."  The researcher returned from the 
other side of the room a few seconds later.   
In the favor condition, the researcher returned with two cans of Diet Coke and 
two small bags of pretzels.  They handed the can of pop and package of pretzels to the 
participant and said, "I got a Diet Coke and snack for myself and thought you would like 
something too."  If the participant refused the Diet Coke and/ or pretzels, the researcher 




In the no favor condition, the researcher returned and began the experiment. 
Next, every participant was asked to read a bogus informed consent form which 
included a $10.00 research fee (Appendix A). Within the bogus consent form there was a 
section labeled "How much is the research fee?" Within this section the following text 
was in 16pt bold and red font, "You will be charged a $10.00 research fee for your 
participation in this experiment. You will see the fee added as a student activity fee on 
your tuition account." The description in the experiment in the registration system did not 
mention anything about a fee. There was not actually any fee charged, and they were be 
debriefed as to such at the completion of the experiment.   The rest of the consent form 
was in black 10pt font. 
If the participant questioned the terms of the bogus consent form, the researcher 
said “I am only running the experiment and are not familiar with the terms of the form.” 
If the participant refused to sign the form, the researcher debriefed the participant as to 
the true nature of the experiment and told them there is no research fee.  The researcher 
then asked the participant to sign the true consent form and ask if they would continue 
with the survey questions. The participant was also informed they were free to leave with 
no negative consequences and would still receive their participation credit regardless of 
whether continuing with the experiment or not.  
If the participant signed the original consent form, the researcher informed them 
the form they just signed is bogus. The researcher debriefed the participant as to the true 
nature of the experiment and told them there was no fee and ripped the bogus consent 




consent form and ask if they would continue with the survey questions. The participant 
was also be informed they were free to leave with no negative consequences and would 
receive their participation credit regardless of whether they continued with the 
experiment or not.  
The researcher inconspicuously timed and recorded how long it took the 
participant to read each of the consent forms.  The researcher also recorded if the 
participant questioned the research fee on the bogus consent form. 
Participants were then asked to complete a survey with questions about the bogus 
consent from process and demographics (Appendix B). 
Results 
Hypothesis I: Participants assigned to the favor condition will sign the bogus 
consent form, with the $10 research fee, more often than participants assigned to no 
favor condition. 
 
A Fisher’s exact test, and not a chi-square test of independence, was performed to 
examine the relation between receiving a favor and signing the bogus consent with a $10 
research fee because there were zero participants who did not sign the bogus consent 
form in the favor condition.  The results did not support Hypothesis I and indicated a 
non-significant increase in the rate participants signed the bogus consent form for those 
who received a favor 100% (61/61) compared to 97% (60/62) who did not receive a favor 
(p = .496, Fisher's exact test). 
Hypothesis II: Participants assigned to the favor condition will be less likely to ask 






A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between 
receiving a favor and questioning the $10 research fee on the bogus consent form. The 
relation between these variables was significant, X2 (1, N = 123) = 7.3, p = .007. The 
results support Hypothesis II that participants who received a favor of a can of Diet Coke 
and bag of pretzels were less likely to question the $10 research fee on the bogus consent 
form that obligates them to pay $10 than participants who did not receive the favor. 
Hypothesis III: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the 
researcher as cooperative, the more likely they will be to sign the bogus consent 
form with the $10 research fee.    
 
Hypothesis V: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them 
to be perceived as cooperative will sign the bogus consent form with the $10 
research fee more than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not 
important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is 
expected that there will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in 
participants who believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative relative to 
participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative.  
 
Model without the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was 
conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as 
cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict signing a bogus consent 
form with a $10 research fee. The outcome of interest is signing the bogus consent form 
(Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, No), importance 
of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7). The Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant (p = .211) indicating the model is correctly 
specified.  Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 93.507 and the Nagelkerke R squared = 
.166. The results did not support Hypothesis III. The model resulted in all the IVs as not 
significant. Receiving a favor β = 17.898, SE = 4881.334, Wald = 0.00, p = .997. 




and trust in the researcher β = -.977, SE = 1.006, Wald = .942, p = .332. The correlation 
matrix is presented in Table 1. Logistic regression results are presented in Table 2. 
Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Predictor Variables for Signing 
$10 Form- Without Interaction 
 Measure M SD 1 2 3 
1. Receiving a favor 
  
-   
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative 5.53 1.41 .000 -  
3. Trust in researcher 5.71 1.17 .000 -.061 - 
Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust  
in researcher: 1- Not at all to 7- Completely 
 
Table 2 
Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Signing of $10 Form- Without Interaction 
  Signing of $10 bogus consent form  
Variable β SE OR [95% CI] 
Constant 10.60 7.12  
Receiving a favor 17.90 4881.33 59313401.77 [.000, -] 
Importance of being 
perceived as cooperative -0.21 0.53 0.81 [.28, 2.30] 
Trust in researcher -0.97 1.01 0.38 [.05, 2.71] 
Note. R2 = .23 (Nagelkerke).  
 
A separate model was run to test for an interaction between receiving a favor x 
importance of being perceived as cooperative. 
Model with the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was 




cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict signing a bogus consent 
form with a $10 research fee. The outcome of interest was signing the bogus consent 
form (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, No), 
importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7) and the 
interaction of receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative. The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant (p = .936) indicating the model is 
correctly specified.  Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 16.055 and the Nagelkerke R 
squared = .229. The model resulted in all of the IVs to be not significant. Receiving a 
favor from the researcher β = 15.00, SE = 22027.12, Wald =.000, p = .999.  importance 
of being perceived as cooperative β = -0.212, SE = .533, Wald =.158, p = .691, Trust in 
the researcher β = -0.977, SE = 1.006, Wald = .942, p = .332.  
The results did not support hypothesis V. The interaction of IVs receiving a favor 
x importance of being perceived as cooperative was also not significant β = 0.495, SE = 
3858.648, Wald = .000, p = 1.00. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 3 Logistic 
regression are presented in Table 4. 
Table 3 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Predictor Variables for Signing 
$10 Form- With Interaction 
 Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Receiving a favor 
  
-    
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative 5.53 1.41 .000 -   
3. Trust in researcher 5.71 1.17 .000 -.061 -  
4. Receiving a favor *  Importance of being 
perceived as cooperative 
  
-.974 .000 .000 - 
Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust  





Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Signing $10 Form- With Interaction 
  Signing of $10 bogus consent form  
Variable β SE OR [95% CI] 
Constant 10.60 7.12  
Receiving a favor 15.00 22027.12 3267699.17 [.000, -] 
Importance of being 
perceived as cooperative -0.21 0.53 0.81 [.28, 2.30] 
Trust in researcher -0.98 1.01 0.38 [.05, 2.71] 
 
Receiving a favor x 
importance of being 
perceived as cooperative 
0.50 3858.65 40189.16 [.000, -] 
Note. R2 = .23 (Nagelkerke).  
Hypothesis IV: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the 
researcher as cooperative, the less likely they will be to question the bogus consent 
form with the $10 research fee.  
 
Hypothesis VI: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for 
them to be perceived as cooperative will question the bogus consent form with the 
$10 research fee less than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not 
important to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is 
expected that there will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in 
participants who believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative relative to 
participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative. 
 
Model without the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was 
conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as 
cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict questioning a $10 research 
fee on a bogus consent form. The outcome of interest is questioning the $10 research fee 
on the bogus consent form (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a 
favor (Yes, No), importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the 




indicating the model is correctly specified.  Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 93.507 
and the Nagelkerke R squared = .166. The results did not support Hypothesis IV. The 
model resulted in the IV trust in the researcher β = .358, SE = .263, Wald = 1.860, p = 
.173 and importance of being perceived as cooperative β = .266, SE = .208, Wald = 
1.640, p = .200 as not significant.  Controlling for importance of being perceived as 
cooperative, and trust in the researcher, the predicter variable, receiving a favor was 
significant and found to contribute to the model β = -1.654, SE = .612, Wald = 7.312, p = 
.007, further evidence supporting Hypothesis II. The estimated odds ratio indicated that 
receiving a favor resulted in a decrease of 80.9% in the likelihood of questioning the $10 
research fee on the bogus consent form, Exp(β) = .191, 95% CI (.058, .634).  The 
correlation matrix is presented in Table 5. Logistic regression results are presented in 
Table 6. 
Table 5 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Predictor Variables for 
Questioning $10 Fee- Without Interaction 
 Measure M SD 1 2 3 
1. Receiving a favor 
  
-   
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative 5.53 1.41 -.066 -  
3. Trust in researcher 5.71 1.17 -.127 -.145 - 
Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust  





















Note. R2 = .17 (Nagelkerke). *p < .01. 
 
A separate model was run to test for an interaction between receiving a favor x 
importance of being perceived as cooperative. 
 Model with the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was 
conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as 
cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict questioning a $10 research 
fee on a bogus consent form. The outcome of interest was questioning the $10 research 
fee (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, No), 
importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7) and the 
interaction of receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative. The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant (p = .210) indicating the model is 
correctly specified.  Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 93.340 and the Nagelkerke R 
squared = .168. The model resulted in all of the IVs to be not significant. Receiving a 
favor from the researcher β = -3.102, SE = 3.758, Wald = 0.681, p = .409, Importance of 
  Questioning of $10 bogus research fee  
Variable β SE OR [95% CI] 
Constant -4.71 1.84  
Receiving a favor -1.65 0.61 0.19 [.058, .634]* 
Importance of being 
perceived as cooperative 0.27 0.21 1.31 [.87, 1.96] 




being perceived as cooperative β = 0.231, SE = 0.221, Wald =1.095, p = .295, Trust in 
the researcher β = 0.347, SE = 0.263, Wald = 1.740, p = .187.  
The results did not support hypothesis VI. The interaction of IVs receiving a favor 
x importance of being perceived as cooperative was also not significant β = 0.239, SE = 
0.604, Wald = 0.156, p = .692. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 7. Logistic 
regression results are presented in Table 8. 
Table 7 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Between Predictor Variables for 
Questioning $10 Fee- With Interaction 
 Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Receiving a favor 
  
-    
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative 5.53 1.41 .329 -   
3. Trust in researcher 5.71 1.17 .077 -.088 -  
4. Receiving a favor *  Importance of being 
perceived as cooperative 
  
-.986 -.354 -.101 - 
Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust  






















Note. R2 = .17 (Nagelkerke).  
 
 
Hypothesis VII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher will be 
equivalent in their likelihood to sign the bogus consent from, with the $10 research 
fee, to participants who have a low level of trust in the researcher.  
 
Two one-sided tests (TOST) were conducted using a binary logistic regression to 
test for equivalency between participants who have low levels of trust in the researcher 
and participants who have high levels of trust in the researcher, in their likelihood to sign 
the bogus consent form. The outcome of interest is compliance in signing the bogus 
consent form (Yes, No) The predictor variable is level of trust participants had in the 
researcher (High, Low). Participants rated their level of trust in the researcher on a scale 
of 1 being very low to 7 very high. Participants who indicated their level of trust in the 
researcher as a 1, 2, 3 or 4 will be considered to have low trust in the researcher, while 
participants who answer with a 5, 6 or 7 will be considered to have high trust in the 
researcher. The TOST utilized a 90% confidence interval to produce two .05 alpha level 
tests. The effect size was determined by the conventional Cohen’s d medium effect size 
  Questioning of $10 bogus research fee  
Variable β SE OR [95% CI] 
Constant -4.44 1.94  
Receiving a favor -3.10 3.76 0.05 [.000, 71.06] 
Importance of being 
perceived as cooperative 0.23 0.22 1.26 [.82, 1.94] 
Trust in researcher 0.35 0.26 1.42 [.85, 2.37] 
 
Receiving a favor x 
importance of being 
perceived as cooperative 




of .499. This effect size was calculated into odds ratios that provides a lower equivalence 
bound of .405 and upper equivalence bound of 2.472.  In order for the two levels of trust 
to be significantly equivalent, the exp(β) and the lower and upper bound would need to 
fall within the parameters of the lower and upper odds ratio equivalence bounds of 90% 
CI [.405, 2.472.]  
The results did not support Hypothesis VII. The model did not find the two 
groups of low trust and high trust significantly equivalent in their likelihood to sign the 
bogus consent form exp(β) = 1.125, 90% CI [.476, 2.661]. See Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
TOST Equivalency Test- Likelihood to Sign $10 Form for High vs Low Levels of Trust 
Note. Effect size for boundaries based on Cohen’s d = .499, 90% CI 
 
Hypothesis VIII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher will be 
equivalent in their likelihood to question the $10 research fee in the bogus consent 
from, to participants who have a low level of trust in the researcher.  
 
A TOST was conducted using a binary logistic regression to test for equivalency 




have high levels of trust in the researcher, in their likelihood to question the $10 research 
fee in the bogus consent form. The outcome of interest is questioning the $10 research fee 
(Yes, No) The predictor variable is level of trust participants had in the researcher (High, 
Low). Participants rated their level of trust in the researcher on a scale of 1 being very 
low to 7 very high. Participants who indicated their level of trust in the researcher as a 1, 
2, 3 or 4 will be considered to have low trust in the researcher, while participants who 
answer with a 5, 6 or 7 will be considered to have high trust in the researcher. The TOST 
utilized a 90% confidence interval to produce two .05 alpha level tests. The effect size 
was determined by the conventional Cohen’s d medium effect size of .499. This effect 
size was calculated into odds ratios that provides a lower equivalence bound of .405 and 
upper equivalence bound of 2.472.  In order for the two levels of trust to be significantly 
equivalent, the exp(β) and the lower and upper bound would need to fall within the 
parameters of the lower and upper odds ratio equivalence bounds of 90% CI [.405, 
2.472.]  
The results did not support Hypothesis VIII. The model did not find the two 
groups of low trust and high trust significantly equivalent in their likelihood to question 
the $10 research fee in the bogus consent form exp(β) = 1.433, 90% CI [.386, 5.323]. See 










TOST Equivalency Test- Likelihood to Question $10 Fee for High vs Low Levels of Trust 
Note. Effect size for boundaries based on Cohen’s d = .499, 90% CI 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 used a procedure identical to that of experiment 1, except the 
research fee listed on the bogus consent form was now $89.56 (Appendix C) and three 
additional demographic questions were added the survey (Appendix D).  The larger fee 
was used to see if the magnitude of the fee impacts the power of reciprocity for people to 
question or move forward with a disadvantageous agreement.  Prior research has shown 
smaller requests have a greater compliance rate than similar larger requests (Freedman & 
Fraser, 1966; Petrova et al., 2007, Sherman, 1980). 
The fee in experiment 2 was almost nine times greater than in experiment 1. One 
might argue a fee of $10 is worth the one study credit a psychology pool participant 
receives for participating in the study. A fee of nearly $90 would be much harder for a 




in studies as a psychology student pool participant and no fee was mentioned in the 
registration system when they signed up to participate in the study. Figure 4 is a chart that 
displays the types of models that experiment 2 attempts to support and refute. 
Figure 4 
Experiment 2’s Hypotheses’ Models of Interest 
Note. These are the hypotheses’ predictions, not results 
 
Statement of Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis I: Participants assigned to the favor condition will sign the bogus consent 
from, with the $89.56 research fee, more often than participants assigned to no favor 
condition. 
 
Hypothesis II: Participants assigned to the favor condition will be less likely to ask 
questions about the $89.56 research fee than participants assigned to no favor condition. 
 
Hypothesis III: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the 
researcher as cooperative, the more likely they will be to sign the bogus consent form 
with the $89.56 research fee.  
 
Hypothesis IV: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the 
researcher as cooperative, the less likely they will be to question the bogus consent form 
with the $89.56 research fee. 
 
Hypothesis V: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to be 
perceived as cooperative will sign the bogus consent form with the $89.56 research fee 
more than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be 
perceived as cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is expected that there 
will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in participants who believe it is 
important to be perceived as cooperative relative to participants who do not believe it is 
important to be perceived as cooperative.  
 
Models Supported Models Refuted 
   
Social Normative  




Hypothesis VI: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to 
be perceived as cooperative will question the bogus consent form with the $89.56 
research fee less than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to 
be perceived as cooperative by the researcher. Stated differently, it is expected that there 
will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in participants who believe it is 
important to be perceived as cooperative relative to participants who do not believe it is 
important to be perceived as cooperative. 
 
Hypothesis VII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher are no more 
likely to sign the bogus consent from, with the $89.56 research fee, than participants who 
have a low level of trust in the researcher.  
 
Hypothesis VIII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher are not less 






There were 120 undergraduate student participants (87 female; mean age 20.0 
years) from a large Midwestern private university who completed the study in exchange 
for course credit.  They were recruited from an experimental management system hosted 
and administered by the psychology department of that university.   
Study design 
The experiment utilized a 2 (Reciprocity: favor, no favor) × 1 (Research fee: 
$89.56) between-subjects design. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, with the exception of the 
research fee being increased to $89.56 and answering three additional demographic 






Hypothesis I: Participants assigned to the favor condition will sign the bogus 
consent form, with the $89.56 research fee, more often than participants assigned to 
no favor condition. 
 
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between 
receiving a favor and signing the bogus consent form. The relation between these 
variables was significant, X2 (1, N = 120) = 5.78, p = .016. The results supported 
Hypothesis I.  Participants who received a favor of a can of Diet Coke and bag of pretzels 
were more likely to sign a bogus consent form that obligates them to pay $89.56 than 
participants who did not receive the favor. 
Hypothesis II: Participants assigned to the favor condition will be less likely to ask 
questions about the $89.56 research fee than participants assigned to no favor 
condition. 
 
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between 
receiving a favor and asking questions about a $89.56 research fee bogus consent form. 
The predicted relation between these variables was not significant, X2 (1, N = 120) = 
0.534, p = .465. The results did not support Hypothesis II. Participants who received a 
favor of a can of Diet Coke and bag of pretzels were no less likely to ask questions about 
the $89.56 research fee than participants who did not receive the favor. 
 
Hypothesis III: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the 
researcher as cooperative, the more likely they will be to sign the bogus consent 
form with the $89.56 research fee.  
 
Hypothesis V: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them 
to be perceived as cooperative will sign the bogus consent form with the $89.56 
research fee more than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not 




expected that there will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in 
participants who believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative relative to 
participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative.  
 
Model without the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was 
conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as 
cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict signing a bogus consent 
form with a $89.56 research fee. The outcome of interest is signing the bogus consent 
form (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, No), 
importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7). The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant (p = .615) indicating the model is 
correctly specified.  Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 113.021 and the Nagelkerke R 
squared = .179. The model resulted in the IV trust in the researcher as not significant β = 
.200, SE = .160, Wald = 1.558, p = .212.  Controlling for importance of being perceived 
as cooperative, and trust in the researcher, the predicter variable, receiving a favor was 
significant and found to contribute to the model β = 1.151, SE = .490, Wald = 5.506, p = 
.019, further supporting Hypothesis I. The estimated odds ratio indicated that receiving a 
favor resulted in an increase of 216.0% in the likelihood for signing the bogus consent 
form, Exp(β) = 3.160, 95% CI (1.209, 8.263).  The results also supported Hypothesis III. 
Controlling for receiving a favor and trust in the researcher, the predicter variable, 
importance of being perceived as cooperative, was also significant and found to 
contribute to the model β = .348, SE = .150, Wald = 5.389, p = .020. The estimated odds 
ratio indicated that for every unit increase in the importance of being perceived as 




form, Exp(β) = 1.416, 95% CI (1.056, 1.899).  The correlation matrix is presented in 
Table 9. Logistic regression results are presented in Table 10. 
Table 9  
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Predictor Variables for Signing 
$89 Form- Without Interaction 
 Measure M SD 1 2 3 
1. Receiving a favor 
  
-   
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative 5.15 1.56 .065 -  
3. Trust in researcher 5.28 1.48 .070 -.162 - 
Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust  
in researcher: 1- Not at all to 7- Completely 
 
Table 10 
Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Signing of $89 Form- Without Interaction 
  Signing of $89 bogus consent form  
Variable β SE OR [95% CI] 
Constant -1.99 1.04  
Receiving a favor 1.15 .49 3.16 [1.21, 8.26]* 
Importance of being 
perceived as cooperative 0.35 0.15 1.42[1.06, 1.90]* 
Trust in researcher 0.20 0.16 1.22 [.892, 1.68] 
Note. R2 = .18 (Nagelkerke). *p < .05. 
A separate model was run to test for an interaction between receiving a favor x 
importance of being perceived as cooperative. 
Model with the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was 
conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as 




form with a $89.56 research fee. The outcome of interest is signing the bogus consent 
form (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, No), 
importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7) and the 
interaction of receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative. The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant (p = .431) indicating the model is 
correctly specified.  Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 112.990 and the Nagelkerke R 
squared = .179. The model resulted in the following IVs as not significant; Receiving a 
favor from the researcher β = 1.408, SE = 1.556, Wald = 0.819, p = .366, Trust in the 
researcher β = 0.201, SE = 0.161, Wald = 1.562, p = .211. Controlling for receiving a 
favor and trust in the researcher, the predicter variable, importance of being perceived as 
cooperative, was significant and found to contribute to the model β = 0.366, SE = 0.183, 
Wald = 3.983, p = .046. The estimated odds ratio indicated that for every unit increase in 
the importance of being perceived as cooperative, there is an increase of 44.2% in the 
likelihood for signing the bogus consent form, Exp(β) = 1.442, 95% CI (1.007, 2.065).   
The results did not support Hypothesis V. The interaction of IVs receiving a favor 
x importance of being perceived as cooperative was not significant β = -0.055, SE = 
0.314, Wald = .031, p = .86. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 11. Logistic 









Table 11  
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Predictor Variables for Signing 
$89 Form- With Interaction 
 Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Receiving a favor 
  
-    
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative 5.15 1.56 .555 -   
3. Trust in researcher 5.28 1.48 .056 -.113 -  
4. Receiving a favor *  Importance of being 
perceived as cooperative 
  
-.949 -.572 -.036 - 
Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust  
in researcher: 1- Not at all to 7- Completely 
 
Table 12 
Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Signing of $89 Form- With Interaction 
  Signing of $89 bogus consent form  
Variable β SE OR [95% CI] 
Constant -2.08 1.17  
Receiving a favor 1.41 1.56 4.09 [.19, 86.39] 
Importance of being 
perceived as cooperative 0.37 0.18 1.44 [1.07, 2.07]* 
Trust in researcher 0.20 0.16 1.22 [.892, 1.68] 
 
Receiving a favor x 
importance of being 
perceived as cooperative 
-0.06 0.31 0.95 [.51, 1.75] 
Note. R2 = .18 (Nagelkerke). *p < .05. 
Hypothesis IV: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the 
researcher as cooperative, the less likely they will be to question the bogus consent 
form with the $89.56 research fee.  
 
 
Hypothesis VI: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for 
them to be perceived as cooperative will question the bogus consent form with the 
$89.56 research fee less than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not 




expected that there will be a magnification of receiving a favor effects in 
participants who believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative relative to 
participants who do not believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative. 
 
Model without the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was 
conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as 
cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict questioning the $89.56 
research fee on the bogus consent form. The outcome of interest is questioning the $89.56 
research fee (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, 
No), importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7). The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant (p = .939) indicating the model is 
correctly specified.  Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 161.330 and the Nagelkerke R 
squared = .053. The results did not support Hypothesis IV.  The model resulted in all the 
IVs as not significant. Receiving a favor β = -.254, SE = 0.373, Wald = 0.465, p = .495. 
importance of being perceived as cooperative β = -.246, SE = .129 Wald = 3.630, p = 
.057, and trust in the researcher β = -.022, SE = 0.133, Wald = .027, p = .869. The 
correlation matrix is presented in Table 13. Logistic regression results are presented in 
Table 14. 
Table 13 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationss Between Predictor Variables for 
Questioning $89 Fee- Without Interaction 
 Measure M SD 1 2 3 
1. Receiving a favor 
  
-   
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative      5.15 1.56 -.008 -  
3. Trust in researcher 5.28 1.48 .021 -.275 - 
Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust  






Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Questioning $89 Fee- Without Interaction 
  Questioning of $89 bogus research fee  
Variable β SE OR [95% CI] 
Constant 1.44 0.87  
Receiving a favor -0.25 0.73 0.78 [.37, 1.61] 
Importance of being 
perceived as cooperative -0.25 0.13 0.78 [.61, 1.01] 
Trust in researcher 0-.02 0.13 0.98 [.76, 1.27] 
Note. R2 = .053 (Nagelkerke).  
A separate model was run to test for an interaction between receiving a favor x 
importance of being perceived as cooperative. 
Model with the interaction term: A binary logistic regression analysis was 
conducted to investigate if receiving a favor, importance of being perceived as 
cooperative, and trust in the researcher are factors that predict questioning the $89.56 
research fee on a bogus consent form. The outcome of interest is questioning the $89.56 
research fee (Yes, No). The possible predictor variables were: receiving a favor (Yes, 
No), importance of being perceived as cooperative (1-7), trust in the researcher (1-7) and 
the interaction of receiving a favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative. The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant (p = .818) indicating the model is 
correctly specified.  Additionally, the -2 log-likelihood = 161.310 and the Nagelkerke R 
squared = .053. The model resulted in the all the IVs being not significant; Receiving a 
favor from the researcher β = -0.071, SE = 1.342, Wald =.003, p = .958, Trust in the 
researcher β = -0.021, SE = 0.133, Wald = 0.025, p = .874. Importance of being 




The results did not support Hypothesis VI. The interaction of IVs receiving a 
favor x importance of being perceived as cooperative was not significant β = -0.036, SE = 
0.249, Wald = 0.020, p = .887. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 15. Logistic 
regression results are presented in Table 16. 
Table 15 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Predictor Variables for 
Questioning $89 Fee- With Interaction 
 Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Receiving a favor 
  
-    
2. Importance of being perceived as cooperative 5.15 1.56 .622 -   
3. Trust in researcher 5.28 1.48 .048 -.180 -  
4. Receiving a favor *  Importance of being 
perceived as cooperative 
  
-.961 -.650 -.044 - 
Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important. Trust  
in researcher: 1- Not at all to 7- Completely 
 
Table 16 
Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Questioning $89 Fee- With Interaction 
  Questioning of $89 bogus research fee  
Variable β SE OR [95% CI] 
Constant 1.36 1.05  
Receiving a favor -0.07 1.34 0.93 [.07, 12.94] 
Importance of being 
perceived as cooperative -0.23 0.17 0.80 [.57, 1.11] 
Trust in researcher 0-.02 0.13 0.98 [.76, 1.27] 
 
Receiving a favor x 
importance of being 
perceived as cooperative 
-0.04 0.25 0.97 [.59, 1.57] 




Hypothesis VII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher will be 
equivalent in their likelihood to sign the bogus consent from, with the $89.56 
research fee, to participants who have a low level of trust in the researcher.  
 
A TOST was conducted using a binary logistic regression to test for equivalency 
between participants who have low levels of trust in the researcher and participants who 
have high levels of trust in the researcher, in their likelihood to sign the bogus consent 
form. The outcome of interest is compliance in signing the bogus consent form (Yes, No) 
The predictor variable is level of trust participants had in the researcher (High, Low). 
Participants rated their level of trust in the researcher on a scale of 1 being very low to 7 
very high. Participants who indicated their level of trust in the researcher as a 1, 2, 3 or 4 
will be considered to have low trust in the researcher, while participants who answer with 
a 5, 6 or 7 will be considered to have high trust in the researcher. The TOST utilized a 
90% confidence interval to produce two .05 alpha level tests.  The effect size was 
determined by the conventional Cohen’s d medium effect size of .499. This effect size 
was calculated into odds ratios that provides a lower equivalence bound of .405 and 
upper equivalence bound of 2.472.  In order for the two levels of trust to be significantly 
equivalent, the exp(β) and the lower and upper bound would need to fall within the 
parameters of the lower and upper odds ratio equivalence bounds of 90% CI [.405, 
2.472.]  
The results did not support Hypothesis VII. The model did not find the two 
groups of low trust and high trust significantly equivalent in their likelihood to sign the 







TOST Equivalency Test- Likelihood to Sign $89 Form for High vs Low Levels of Trust 
Note. Effect size for boundaries based on Cohen’s d = .499, 90% CI 
 
Hypothesis VIII: Participants who have a high level of trust in the researcher will be 
equivalent in their likelihood to question the $89.56 research fee in the bogus 
consent from, to participants who have a low level of trust in the researcher.  
 
A TOST was conducted using a binary logistic regression to test for equivalency 
between participants who have low levels of trust in the researcher and participants who 
have high levels of trust in the researcher, in their likelihood to question the $89.56 
research fee in the bogus consent form. The outcome of interest is questioning the $89.56 
research fee (Yes, No) The predictor variable is level of trust participants had in the 
researcher (High, Low). Participants rated their level of trust in the researcher on a scale 
of 1 being very low to 7 very high. Participants who indicated their level of trust in the 
researcher as a 1, 2, 3 or 4 will be considered to have low trust in the researcher, while 
participants who answer with a 5, 6 or 7 will be considered to have high trust in the 
researcher. The TOST utilized a 90% confidence interval to produce two .05 alpha level 
tests. The effect size was determined by the conventional Cohen’s d medium effect size 




bound of .405 and upper equivalence bound of 2.472.  In order for the two levels of trust 
to be significantly equivalent, the exp(β) and the lower and upper bound would need to 
fall within the parameters of the lower and upper odds ratio equivalence bounds of CI 
[.405, 2.472.]  
The results did not support Hypothesis VIII. The model did not find the two 
groups of low trust and high trust to be significantly equivalent in their likelihood to 
question the $89.56 research fee in the bogus consent form exp(β) = .721, 90% CI [.379, 
1.371]. See Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 
TOST Equivalency Test- Likelihood to Question $89 Fee for High vs Low Levels of Trust 
Note. Effect size for boundaries based on Cohen’s d = .499, 90% CI 
 
Discussion- Experiments 1 and 2 
The aim of Experiments 1 and 2 was to explore people’s susceptibility to comply 




the impact of small unsolicited favors on complying with and questioning fraudulent 
requests. Additionally, underlying factors such as the importance to be perceived as 
cooperative, trust in the requester and the dollar amount of the fraudulent request were 
considered in how they may contribute to compliance and questioning of the 
unscrupulous request.  
The results indicate that a small favor does make people more susceptible to a 
subsequent fraudulent request. In the $89.56 condition, the unsolicited favor led people to 
be more compliant and susceptible to paying the unwarranted fee.  The $10 condition did 
not show a significant increase in compliance rates, although this result does not provide 
evidence against the power of reciprocity.  In fact, there was 100% compliance in the 
favor condition. An explanation for the non-significant result could be the compliance 
rate was also high in the no favor condition, with 97% of the participants signing the $10 
bogus consent form, which masked any reciprocity effects. These results are consistent 
with past reciprocity findings that favors generate a sense of obligation in the receiver 
and make it more likely they will comply with a subsequent request (Cialdini, 2009; 
Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; Gouldner, 1960).  
The hypotheses predicting that a small favor would make it less likely for 
someone to ask questions about a subsequent fraudulent request saw mixed results. The 
$10 condition resulted in individuals who received a favor questioning the $10 research 
fee significantly less than those who did not receive a favor.  In fact, individuals who 
received a favor were almost four times less likely to question the fee than those who did 
not receive a favor, with the questioning rates being 6.56% and 24.19% respectively.  




theory of normative conduct, in that when an expectation for social approval is salient, 
individuals will adjust their behavior to align with others’ expectations (Cialdini et al, 
1990; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; White & Simpson, 2013). The expectation in this case 
is to go along to get along and not question the request of the researcher who just 
provided the individual with an unsolicited favor.  
The $89.56 research fee scenario did not see the same pattern of results as the $10 
fee scenario.  There was no significant difference in the questioning rates between the 
favor an no favor conditions with the $89.56 research fee.  Questioning rates were higher 
in the $89.56 scenario than the $10 scenario, with the $89.56 fee resulting in 51.67% of 
individuals questioning the fee who did not receive a favor and 45.00% who did receive a 
favor. This pattern of results suggests there could be boundary conditions to the focus 
theory of normative conduct.  The magnitude of a request could impact the power of 
injunctive norms on an individual’s behavior. These results shed light on a troubling 
phenomenon that small stakes fraud is less likely to be questioned and more likely to 
succeed than similar but larger attempts to defraud someone. Future research is needed to 
investigate these boundary conditions and find interventions to make people less 
susceptible to small stakes fraud. 
An additional goal of Experiments 1 and 2 was to investigate underlying reasons 
why individuals might move forward with a fraudulent request, such as importance to be 
perceived as cooperative and their level of trust in the researcher.  Again, there were 
mixed results when comparing the $10 and $89.56 scenarios when investigating if the 
importance to be perceived as cooperative led to compliance in signing the bogus consent 




and how important it was to be perceived as cooperative.  This could be due to the little 
variance in compliance rates, with 121 out of 123 signing the bogus consent form.   
In the $89 condition, importance to be perceived as cooperative was found to be 
significant in predicting compliance with signing the bogus consent form.  These results 
are consistent with the focus theory of normative conduct and self-discrepancy theory 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Higgins, 1987; Higgins et al., 1997; Roney and Sorrentino, 
1995; White & Simpson, 2013). The need to be perceived as cooperative by the 
researcher demonstrates the salience of the need for approval and adhere to social 
obligations. This motivated participants to adapt their behavior to comply with the 
request by signing the bogus consent form, that clearly obliged them to pay a fee that 
they should not have to, in order to gain the social approval (avoid disapproval) of the 
researcher. 
Experiments 1 and 2 also predicted a magnification of reciprocity effects from an 
interaction with the importance to be perceived as cooperative on compliance and 
questioning the request to sign the bogus consent form. The results of the experiments did 
not support these predictions. Injunctive norms need to be salient to change behavior 
(Cialdini et al., 1990; Kallgren et al., 2000) In these experiments the requester was 
somewhat passive in the request by handing the consent form to the participant and 
letting them read and sign it on their own. Future studies may want to manipulate the 
salience of the expectation to sign the form.  The researcher could point to the signature 
line and ask for the participant to sign.  It would also be recommended to not use the $10 




Four equivalency tests investigated the role trust had in compliance and 
questioning of the fraudulent request to sign a bogus consent form.  Dunning et al. (2014) 
demonstrated that people will behave in ways that show they trust another person, when 
privately they do not due to social pressure as predicted by the focus theory of normative 
conduct and self-discrepancy theory.  Experiments 1 and 2 postulated that based on the 
need to adhere to injunctive norms and outwardly adapt one’s behavior to social 
expectations, individuals who had low trust in the researcher would be equivalent in their 
compliance and questioning rates to those who had high levels of trust. Contrary to what 
was expected, the two groups were not statistically equivalent in compliance and 
questioning rates. Limitations for these hypotheses were small sample sizes for TOST 
equivalency tests.  The data was dichotomized into groups of high and low levels of trust. 
Future research should manipulate the actions of the requester to create conditions of 
being trustworthy and not trustworthy and then test for compliance and questioning rates. 
Experiments 1 and 2 utilized an undergraduate student sample. Future fraud and 
reciprocity studies should employ other real-life situations, with a sample more diverse 
than just undergraduate college students.  
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 investigated if people will violate a certain ethical standard in order 
to satisfy a competing ethical standard of giving back to someone who has given to them.  
Tangpong et al. (2016) demonstrated that individuals are vulnerable to committing 
unethical acts due to satisfying the ethical standard to give back to others, although there 
was always a potential benefit beyond satisfying the obligation to return a favor.  The 




reciprocate and can be potentially exploited to comply with an unethical request 
(Cialdini, 2009).   
This experiment was built on Tangpong et al. (2016) and test the vulnerability of 
individuals to commit an unethical act when there is no other benefit than to satisfy the 
obligation to repay a favor. This pattern of behavior would be consistent with injunctive 
norms and the focus theory of normative conduct in that downstream consequences of 
actions being blinded due to attending to others’ expectation to return the favor. The 
expected disapproval of not adhering to the requester’s request, when the requester and 
requestee are together, is salient and will drive compliance, with no consideration for the 
ramifications in committing fraud or and unethical act. Figure 7 is a chart that displays 
the types of models that experiment 3 attempts to support and refute. 
Figure 7 
Experiment 3’s Hypotheses’ Models of Interest 
Note. These are the hypotheses’ predictions, not results 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Ia: Participants who receive a favor will sign someone else’s name to the 
second consent form, more often than participants who do not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis Ib: Participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their 
driveway will be more likely to sign the community service hours form, more often than 
participants who do not receive a favor. 
Models Supported Models Refuted 
    
Social Normative  
Decision Models 





Hypothesis Ic: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-
worker will be more likely to agree to send referrals to them more often than participants 
who do not receive a favor. 
 
Hypothesis Id: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining 
wall, will be more likely to give the contractor a price for the association’s roof project, 
more often than participants who do not receive a favor. 
 
As in the first two experiments, this hypothesis was based on the norm of 
reciprocity that people feel an obligation to repay a favor to those that provided a favor to 
them (Gouldner, 1960). The predicted results are contrary to what traditional normative 
models, such as Becker’s (1976) rational choice theory, would predict. In this 
experiment, the requesters are asking for compliance by the participants to commit in an 
unethical act. 
Hypothesis IIa: Participants who receive a favor will be less likely to consider the 
negative consequences they could face by signing someone else’s name than participants 
who did not receive a favor. 
 
Hypothesis IIb: Participants who received a favor of their neighbor shoveling their 
driveway will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face by 
signing the community service hours form than participants who did not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis IIc: Participants who received a favor of a free meal from their former co-
worker will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face by 
agreeing to send referrals to them than participants who did not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis IId: Participants who received a favor of free work on their brick retaining 
wall will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face by giving 
the contractor a price for the association’s roof project than participants who did not 
receive a favor.   
 
 The predicted results that a favor will make it less likely to consider downstream 
negative consequences would support the focus theory of normative conduct. There 
would be competing norms and the salient norm to reciprocate will influence participants 




consequences of committing fraud, a normative rational decision theory such as expected 
utility theory would be supported.  
Hypothesis IIIa: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to 
those who have given to them and who receive a favor will be more likely to sign 
someone else’s name to the second consent form than participants who indicate they feel 
an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and did not receive a 
favor. 
 
Hypothesis IIIb: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to 
those who have given to them and who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their 
driveway will be more likely to sign the community service hours form than participants 
who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them 
and did not receive a favor. 
 
Hypothesis IIIc: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to 
those who have given to them and who receive a favor of a free meal from their former 
co-worker will be more likely to agree to send referrals to them than participants who 
indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them and 
did not receive a favor. 
 
Hypothesis IIId: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to 
those who have given to them and who received a favor of free work on their brick 
retaining wall will be more likely give the contractor a price for the association’s roof 
project than participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those 
who have given to them and did not receive a favor. 
 
The predicted results would support the findings of Umphress et al. (2010) that 
strong reciprocity beliefs are more likely to lead people to act unethically after receiving 
a favor and asked to perform an unethical act. Umphress et al. (2010) investigated strong 
reciprocity in the context of an employee committing unethical pro-organizational 
behavior. This predicted results would extend Umphress et al’s. (2010) findings by 
eliminating any potential employee, employer confounds and demonstrate the ethical 
standard to reciprocate can override other ethical standards in people who feel an ethical 





Hypothesis IVa: Participants who rate signing someone else’s name to the second 
consent form as unethical and receive a favor will be more likely to sign someone else’s 
name to the second consent from than participants who rate signing someone else’s name 
to the second consent form as unethical and do not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis IVb: Participants who rate signing a community service hours form for their 
neighbor, even though the neighbor did not complete the hours, as unethical and receive 
a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will be more likely to by sign the 
community service hours form than participants who rate signing the form as unethical 
and do not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis IVc: Participants who rate sending referrals to a former co-worker, even 
though it is against company policy, as unethical and receive a favor of a free meal from 
their former co-worker will be more likely to send referrals to their former co-worker 
than participants who rate sending referrals to the former co-worker as unethical and do 
not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis IVd: Participants who rate giving a contractor the price necessary to win the 
bid for the association’s roof project as unethical and receive a favor of free work on 
their brick retaining wall will be more likely to give the price to the contractor than 
participants who giving the price to the contractor as unethical and do not receive a 
favor. 
 
This pattern of predicted results would support the norm of reciprocity, even if 
when the requested return favor is unethical. If the predicted pattern is not observed, it 
would suggest there are boundary conditions for reciprocity in that unethical requests 
would moderate the strength of reciprocity. 
 
Hypothesis Va: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the 
researcher as cooperative, the more likely they will be to sign someone else’s name to the 
second consent form.  
 
Hypothesis Vb: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by their 
neighbor as cooperative, the more likely they will be to comply with the request to sign 
their community service hours form, even though the neighbor did not complete the 
hours. 
 
Hypothesis Vc: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by their former 
co-worker as cooperative, the more likely they will be to agree to send referrals to the 





Hypothesis Vd: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the 
contractor as cooperative, the more likely they will give the contractor the price 
necessary to win the bid for the association’s roof project. 
 
If the predicted results are observed, it would support the focus theory of 
normative conduct, in that an individual’s behavior will be affected by dispositional 
factors that are currently salient (i.e., endorsement of being perceived as cooperative is 
important).  
 
Hypothesis VIa: Participants who receive a favor and indicate it is important for them to 
be perceived as cooperative will sign someone else’s name to the second consent form 
more than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be 
perceived as cooperative by the researcher.  
 
Hypothesis VIb: Participants receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway 
and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will be more likely to 
sign the neighbor’s community service hours form than participants who receive a favor 
and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by their neighbor.  
Hypothesis VIc: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-
worker and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will be more 
likely to send referrals to their former co-worder than participants who receive a favor 
and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by their former co-worker.  
 
Hypothesis VId: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining 
wall and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will be more 
likely to give the price to the contractor than participants who receive a favor and 
indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor. 
 
The precited interaction effect between reciprocity and the importance of being 
perceived as cooperative is consistent with the focus theory of normative conduct. Prior 
research on injunctive norms (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; Kallgren et al., 2000) would 
suggest there will be a magnification effect of the receiving a favor on compliance due to 
the importance of being perceived as cooperative and the exception to reciprocate are 




Hypothesis VIIa: For individuals who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels 
from the researcher, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted the researcher 
will be greater than they actually trusted the researcher. 
 
Hypothesis VIIb: For individuals who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their 
driveway, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted their neighbor will be 
greater than they actually trusted the neighbor. 
 
Hypothesis VIIc: For individuals who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-
worker, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted their former co-worker will be 
greater than they actually trusted their former co-worker. 
 
Hypothesis VIId: For individuals who receive a favor of free work on their brick 
retaining wall from a contractor, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted the 
contractor will be greater than they actually trusted the contractor. 
 
Hypothesis VIIIa: The difference between how much a participant acted like they trusted 
the researcher and how much they actually trusted the researcher will be greater for 
those who received a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels than those who did not 
receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis VIIIb: The difference between how much a participant acted like they trusted 
their neighbor and how much they actually trusted their neighbor will be greater for 
those who received a favor of the neighbor shoveling their driveway than those who did 
not receive a favor. 
  
Hypothesis VIIIc: The difference between how much a participant acted like they trusted 
their former co-worker and how much they actually trusted their former co-worker will 
be greater for those who received a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker than 
those who did not receive a favor. 
  
Hypothesis VIIId: The difference between how much a participant acted like they trusted 
a contractor and how much they actually trusted the contractor will be greater for those 
who received a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall from the contractor than 
those who did not receive a favor.   
 
The predicted results for hypotheses VIIa to VIId and VIIa to VIIId would be 
consistent with injunctive norms that individuals will behave in ways that are congruent 
with the expectations of others and not necessarily what think what is right. Dunning et 
al. (2014) demonstrated that individuals’ behavior will display trust despite the situation 






There were 150 ‘Master’ Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) worker participants 
in the United States (66 female; mean age 41.5 years).  MTurk workers have achieved a 
‘Master’ qualification by consistently demonstrating a high degree of success in a wide 
range of HITs across a large number of requesters (Amazon Mechanical Turk, 2021). 
Participants completed the study in exchange for a small amount of money. 
The statistical software G*Power version 3.1.9.7 was utilized to determine the 
sample size needed (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007). The power analysis 
conducted was run with G*Power using the statistical test analysis of “Means: Difference 
between two independent means (two groups)” in the program. The parameters used were 
Cohen’s d effect size of .51, alpha level equal to .05, the power level at .80, the allocation 
ratio was set to 1 for equal group sizes.  The Cohen’s d effect size of .51 was derived 
from the data in Tangpong et al.’s (2016) study 1 that investigated ethical compromise 
and reciprocity. The results of the power analysis suggested a total sample size of 124 (62 
per condition). 
Study design 
The experiment utilized a 2 (Reciprocity: favor, no favor) × 1 (Fraud request to 





Participants were recruited via MTurk and given a link to the study hosted on 
Qualtrics. Participants were randomly assigned to either the favor or no favor conditions 
for each of the four scenarios. Each scenario started with the participants reading a 
vignette. Synopses of the four vignettes are below. The full vignettes can be found in 
Appendix E. 
Scenario one synopsis- Bogus consent from/ Diet Coke & pretzels 
 
Favor condition: A participant arrives a research lab to complete a survey study.  
Upon arriving they are given an unsolicited favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels by a 
researcher. After the survey is complete, the researcher asks the participant to sign 
someone else’s name to a second consent form. 
No favor condition:  This is same as the favor condition with the exception of the 
Diet Coke and bag of pretzels not being given to the participant.  
Scenario two synopsis- Neighbor’s community service form/ snow shoveling 
 
Favor condition: A participant returns home from work to find their neighbor 
finding shoveling their driveway after it had snowed. Later, when the participant is taking 
out their trash, they see their neighbor who asks if the participant would sign a form 
stating they have completed community service hours that they had not completed. 
No favor condition:  This is same as the favor condition with the exception that 
the neighbor does not shovel the participants driveway.  
Scenario three synopsis- Sending referrals to former co-worker/ free meal 
 
Favor condition: A participant meets a former co-worker for dinner. The former 
co-worker pays for the entire meal. After the bill is paid, the former co-worker asks if the 




No favor condition:  This is same as the favor condition with the exception that 
the bill for the meal is split between the participant and former co-worker.  
Scenario four synopsis- Providing price for contractor to win bid/ free brick work 
Favor condition: A participant comes home to find a contractor fixing their brick 
retaining wall.  When the participant tells the contractor they didn’t order the work, the 
contractor says they were doing something at the neighbors and decided to fix the wall 
free of charge. Later, the contractor asks the participant if they can give them the price 
they need to be at in order to win the roofing project for the condo association.   
No favor condition:  This is same as the favor condition with the exception that 
the contractor does not fix the brick retaining wall.  
After participants read their assigned vignette, they will be asked to answer 
survey questions about their likelihood to comply with the requests, consideration of 
negative consequences they could face, attitude towards the requester, ethical obligations, 
etc. (Appendix F). 
 
Results 
Hypothesis Ia: Participants who received a favor of a can of Diet Coke and bag of 
pretzels will be more likely to sign someone else’s name to the second consent form, 
more often than participants who do not receive a favor. 
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare compliance in signing 
someone else’s name to a consent form in favor and no favor conditions. The results did 
not support Hypothesis Ia. There was a not significant difference in the scores for 
receiving a favor (M = 5.40, SD = 1.86, n = 75) and no favor (M = 5.56, SD = 1.84, n = 




The mean scores for the likelihood a participant would comply with the request in 
the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph 
in Figure 8. 
Hypothesis Ib: Participants who received a favor of their neighbor shoveling their 
driveway will be more likely to sign the community service hours form, more often 
than participants who do not receive a favor. 
  
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare compliance in signing a 
form that stated your neighbor completed community service hours, even though they 
had not, in favor and no favor conditions. The results did not support Hypothesis Ib. 
There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor (M = 5.01, SD = 
1.95, n = 75) and no favor (M = 5.32, SD = 1.91, n = 75) conditions; t (148)= 0.80, p = 
.21 (one-tailed).  
The mean scores for the likelihood a participant would comply with the request in 
the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph 
in Figure 8. 
Hypothesis Ic: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-
worker will be more likely to agree to send referrals to them more often than 
participants who do not receive a favor. 
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare compliance in agreeing 
to send referrals to a former co-worker, even though it is against company policy, in 
favor and no favor conditions. The results did not support Hypothesis Ic. There was a not 
significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor (M = 4.33, SD = 2.03, n = 75) 




The mean scores for the likelihood a participant would comply with the request in 
the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph 
in Figure 8. 
Hypothesis Id: Participants who received a favor of free work on their brick 
retaining wall, will be more likely to give the contractor a price for the association’s 
roof project, more often than participants who do not receive a favor. 
 
 An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare compliance in agreeing 
to give the contractor the price necessary to win the association’s roof project, in favor 
and no favor conditions. The results supported Hypothesis Id. There was a significant 
difference in the scores for receiving a favor (M = 3.66, SD = 1.95, n = 75) and no favor 
(M = 4.51, SD = 1.73, n = 75) conditions; t (148)= 2.78, p = .003 (one-tailed).  These 
results suggest that an unsolicited favor will impact the likelihood someone would 
comply with an unethical request by the favor giver. Specifically, a contractor’s 
unsolicited favor of fixing a small retaining wall made it more likely a participant would 
give the contractor the price they needed to quote, in order to get the larger roofing 
project.  
The mean scores for the likelihood a participant would comply with the request in 
the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph 








Means for Likelihood to Comply with Request in Favor and No Favor Conditions  
Note. *p < .01 (one-tailed) 
Hypothesis IIa: Participants who received a favor of a can of Diet Coke and bag of 
pretzels will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face by 
signing someone else’s name than participants who did not receive a favor.  
  
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the likelihood to 
consider the negative consequences in complying with a request to sign someone else’s 
name to a consent form, in favor and no favor conditions. The results did not support 
Hypothesis IIa. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor 
(M = 3.04, SD = 2.15, n = 75) and no favor (M = 3.32, SD = 2.01, n = 75) conditions; t 




The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative 
consequences they could face if they complied with the request, in the favor and no favor 
conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 9. 
Hypothesis IIb: Participants who received a favor of their neighbor shoveling their 
driveway will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face by 
signing the community service hours form than participants who did not receive a 
favor.  
  
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the likelihood to 
consider the negative consequences in complying with a request to sign a form that stated 
your neighbor completed community service hours, even though they had not, in favor 
and no favor conditions. The results did not support Hypothesis IIb. There was a not 
significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor (M = 3.88, SD = 2.11, n = 75) 
and no favor (M = 3.68, SD = 2.01, n = 75) conditions; t (148)= 0.59, p = .21 (one-tailed).  
The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative 
consequences they could face if they complied with the request, in the favor and no favor 
conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 9. 
Hypothesis IIc: Participants who received a favor of a free meal from their former 
co-worker will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face 
by agreeing to send referrals to them than participants who did not receive a favor.  
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the likelihood to 
consider the negative consequences in complying with a request to send referrals to a 
former co-worker, even though it was against company policy, in favor and no favor 
conditions. The results did not support Hypothesis IIc. There was a not significant 
difference in the scores for receiving a favor (M = 3.72, SD = 2.08, n = 75) and no favor 




The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative 
consequences they could face if they complied with the request, in the favor and no favor 
conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 9. 
Hypothesis IId: Participants who received a favor of free work on their brick 
retaining wall will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could 
face by giving the contractor a price for the association’s roof project than 
participants who did not receive a favor.  
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the likelihood to 
consider the negative consequences in complying with a request to give a contractor the 
price they needed to be at to win a roofing project for the association, in favor and no 
favor conditions. The results did not support Hypothesis IId. There was a not significant 
difference in the scores for receiving a favor (M = 4.39, SD = 1.95, n = 75) and no favor 
(M = 4.40, SD = 1.82, n = 75) conditions; t (148)= 0.04, p = .48 (one-tailed). 
The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative 
consequences they could face if they complied with the request, in the favor and no favor 















Hypothesis IIIa: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give 
back to those who have given to them and who receive a favor of a can of Diet Coke 
and bag of pretzels will be more likely to sign someone else’s name to the second 
consent form than participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give 
back to those who have given to them and did not receive a favor.   
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who feel an obligation to 
give back to others who have given to them to compare the likelihood to comply with a 
request to sign someone else’s name to a consent form, in favor and no favor conditions. 
Participants indicated how much they agree that they have an ethical obligation to give 
back to those who have given to them on a scale of 1-agree strongly to 7-disagree 




if they answered the question with 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this analysis. The 
results did not support Hypothesis IIIa. There was a not significant difference in the 
scores for receiving a favor (M = 4.45, SD = 2.18, n = 22) and no favor (M = 5.33, SD = 
2.00, n = 27) conditions; t (47)=1.47, p = .07 (one-tailed). 
The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel 
an ethical obligation to give back to others who have given to them, in the favor and no 
favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 10. 
Hypothesis IIIb: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give 
back to those who have given to them and who receive a favor of their neighbor 
shoveling their driveway will be more likely to sign the community service hours 
form than participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to 
those who have given to them and did not receive a favor. 
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who feel an obligation to 
give back to others who have given to them to compare the likelihood to comply with a 
request to sign a neighbor’s community service hours form, in favor and no favor 
conditions. Participants indicated how much they agree that they have an ethical 
obligation to give back to those who have given to them on a scale of 1-agree strongly to 
7-disagree strongly.  Participants were considered to feel an ethical obligation to give 
back to others if they answered the question with 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this 
analysis. The results did not support Hypothesis IIIb. There was a not significant 
difference in the scores for receiving a favor (M = 4.69, SD = 2.05, n = 26) and no favor 
(M = 5.09, SD = 2.13, n = 23) conditions; t (47)= 0.66, p = .26 (one-tailed). 
The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel 
an ethical obligation to give back to others who have given to them, in the favor and no 




Hypothesis IIIc: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give 
back to those who have given to them and who receive a favor of a free meal from 
their former co-worker will be more likely to agree to send referrals to them than 
participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give back to those who 
have given to them and did not receive a favor. 
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who feel an obligation to 
give back to others who have given to them to compare the likelihood to comply with a 
request to send referrals to a former co-worker, in favor and no favor conditions. 
Participants indicated how much they agree that they have an ethical obligation to give 
back to those who have given to them on a scale of 1-agree strongly to 7-disagree 
strongly.  Participants were considered to feel an ethical obligation to give back to others 
if they answered the question with 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this analysis. The 
results did not support Hypothesis IIIc. There was a not significant difference in the 
scores for receiving a favor (M = 4.11, SD = 1.89, n = 27) and no favor (M = 4.14, SD = 
1.98, n = 22) conditions; t (47)= 0.05, p = .48 (one-tailed). 
The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel 
an ethical obligation to give back to others who have given to them, in the favor and no 
favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 10. 
Hypothesis IIId: Participants who indicate they feel an ethical obligation to give 
back to those who have given to them and who received a favor of free work on their 
brick retaining wall will be more likely give the contractor a price for the 
association’s roof project than participants who indicate they feel an ethical 
obligation to give back to those who have given to them and did not receive a favor. 
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who feel an obligation to 
give back to others who have given to them to compare the likelihood to comply with a 
request to give a contractor the price they needed to be at to win the condo association’s 




agree that they have an ethical obligation to give back to those who have given to them 
on a scale of 1-agree strongly to 7-disagree strongly.  Participants were considered to feel 
an ethical obligation to give back to others if they answered the question with 1, 2 or 3 
and were included in this analysis. The results did not support Hypothesis IIId. There was 
a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor (M = 3.94, SD = 2.06, n = 
33) and no favor (M = 4.38, SD = 1.59, n = 16) conditions; t (47)= 0.74, p = .23 (one-
tailed). 
The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel 
an ethical obligation to give back to others who have given to them, in the favor and no 
favor conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 10. 
Figure 10 
Means for Lilklihood to Comply in Favor and No Favor Conditions for Those Who Feel 





Hypothesis IVa: Participants who rate signing someone else’s name to the second 
consent form as unethical and receive a favor of a diet coke and bag of pretzels will 
be more likely to sign someone else’s name to the second consent from than 
participants who rate signing someone else’s name to the second consent form as 
unethical and do not receive a favor.   
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who rate signing someone 
else’s name to a consent form as unethical to compare the likelihood to comply with a 
request to sign someone else’s name to a consent form, in favor and no favor conditions. 
Participants indicated how ethical it is to comply with the request on a scale of 1-totally 
unethical to 7- perfectly ethical.  Participants were considered to rate compliance with the 
request as unethical if they answered the question with a 1, 2 or 3 and were included in 
this analysis. The results did not support Hypothesis IVa. There was a not significant 
difference in the scores for receiving a favor (M = 5.65, SD = 1.93, n = 61) and no favor 
(M = 5.84, SD = 1.85, n = 61) conditions; t (116)= 0.54, p = .30 (one-tailed). 
The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel 
the requested act is unethical, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four 
scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 11. 
Hypothesis IVb: Participants who rate signing a community service hours form for 
their neighbor, even though the neighbor did not complete the hours, as unethical 
and receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will be more likely to 
by sign the community service hours form than participants who rate signing the 
form as unethical and do not receive a favor.  
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who rate signing a 
community service hours form for their neighbor as unethical, even though the neighbor 
did not complete the hours, to compare the likelihood to comply with the request to sign 
the community service hours form, in favor and no favor conditions. Participants 




7- perfectly ethical.  Participants were considered to rate compliance with the request as 
unethical if they answered the question with a 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this analysis. 
The results did not support Hypothesis IVb. There was a not significant difference in the 
scores for receiving a favor (M = 5.85, SD = 1.45, n = 54) and no favor (M = 5.96, SD = 
1.67, n = 52) conditions; t (104)= 0.36, p = 0.36 (one-tailed). 
The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel 
the requested act is unethical, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four 
scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 11. 
Hypothesis IVc: Participants who rate sending referrals to a former co-worker, even 
though it is against company policy, as unethical and receive a favor of a free meal 
from their former co-worker will be more likely to send referrals to their former co-
worker than participants who rate sending referrals to the former co-worker as 
unethical and do not receive a favor.  
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who rate sending referrals 
to a former co-worker, even though it is against company policy, as unethical, to compare 
the likelihood to comply with the request to agree to send referrals to the former co-
worker, in favor and no favor conditions. Participants indicated how ethical it is to 
comply with the request on a scale of 1-totally unethical to 7- perfectly ethical.  
Participants were considered to rate compliance with the request as unethical if they 
answered the question with a 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this analysis. The results did 
not support Hypothesis IVc. There was a not significant difference in the scores for 
receiving a favor (M = 5.41, SD = 1.86, n = 32) and no favor (M = 5.79, SD = 1.40, n = 




The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel 
the requested act is unethical, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four 
scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 11. 
Hypothesis IVd: Participants who rate giving a contractor the price necessary to 
win the bid for the association’s roof project as unethical and receive a favor of free 
work on their brick retaining wall will be more likely to give the price to the 
contractor than participants who giving the price to the contractor as unethical and 
do not receive a favor.  
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted for those who rate giving a 
contractor the price necessary to win the bid for the association’s roof project as 
unethical, to compare the likelihood to comply with the request to give the contractor the 
price, in favor and no favor conditions. Participants indicated how ethical it is to comply 
with the request on a scale of 1-totally unethical to 7- perfectly ethical.  Participants were 
considered to rate compliance with the request as unethical if they answered the question 
with a 1, 2 or 3 and were included in this analysis. The results did not support Hypothesis 
IVd. There was a not significant difference in the scores for receiving a favor (M = 5.10, 
SD = 1.80, n = 20) and no favor (M = 5.48, SD = 1.58, n = 27) conditions; t (45)= 0.77, p 
= 0.22 (one-tailed). 
The mean scores for likelihood to comply with a request, for participants who feel 
the requested act is unethical, in the favor and no favor conditions, for each of the four 












Means for Lilkelihood to Comply in Favor and No Favor Conditions for Those Who Feel 




Hypothesis Va: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the 
researcher as cooperative, the more likely it will be they will comply with a request 
be to sign someone else’s name to the second consent form.  
 
A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as 
cooperative by the researcher predicted the likelihood a participant would comply with a 
request to sign someone else’s name to a consent form. The importance to be perceived 
as cooperative scores were recoded to 1 being extremely important to 7 being not 
important, for ease of interpretation, and likelihood to comply was coded 1 definitely 
comply to 7 definitely not comply. The results of the regression indicated that the model 





The results supported Hypothesis Va. The model found that importance to be 
perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request to sign 
someone else’s name to a consent form. (β = 0.38, p < .001) The final predictive model 
was: β = 3.84 + (0.38*importance to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher) 
Hypothesis Vb: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by their 
neighbor as cooperative, the more likely they will be to comply with the request to 
sign their community service hours form, even though the neighbor did not 
complete the hours. 
 
A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as 
cooperative by a participant’s neighbor predicted the likelihood a participant would 
comply with a request to sign their community service hours form, even though the 
neighbor did not complete the hours. The importance to be perceived as cooperative 
scores were recoded to 1 being extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of 
interpretation, and likelihood to comply was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not 
comply.  The results of the regression indicated that the model explained 32.5% of the 
variance and that the model was significant, F(1,148)= 71.13, p < .001.  
The results supported Hypothesis Vb. The model found that importance to be 
perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request to sign the 
neighbor’s community service hours form. (β = 0.59, p < .001) The final predictive 
model was: β = 2.76 + (0.59*importance to be perceived as cooperative by the neighbor). 
 
Hypothesis Vc: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by their 
former co-worker as cooperative, the more likely they will be to agree to send 





A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as 
cooperative by a former co-worker predicted the likelihood that a participant would 
comply with a request to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker, even though it is 
against company policy. The importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were 
recoded to 1 being extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of 
interpretation, and likelihood to comply was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not 
comply. The results of the regression indicated that the model explained 24.9.% of the 
variance and that the model was significant, F(1,148)= 49.02, p < .001.  
The results supported Hypothesis Vc. The model found that importance to be 
perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request to send 
referrals to the former co-worker. (β = 0.59, p < .001) The final predictive model was: β 
= 2.33 + (0.59* importance to be perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker). 
 
Hypothesis Vd: The more important it is for a participant to be perceived by the 
contractor as cooperative, the more likely they will give the contractor the price 
necessary to win the bid for the association’s roof project. 
 
 
A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as 
cooperative by the contractor predicted the likelihood a participant would comply with a 
request to give the contractor the price necessary to win the bid for the association’s roof 
project. The importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were recoded to 1 being 
extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of interpretation, and likelihood to 
comply was coded 1 definitely comply to7 definitely not comply.  The results of the 
regression indicated that the model explained 6.7% of the variance and that the model 




The results supported Hypothesis Vd. The model found that importance to be 
perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request give the 
contractor the price necessary to win the bid for the association’s roof project. (β = 0.28, 
p =.001) The final predictive model was: β = 2.92 + (0.28*importance to be perceived as 
cooperative by the contractor). 
 
Hypothesis VIa: Participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels 
from the researcher and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as 
cooperative will be more likely to sign someone else’s name to the second consent 
form than participants who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be 
perceived as cooperative by the researcher.  
 
A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as 
cooperative by the researcher predicted the likelihood a participant would comply with a 
request to sign someone else’s name to a consent form for those who received a favor 
from the researcher. The importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were recoded 
to 1 being extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of interpretation, and 
likelihood to comply was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not comply. The 
results of the regression indicated that the model explained 10.6% of the variance and 
that the model was significant, F(1,73)= 8.68, p = .004.  
The results supported Hypothesis VIa. The model found that importance to be 
perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request to sign 
someone else’s name to a consent form, for those who received a favor. (β = 0.32, p = 
.004) The final predictive model was: β = 4.14 + (0.32*importance to be perceived as 
cooperative by the researcher). 
 
Hypothesis VIb: Participants receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their 




more likely to sign the neighbor’s community service hours form than participants 
who receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative 
by their neighbor.  
 
A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as 
cooperative by a participant’s neighbor predicted the likelihood a participant would 
comply with a request to sign their community service hours form, even though the 
neighbor did not complete the hours, for those who had received a favor from their 
neighbor. The importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were recoded to 1 being 
extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of interpretation, and likelihood to 
comply was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not comply.  The results of the 
regression indicated that the model explained 29.6% of the variance and that the model 
was significant, F(1,73)= 30.76, p < .001.  
The results supported Hypothesis VIb. The model found that importance to be 
perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request to sign the 
neighbor’s community service hour form, for those who received a favor. (β = 0.58, p < 
.001) The final predictive model was: B = 2.75 + (0.58*importance to be perceived as 
cooperative by the neighbor). 
 
Hypothesis VIc: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former 
co-worker and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative will 
be more likely to send referrals to their former co-worder than participants who 
receive a favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by 
their former co-worker.  
 
A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as 
cooperative by a former co-worker predicted the likelihood that a participant would 
comply with a request to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker, even though it is 




importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were recoded to 1 being extremely 
important to 7 being not important, for ease of interpretation, and likelihood to comply 
was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not comply. The results of the regression 
indicated that the model explained 23.0.% of the variance and that the model was 
significant, F(1,73)= 21.78, p < .001.  
The results supported Hypothesis VIc. The model found that importance to be 
perceived as cooperative significantly predicted compliance with the request to send 
referrals to the former co-worker. (β = 0.60, p < .001) The final predictive model was: β 
= 2.18 + (0.60* importance to be perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker). 
 
Hypothesis VId: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick 
retaining wall and indicate it is important for them to be perceived as cooperative 
will be more likely to give the price to the contractor than participants who receive a 
favor and indicate it is not important to be perceived as cooperative by the 
contractor. 
 
A simple regression was carried out to test if the importance to be perceived as 
cooperative by the contractor predicted the likelihood a participant would comply with a 
request to give the contractor the price necessary to win the bid for the association’s roof 
project. The importance to be perceived as cooperative scores were recoded to 1 being 
extremely important to 7 being not important, for ease of interpretation, and likelihood to 
comply was coded 1 definitely comply to 7 definitely not comply.  The results of the 
regression indicated that the model explained 3.1% of the variance although the model 
was not significant, F(1,73)= 2.36, p = .13.  
The results did not support Hypothesis VId. It was found that importance to be 
perceived as cooperative did not significantly predict compliance with the request give 




0.20, p =.13) The final non predictive model was: β = 2.87 + (0.20*importance to be 
perceived as cooperative by the contractor). 
 
Hypothesis VIIa: For individuals who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of 
pretzels from the researcher, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted the 
researcher will be greater than they actually trusted the researcher.  
 
A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare how much participants acted 
like they trusted the researcher to how much they actually trusted the researcher, for those 
who received a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from the researcher.  
The results supported Hypothesis VIIa. There was a significant difference in the 
scores for how much participants acted like they trusted the researcher (M = 4.57, SD = 
1.58, n = 75) and how much they actually trusted the researcher (M = 3.53, SD = 1.94, n 
= 75) conditions; t (74)= 5.36, p < .001 (one-tailed).  These results suggest that 
participants who receive a favor from the researcher will act as if they trust the researcher 
more than they actually do. 
The mean scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the requester 
and how much they actually trusted the requester, for participants who received a favor, 
in each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 12. 
Hypothesis VIIb: For individuals who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling 
their driveway, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted their neighbor 
will be greater than they actually trusted the neighbor. 
 
A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare how much participants acted 
like they trusted their neighbor to how much they actually trusted their neighbor, for 
those who received a favor of their driveway being shoveled by their neighbor.  
The results supported Hypothesis VIIb. There was a significant difference in the 




1.64, n = 75) and how much they actually trusted the researcher (M = 3.69, SD = 1.74, n 
= 75) conditions; t (74)= 3.32, p < .001 (one-tailed).  These results suggest that 
participants who receive the favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway will act as if 
they trust their neighbor more than they actually do. 
The mean scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the requester 
and how much they actually trusted the requester, for participants who received a favor, 
in each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 12. 
Hypothesis VIIc: For individuals who receive a favor of a free meal from their 
former co-worker, the extent to how much they acted like they trusted their former 
co-worker will be greater than they actually trusted their former co-worker. 
 
A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare how much participants acted 
like they trusted their former co-worker to how much they actually trusted their former 
co-worker, for those who received a favor of a free meal from their former co-worker.  
The results supported Hypothesis VIIc. There was a significant difference in the 
scores for how much participants acted like they trusted their former co-worker (M = 
4.84, SD = 1.58, n = 75) and how much they actually trusted the researcher (M = 4.36, SD 
= 1.81, n = 75) conditions; t (74)= 2.93, p = .002 (one-tailed).  These results suggest that 
participants who receive the favor of a free meal from their former co-worker will act as 
if they trust their neighbor more than they actually do. 
The mean scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the requester 
and how much they actually trusted the requester, for participants who received a favor, 





Hypothesis VIId: For individuals who receive a favor of free work on their brick 
retaining wall from a contractor, the extent to how much they acted like they 
trusted the contractor will be greater than they actually trusted the contractor. 
 
A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare how much participants acted 
like they trusted a contractor to how much they actually trusted a contractor, for those 
who received a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall from the contractor.  
The results supported Hypothesis VIId. There was a significant difference in the 
scores for how much participants acted like they trusted the contractor (M = 4.48, SD = 
1.49, n = 75) and how much they actually trusted the contractor (M = 4.20, SD = 1.64, n = 
75) conditions; t (74)= 1.81, p = .04 (one-tailed).  These results suggest that participants 
who receive the favor of free work on their brick retaining wall from the contractor will 
act as if they trust the contractor more than they actually do 
The mean scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the requester 
and how much they actually trusted the requester, for participants who received a favor, 











Means for How Much How Much Participants Acted Like They Trusted Requester vs. 
How Much the Actually Trusted the Requester for Those Who Received a Favor  




Hypothesis VIIIa: The difference between how much a participant acted like they 
trusted the researcher and how much they actually trusted the researcher will be  
greater for those who received a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels than those 
who did not receive a favor.  
 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the difference between 
how much participants acted like they trusted the researcher and how much they actually 
trusted the researcher, for those who received a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels 
from the researcher and those who did not receive a favor. The difference score was 
calculated by subtracting the score for how much a participant trusted the researcher from 




The results did not support Hypothesis VIIIa. There was no significant effect 
between the favor and no favor condition, t(148) = -0.83, p = .20 (one tailed), despite the 
favor condition (M = 1.04, SD = 1.68, n = 75) having a larger difference between how 
much they acted like the trusted the researcher and how much they actually trusted the 
researcher than the no favor condition (M = 0.83, SD = 1.45, n = 75). 
The mean change scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the 
requester less how much they actually trusted the requester, in the favor and no favor 
conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 13. 
Hypothesis VIIIb: The difference between how much a participant acted like they 
trusted their neighbor and how much they actually trusted their neighbor will be 
greater for those who received a favor of the neighbor shoveling their driveway than 
those who did not receive a favor.  
 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the difference between 
how much participants acted like they trusted their neighbor and how much they actually 
trusted their neighbor, for those who received a favor of their neighbor shoveling their 
driveway and those who did not receive a favor. The difference score was calculated by 
subtracting the score for how much a participant trusted their neighbor from how much 
they actually trusted the neighbor.  
The results did not support Hypothesis VIIIb. There was no significant effect 
between the favor and no favor condition, t(148) = -0.70, p = .24 (one tailed), despite the 
favor condition (M = 0.61, SD = 1.60, n = 75) having a larger difference between how 
much they acted like the trusted their neighbor and how much they actually trusted their 




The mean change scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the 
requester less how much they actually trusted the requester, in the favor and no favor 
conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 13. 
Hypothesis VIIIc: The difference between how much a participant acted like they 
trusted their former co-worker and how much they actually trusted their former co-
worker will be greater for those who received a favor of a free meal from their 
former co-worker than those who did not receive a favor.  
 
An independent t-test was conducted to compare the difference between how 
much participants acted like they trusted their former co-worker and how much they 
actually trusted their former co-worker, for those who received a favor of a free meal 
from their former co-worker and those who did not receive a favor. The difference score 
was calculated by subtracting the score for how much a participant trusted their former 
co-worker from how much they actually trusted their former co-worker.  
The results did not support Hypothesis VIIIc. There was no significant effect 
between the favor and no favor condition, t(148) = 0.43, p = .33 (one tailed).  The favor 
condition (M = 0.48, SD = 1.42, n = 75) had a smaller difference between how much they 
acted like the trusted their former co-worker and how much they actually trusted their 
former co-worker than the no favor condition (M = 0.57, SD = 1.21, n = 75). 
The mean change scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the 
requester less how much they actually trusted the requester, in the favor and no favor 
conditions, for each of the four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 13. 
Hypothesis VIIId: The difference between how much a participant acted like they 
trusted a contractor and how much they actually trusted the contractor will be 
greater for those who received a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall 





An independent t-test was conducted to compare the difference between how 
much participants acted like they trusted the contractor and how much they actually 
trusted the contractor, for those who received a favor free work on their brick retaining 
wall from the contractor and those who did not receive a favor. The difference score was 
calculated by subtracting the score for how much a participant trusted the contractor from 
how much they actually trusted the contractor.  
The results did not support Hypothesis VIIId. There was no significant effect 
between the favor and no favor condition, t(148) = -0.88, p = .19 (one tailed), despite the 
favor condition (M = 0.28, SD = 1.34, n = 75) having a larger difference between how 
much they acted like the trusted the contractor and how much they actually trusted the 
contractor than the no favor condition (M = 0.10, SD = 1.05, n = 75). 
The mean change scores for how much a participant acted like they trusted the 
requester less how much they actually trusted the requester, in the favor and no favor 
























Means for Change Scores for How Much How Much Participants Acted Like They 
Trusted Requester vs. How Much the Actually Trusted the Requester 
Note. Participants rated trust scores on a scale from 1- Not at all to 7- Completely 
 
Discussion- Experiment 3 
The aim of Experiment 3 was to build on Experiments 1 and 2 and investigate 
how ethics play a role in reciprocity and fraud. Specifically, will an original favor 
receiver violate a certain ethical standard, to satisfy another ethical standard of giving 
back to others who have given to them. Another objective was to uncover the role trust 
has on compliance with an unethical request and reciprocity. An additional goal of 
Experiment 3 was to have results that were generalizable to the general population by 




Hypotheses Ia – Id predicted an initial favor receiver would commit an unethical 
act by complying with a subsequent request more than individuals who did not receive a 
favor. While the pattern in each scenario was consistent with expected results, only 
hypothesis Id had significant results. This is an interesting finding and could be 
interpreted as consistent with Tangpong et al. (2016). Their study found favors 
significantly increased compliance with a subsequent unlawful request in a business 
context. Hypothesis Id was the only scenario where the participant had something to gain 
by complying.  There could be more to gain from a long-term business relationship than 
the transactional type scenarios in the present experiment, where at least the first three 
had no payoff beyond satisfying social pressure to repay the favor by complying with an 
unethical request. These results suggest people will be more susceptible to the norm of 
reciprocity and committing an unethical act if they have something to gain by doing so. 
This finding should be explored in future research.   
Hypotheses IIa – IId predicted that receiving a favor would lead to less 
consideration of negative consequences for complying with the subsequent unethical 
request. The results were not significant in all four scenarios and contradict what would 
be expected based on injunctive norms and the obligation to repay a favor, which could 
result in blinding people to downstream consequences. An alternative explanation for 
these results would be there are two competing ethical standards, one to not commit a 
fraudulent/ unethical act and the other to repay a favor. The reciprocity effects were not 
strong enough to overcome the other ethical standard to not be a party to fraud. 
Like the hypotheses Ia- Id, an interesting finding of this analysis is that the fourth 




levels of considering negative consequences out of the four scenarios, irrespective of 
favor condition.  
The next two sets of Hypotheses looked at compliance rates and ethics. 
Hypotheses IIIa to IIId predicted that of individuals who feel an ethical obligation to give 
back to others, those who received a favor would be more likely to comply with the 
unethical request.  Hypotheses IVa to IVd predicted of those individuals that rated the 
request as unethical, compliance would be more likely for participants who received a 
favor.   Contrary to the predictions, all the results were not significant. A possible 
explanation for these results could be the effects of the ethics views were much stronger 
and masked any reciprocity effects.  
Hypotheses Va to Vd predicted the more important it is for a participant to be 
perceived as cooperative by the requester, the more likely it will be that they comply with 
the unethical request.  As predicted and consistent with research on injunctive norms and 
the focus theory of normative conduct, the more important it is to be perceived as 
cooperative means the expectation to be cooperative is salient. This results in people 
adapting their behavior and more likely to comply with the unethical request to be 
perceived as cooperative. Future research should explore individual differences to test if 
personality characteristics such as agreeableness from Goldberg’s (1992) Big Five 
Personality Inventory, would predict susceptibility to comply with a request to commit an 
unethical act after receiving a favor.  
Hypotheses VIa to VId were nearly identical to hypotheses Va to Vd with the 




pattern of results was generally the same except for the VId.  Again, this scenario where 
the participant had something to gain by complying with the unethical request had 
different results and was not significant. When comparing these results to those of 
hypotheses Id and Vd, a clearer picture emerges.  It is possible the reciprocity effects are 
stronger in this scenario and mask the effects from the importance to be perceived as 
cooperative.  
Hypothses VIIa to VIId predicted that for individuals who received a favor, they 
would act like they trusted the requester more than they actually trusted the requester.  
Consistent with the hypotheses’ predictions, the initial favor receiver acted like they 
trusted the requester more than they actually trusted them.  This maps on to the focus 
theory of normative conduct and injunctive norms, in that there is an expectation by the 
requester to be trusted that is salient, individuals adjusted their behavior to align with this 
expectation, even though privately, they did not trust them as much as their behavior 
indicated. Thees findings are also consistent with Dunning et al (2014), who 
demonstrated individuals behavior indicted they trusted others more than they wanted to 
trust them.  
While previous hypotheses saw mixed results for compliance with a request for an 
unethical act, the implications for Hypotheses VIIa to VIId’s findings are still concerning.  
In a variety of different settings, the results demonstrate people will act as if they trust an 
individual, who makes a request for them to act unethically, more than they actually do. 
Future research should investigate these findings in the context of whistle blowers.  In 




Would the need to appear as if they trusted others make it unlikely the fraud gets 
reported, if the perpetrator requested the individual to keep quiet? 
The final set of hypotheses were similar to Hypotheses VIIa – VIId, in that they 
investigated trust scores for how much participants acted like they trusted the requester to 
how much they actually trusted them.  The sets of hypotheses differed from each other in 
that the final set of hypotheses’ dependent variable was change scores between the 
reported trust levels and not the actual levels of trust. The change scores were not 
significantly different between the favor an no favor conditions in any of the four 
scenarios. This suggests that reciprocity did not increase the outward display of trust from 
actual trust levels.  A limitation of this analysis is it does not capture if a favor increased 
actual levels of trust.  It is possible the trust change scores were not significantly different 
between favor and no favor conditions, if a favor increased both the actual trust and acted 
like they trusted levels.  Future research should run an analysis that takes this into 
account. 
Experiment 3 faced a limitation that it was conducted entirely online due to the 
pandemic and social distancing requirements. The experiment asked participants to 
imagine they were in a scenario by reading vignettes and then answer survey questions 
about how they would behave.  Future studies should utilize a paradigm similar to 
Experiments 1 and 2 where participants are actually in the scenario making real life 





Experiment 4, like experiment 3 investigated people violating an ethical standard 
to satisfy another ethical standard of giving back to someone who has given to you.  In 
addition, this experiment also tested if the explicitness of the requested ethics violation 
impacts compliance. Injunctive norms suggest as people will behave in ways that align 
with others’ expectations, as long as those expectations are salient (Kallgren et al., 2000).  
The focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990) postulates there are often 
competing norms that could shape behavior. This experiment tested the boundary 
conditions of the injunctive norm to adhere to someone’s request when it is also explicit, 
to the requester and requestee, that the request is unethical. Does the salience of the 
request being unethical increase the awareness of potential downstream consequences, 
leading the requestee to deny the unethical request? Figure 14 is a chart that displays the 
types of models that experiment 3 attempts to support and refute. 
Figure 14 
Experiment 4’s Hypotheses’ Models of Interest 
Note. These are the hypotheses’ predictions, not results 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Ia: Participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from 
a researcher will comply with an unethical request to sign someone else’s more often 
than participants who do not receive a favor.  
 
Models Supported Models Refuted 
    
Social Normative  
Decision Models 





Hypothesis Ib: Participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their 
driveway will comply with an unethical request to sign the neighbor’s community service 
hours form more often than participants who do not receive a favor. 
  
Hypothesis Ic: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-
worker will comply with an unethical request to agree to send referrals to the former co-
worker more often than participants who do not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis Id: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining wall 
from a contractor will comply with an unethical request to provide the contractor with 
the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s roofing project more often 
than participants who do not receive a favor. 
 
As in the previous experiments, this hypothesis was based on the norm of 
reciprocity that people feel an obligation to repay a favor to those that provided a favor to 
them (Gouldner, 1960).  
 
Hypothesis IIa: Participants will comply with the request to sign someone else’s name to 
a consent form when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than when the 
request is explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis IIb: Participants will comply with the request to sign the neighbor’s 
community service hours form when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than 
when the request is explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis IIc: Participants will comply with the request to agree to send referrals to 
their former co-worker when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than when 
the request is explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis IId: Participants will comply with the request to provide the contractor with 
the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s roofing project, when the 
ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than when the request is explicitly stated as 
unethical. 
 
 If the predicted results are observed the focus theory of normative conduct 
(Cialdini et al., 1990) and would be supported.  These results would also be consistent 
with Butterfield et al. (2000) in that the use of moral language will influence people to act 
in ethical ways by triggering a moral schema. When the requester explicitly points out the 




chances the unethical request is refused. The predicted results would establish boundary 
conditions for the norm of reciprocity.  
Hypothesis IIIa: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and 
whether the request to sign someone else’s name is explicitly or not explicitly stated as 
unethical.   Specifically, participants will comply with the request more often when the 
requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. Stated 
differently, the request being explicitly sated as unethical will reduce the effects of 
receiving a favor. 
 
Hypothesis IIIb: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and 
whether the request to sign the neighbor’s community service hours form is explicitly or 
not explicitly stated as unethical.   Specifically, participants will comply with the request 
more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a 
favor. Stated differently, the request being explicitly sated as unethical will reduce the 
effects of receiving a favor. 
 
Hypothesis IIIc: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and 
whether the agree to send referrals to a former co-worker is explicitly or not explicitly 
stated as unethical.   Specifically, participants will comply with the request more often 
when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. 
Stated differently, the request being explicitly sated as unethical will reduce the effects of 
receiving a favor. 
 
Hypothesis IIId: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and 
whether the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for 
the condo association’s roofing project is explicitly or not explicitly stated as unethical.   
Specifically, participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act 
is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. Stated differently, the 
request being explicitly sated as unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor. 
 
The precited interaction effect between reciprocity and the how explicit the 
unethical request is, is consistent with the focus theory of normative conduct and moral 
awareness. Prior research on injunctive norms (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; Kallgren et al., 
2000) and moral awareness (Butterfield et al., 2000) would suggest that a request that 
unethically salient will mitigate the effect of the receiving a favor on compliance.  
Hypothesis IVa: Participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from 
a researcher will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they could face for 






Hypothesis IVb: Participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their 
driveway will be consider the negative consequences they could face for complying with 
the request to sign the neighbor’s community service hours form less than participants 
who did not receive a favor. 
 
Hypothesis IVc: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-
worker will be consider the negative consequences they could face for complying with the 
request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker less than participants who 
did not receive a favor. 
 
Hypothesis IVd: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick retaining 
wall from a contractor will consider the negative consequences they could face for 
complying with the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the 
bid for the condo association’s roofing project less than participants who did not receive 
a favor. 
 
Like experiment three, the predicted results that a favor will make it less likely to 
consider downstream negative consequences would support the focus theory of normative 
conduct. There would be competing norms and the salient norm to reciprocate will 
influence a person to participate in fraud.  If the favor does not influence participants to 
consider negative consequences of committing fraud, a normative rational decision 
theory such as expected utility theory would be supported. 
Hypothesis Va: Participants who are asked to comply with the explicit unethical request 
to sign someone else’s name to a consent form will be more likely to consider the 
negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked to agree to a non-
explicit unethical request.  
 
Hypothesis Vb: Participants who are asked to comply with the explicit unethical request 
to sign the neighbor’s community service hours form will be more likely to consider the 
negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked to agree to a non-
explicit unethical request.  
 
Hypothesis Vc: Participants who are asked to comply with the explicit unethical request 
to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker will be more likely to consider the 
negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked to agree to a non-
explicit unethical request.  
 
Hypothesis Vd: Participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request 




association’s roofing project will be more likely to consider the negative consequences 
they could face than participants who are asked to agree to a non-explicit unethical 
request. 
 
The predicted results are consistent with Butterfield et al. (2010) in that the use of 
moral language will influence people to act in ethical ways by triggering a moral schema.   
 
Hypothesis VIa: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and the 
explicitness of the unethical act that is requested.   Specifically, participants will consider 
the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to sign 
someone else’s name to a consent form less when they receive a favor, and the request is 
not explicitly unethical.  Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will 
reduce the effects of receiving a favor. 
 
Hypothesis VIb: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and the 
explicitness of the unethical act that is requested.   Specifically, participants will consider 
the negative consequence they could face for complying with the request to sign the 
neighbor’s community service hours form less when they receive a favor, and the request 
is not explicitly unethical.  Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will 
reduce the effects of receiving a favor.  
 
Hypothesis VIc: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and the 
explicitness of the unethical act that is requested.   Specifically, participants will consider 
the negative consequence they could face for complying with the request to agree to send 
referrals to their former co-worker less when they receive a favor, and the request is not 
explicitly unethical.  Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the 
effects of receiving a favor.  
 
Hypothesis VId: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and the 
explicitness of the unethical act that is requested.   Specifically, participants will consider 
the negative consequence they could face for complying with the request to agree to send 
referrals to their former co-worker less when they receive a favor, and the request is not 
explicitly unethical.  Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the 
effects of receiving a favor. 
 
Hypothesis VIIa: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by the 
researcher for participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels from 
the researcher than participants who do not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis VIIb: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by a neighbor 
for participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their driveway than 





Hypothesis VIIc: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by a former co-
worker for participants who receive a favor of a free meal from the former co-worker 
than participants who do not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis VIId: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by the 
contractor for participants who receive a favor of the contractor fixing the participants 
brick retaining wall for free than participants who do not receive a favor. 
 
The predicted results would support the focus theory of normative conduct and 
the norm of reciprocity. The norm of reciprocity says you must give back to those that 
have given to you. When someone does a favor, the giver can be viewed as being 
cooperative. There is expectation the receiver be cooperative in return.   
 
 Hypothesis VIIIa: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for 
participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to sign someone 
else’s name to a consent form than participants who are asked to agree to the same 
unethical request that is not explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis VIIIb: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for participants 
who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to sign the neighbor’s 
community service hours form to than participants who are asked to agree to the same 
unethical request that is not explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis VIIIc: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for participants 
who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to send referrals to the former 
co-worker than participants who are asked to agree to the same unethical request that is 
not explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis VIIId: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for participants 
who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to provide the contractor with 
the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s roofing project than 
participants who are asked to agree to the same unethical request that is not explicitly 
stated as unethical. 
 
The predicted results are consistent with Butterfield et al. (2010) in that the use of 
moral language will influence people to act in ethical ways by triggering a moral schema.  
The salience of the request being unethical will moderate the norm of reciprocity and the 





Hypothesis IXa: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of 
receiving a can of Diet Coke and bag of pretzels and how explicit the unethical act is that 
is requested.   Specifically, participants will find it less important to be perceived as 
cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is explicitly unethical.  
Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving 
a favor in the importance of being perceived as cooperative. 
 
Hypothesis IXb: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of the 
neighbor shoveling the participant’s driveway and how explicit the unethical act is that is 
requested.   Specifically, participants will find it less important to be perceived as 
cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is explicitly unethical.  
Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving 
a favor in the importance of being perceived as cooperative. 
 
Hypothesis IXc: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of the 
former co-worker buying dinner for the participant and how explicit the unethical act is 
that is requested.   Specifically, participants will find it less important to be perceived as 
cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is explicitly unethical.  
Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving 
a favor in the importance of being perceived as cooperative. 
 
Hypothesis IXd: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of the 
contractor fixing the participants brick retaining wall for free and how explicit the 
unethical act is that is requested.   Specifically, participants will find it less important to 
be perceived as cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is explicitly 
unethical.  Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of 




There were 308 ‘Master’ Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) worker participants 
in the United States (141 female; mean age 39.3 years).  MTurk workers have achieved a 
‘Master’ qualification by consistently demonstrating a high degree of success in a wide 
range of HITs across a large number of requesters (Amazon Mechanical Turk, 2021). 




The statistical software G*Power version 3.1.9.7 was utilized to determine the 
sample size needed (Faul et al., 2007). The power analysis conducted was run with 
G*Power using the statistical test analysis of “ANOVA: Fixed effects, special, main 
effects and interactions” in the program. The parameters used were Cohen’s f effect size 
of .17, alpha level equal to .05, the power level at .80, the numerator df was set to 1 and 
the number of groups was 2.  The Cohen’s f effect size of .17 was derived from the data 
in Tangpong et al.’s (2016) study 2, that investigated ethical compromise and reciprocity. 
The results of the power analysis suggested a total sample size of 280. 
Study design 
The experiment utilized a 2 (Reciprocity: favor, no favor) × 2 (Explicitness  of 
unethical request: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects design for each of four different 
scenarios. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited via MTurk and given a link to the study hosted on 
Qualtrics. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: favor/ 
explicitly unethical, favor/ not explicitly unethical, no favor/ explicitly unethical or no 
favor/ not explicitly unethical, for each of the four different scenarios.  Each scenario 
started with the participants reading a vignette. Synopses of the four vignettes are below. 
The full vignettes can be found in Appendix G. 





Favor/ explicitly unethical condition: A participant arrives a research lab to 
complete a survey study.  Upon arriving they are given an unsolicited favor of a Diet 
Coke and bag of pretzels by a researcher. After the survey is complete, the researcher 
says they know this is wrong, but would the participant sign someone else’s name to a 
second consent form. 
Favor/ not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ 
explicitly unethical condition with the exception the researcher does not say “I know this 
is wrong.” 
No favor / explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ 
explicitly unethical condition with the exception the participant does not receive a Diet 
Coke and bag of pretzels. 
No favor / not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ 
explicitly unethical condition with the exceptions the participant does not receive a Diet 
Coke and bag of pretzels and the researcher does not say, “I know this is wrong.” 
Scenario two synopsis- Neighbor’s community service form/ snow shoveling 
 
Favor/ explicitly unethical condition: A participant returns home from work to 
find their neighbor shoveling their driveway after it had snowed. Later, when the 
participant is taking out their trash, they see their neighbor who asks if the participant 
would sign a form stating they have completed community service hours, adding even 
though they have not done the community service. 
Favor/ not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ 
explicitly unethical condition with the exception the neighbor does not say, “even though 




No favor / explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ 
explicitly unethical condition with the exception the neighbor does not shovel the 
participants driveway 
No favor / not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ 
explicitly unethical condition with the exceptions the neighbor does not shovel the 
participant’s driveway and the neighbor does not say, “even though I haven’t” , regarding 
the community service. 
Scenario three synopsis- Sending referrals to former co-worker/ free meal 
 
Favor/ explicitly unethical condition: A participant meets a former co-worker 
for dinner. The former co-worker pays for the entire expensive meal. After the bill is 
paid, the former co-worker says, “I know it is against company policy, but any potential 
customers you can send my way would be much appreciated.” 
Favor/ not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ 
explicitly unethical condition with the exception the former co-worker does not say, “I 
know it’s against company policy”, regarding sending referrals to them. 
No favor / explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ 
explicitly unethical condition with the exception that the cost of the expensive meal is 
split between the participant and the former co-worker. 
No favor / not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ 
explicitly unethical condition with the exceptions the former co-worker does not say, “I 
know it’s against company policy” and the cost of the expensive meal is split between the 
participant and the former co-worker.  




Favor/ explicitly unethical condition: A participant comes home to find a 
contractor fixing their brick retaining wall.  When the participant tells the contractor, they 
didn’t order the work, the contractor says they were doing something at the neighbor’s 
and decided to fix the wall free of charge. Later, the contractor inquires about the condo 
association pending roof project and says, “It’s probably illegal for you to tell me but, 
where does my price need to be in order to get the business?” 
Favor/ not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ 
explicitly unethical condition with the exception the contractor does not say, “It’s 
probably illegal for you to tell me”, regarding the price needed to win the association’s 
roofing project business. 
No favor / explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ 
explicitly unethical condition with the exception that the contractor did not fix the 
participant’s brick retaining wall. 
No favor / not explicitly unethical condition: This is the same as the favor/ 
explicitly unethical condition with the exceptions that the contractor did not fix the 
participant’s brick retaining wall and the contractor does not say, “It’s probably illegal for 
you to tell me”, regarding the price needed to win the association’s roofing project 
business.  
After participants read each of their randomly assigned four vignettes, they 
answered survey questions about their likelihood to comply with the requests, 
consideration of negative consequences they could face, importance to be perceived as 






Hypothesis Ia: Participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels 
from a researcher will comply with an unethical request to sign someone else’s more 
often than participants who do not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis IIa: Participants will comply with the request to sign someone else’s 
name to a consent form when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than 
when the request is explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis IIIa: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and 
whether the request to sign someone else’s name is explicitly or not explicitly stated 
as unethical.   Specifically, participants will comply with the request more often 
when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. 
Stated differently, the request being explicitly sated as unethical will reduce the 
effects of receiving a favor. 
 
 
Hypotheses Ia, IIa and IIIa were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no 
favor) × 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for likelihood to comply with the request to sign someone 
else’s name to a consent form (1 definitely comply – 7 definitely not comply). The means 
and standard deviations are presented in Table 17. An analysis of variance summary table 
is included as Table 18. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis Ia, the analysis did not 
yield a significant main effect for likelihood to comply with the request to sign someone 
else’s name to the consent form in the favor condition (M = 5.59, SD = 1.75) than in no 
favor condition (M = 5.86, SD = 1.80), F(1,304) = 1.79  p =.18.  
The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly sated as 
unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis IIa. The likelihood to 
comply with the request to sign someone else’s name to the consent form in explicit 
condition (M = 5.72, SD = 1.75) was not significantly different than the likelihood to 
comply with the request in the not explicit condition (M = 5.73, SD = 1.81), F(1,304) = 




Hypothesis IIIa predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the 
explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request. More 
specifically participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act 
is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor.  The same ANOVA analysis 
as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and 
explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request to sign 
someone else’s name to a consent form F(1,304) = 0.88 p = .35. Stated differently, the 
request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from 
receiving a favor in likelihood to comply with the request. 
 The means for likelihood of compliance by condition, for all four 
scenarios, are presented as a graph in Figure 15. 
Table 17 
Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Bogus Consent Form  




  Favor Condition No Favor Condition 








Dependent variable (n=76) (n=77) (n=77) (n=78) 
Likelihood to 
comply with request 5.49 5.69 5.95 5.77 






Analysis of Variance for Likelihood to Sign Bogus Consent Form by Favor and Explicit 
Conditions 
 Source SS df MS F 
 Favor Condition 5.66 1 5.66 1.79 
 Explicit  0.01 1 0.01 0.003 
Favor Condition * 
Explicit 2.78 1 2.78 0.88 
Error 961.15 304 3.16  
 
Hypothesis Ib: Participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their 
driveway will comply with an unethical request to sign the neighbor’s community 
service hours form more often than participants who do not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis IIb: Participants will comply with the request to sign the neighbor’s 
community service hours form when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more 
than when the request is explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis IIIb: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and 
whether the request to sign the neighbor’s community service hours form is 
explicitly or not explicitly stated as unethical.   Specifically, participants will comply 
with the request more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as 
unethical, and they receive a favor. Stated differently, the request being explicitly 
sated as unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor. 
 
 
Hypotheses Ib, IIb and IIIb were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no 
favor) × 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for likelihood to comply with a request to sign your 
neighbor’s community service hours form (1 definitely comply – 7 definitely not 
comply). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 19. An analysis of 
variance summary table is included as Table 20. As predicted in Hypothesis Ib, the 
analysis yielded the main effect for likelihood to comply with the request to sign the 
neighbor’s form in the favor condition (M = 4.61, SD = 1.94) than in no favor condition 




The analysis found no main effect for if the request was explicitly sated as 
unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis IIb. The likelihood to 
comply with the request to sign the neighbor’s community service hours form in explicit 
condition (M = 4.99, SD = 1.87) was not significantly different than the likelihood to 
comply with the request in the not explicit condition (M = 4.91, SD = 1.93), F(1,304) = 
0.14 p = .71. 
Hypothesis IIIb predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the 
explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request. More 
specifically participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act 
is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor.  The same ANOVA analysis 
as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and 
explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request to sign the 
neighbor’s community service hours form F(1,304) = 0.78 p = 0.38. Stated differently, 
the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly reduce the effect from 
receiving a favor in likelihood to comply with the request. 
The means for likelihood of compliance by condition, for all four scenarios, are 


















Analysis of Variance for Likelihood to Sign Neighbor’s Form by Favor and Explicit 
Conditions 
 Source SS df MS F 
 Favor Condition 35.81 1 35.81 10.26* 
 Explicit  0.48 1 0.48 0.14 
Favor Condition * 
Explicit 2.74 1 2.74 0.78 
Error 1061.18 304 3.49  
Note. * = p = .002 
 
 
Hypothesis Ic: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former co-
worker will comply with an unethical request to agree to send referrals to the 
former co-worker more often than participants who do not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis IIc: Participants will comply with the request to agree to send referrals 
to their former co-worker when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than 
when the request is explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis IIIc: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and 
whether the agree to send referrals to a former co-worker is explicitly or not 
explicitly stated as unethical.   Specifically, participants will comply with the request 
more often when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they 
receive a favor. Stated differently, the request being explicitly sated as unethical will 
reduce the effects of receiving a favor. 
 
 
  Favor Condition No Favor Condition 








Dependent variable (n=76) (n=77) (n=78) (n=77) 
Likelihood to 
comply with request 4.55 4.66 5.42 5.16 




Hypotheses Ic, IIc and IIIc were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no 
favor) × 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for likelihood to comply with the request of sending 
referrals to a former co-worker (1 definitely comply – 7 definitely not comply). The 
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 21. An analysis of variance 
summary table is included as Table 22. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis Ic, the 
analysis did not yield a significant main effect for likelihood to comply with the request 
to send referrals to your former co-worker in the favor condition (M = 4.86, SD = 1.71) 
than in no favor condition (M = 5.07, SD = 1.76), F(1,304) = 1.18  p =.28.  
The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly sated as 
unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis IIc. The likelihood to 
comply with the request to send referrals to a former co-worker in explicit condition (M = 
4.97, SD = 1.76) was not significantly different than the likelihood to comply with the 
request in the not explicit condition (M = 4.95, SD = 1.72), F(1,304) = 0.01 p = .92. 
Hypothesis IIIc predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and 
explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request. More 
specifically participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act 
is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor.  The same ANOVA analysis 
as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and 
explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request to send 
referrals to a former co-worker F(1,304) = 0.15 p = .82. Stated differently, the request 
being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a 




The means for likelihood of compliance by condition, for all four scenarios, are 
presented as a graph in Figure 15. 
Table 21 
Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Former Co-Worker  




Analysis of Variance for Likelihood to Send Co-Worker Referrals by Favor and Explicit 
Conditions 
 Source SS df MS F 
 Favor Condition 3.56 1 3.56 .279 
 Explicit .03 1 .03 .917 
Favor Condition * 
Explicit .16 1 .16 .821 
Error 918.87 304 3.02  
 
 
Hypothesis Id: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick 
retaining wall from a contractor will comply with an unethical request to provide 
the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s 
roofing project more often than participants who do not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis IId: Participants will comply with the request to provide the contractor 
with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s roofing project, 
when the ethics violation is not explicitly stated more than when the request is 
explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis IIId: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and 
whether the request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the 
bid for the condo association’s roofing project is explicitly or not explicitly stated as 
unethical.   Specifically, participants will comply with the request more often when 
  Favor Condition No Favor Condition 








Dependent variable (n=77) (n=76) (n=77) (n=78) 
Likelihood to 
comply with request 4.84 4.87 5.10 5.04 




the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor. 
Stated differently, the request being explicitly sated as unethical will reduce the 
effects of receiving a favor. 
 
 
Hypotheses Id, IId and IIId were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no 
favor) × 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for likelihood to comply with the request to provide the 
contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s roofing 
project (1 definitely comply – 7 definitely not comply). The means and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 23. An analysis of variance summary table is included 
as Table 24. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis Id, the analysis did not yield a 
significant main effect for likelihood to comply with the request to provide the contractor 
with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s roofing project in the 
favor condition (M = 4.23, SD = 1.90) than in no favor condition (M = 4.45, SD = 1.86), 
F(1,304) = 1.20  p =.27.  
The analysis found a main effect for if the request was explicitly sated as 
unethical or not, as was predicted by Hypothesis IId. The likelihood to comply with the 
request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo 
association’s roofing project in the explicit condition (M = 4.60, SD = 1.81) was 
significantly different than the likelihood to comply with the request in the not explicit 
condition (M = 4.08, SD = 1.87), F(1,304) = 5.99 p = .02. The results suggest the 
explicitly unethical requests were less likely to be carried out by the participants than the 
same request that was not stated as explicitly unethical. 
Hypothesis IIId predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and 




specifically participants will comply with the request more often when the requested act 
is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor.  The same ANOVA analysis 
as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and 
explicitness of the ethics violation in the likelihood to comply with the request to provide 
the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s roofing 
project F(1,304) = 1.99 p = .16. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly 
unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor in likelihood to 
comply with the request. 
The means for likelihood of compliance by condition, for all four scenarios, are 
presented as a graph in Figure 15. 
Table 23 
Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Contractor  





  Favor Condition No Favor Condition 








Dependent variable (n=77) (n=77) (n=76) (n=78) 
Likelihood to 
comply with request 4.34 4.12 4.87 4.05 







Analysis of Variance for Likelihood to Give Contractor Price to Win Condo Roofing 
Project by Favor and Explicit Conditions 
 Source SS df MS F 
 Favor Condition 4.17 1 4.17 1.204 
 Explicit  20.74 1 20.74 5.99* 
Favor Condition * 
Explicit 6.85 1 6.85 1.979 
Error 1051.65 304 3.46  
Note. * = p = .015 
 
Figure 15 




Hypothesis IVa: Participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels 
from a researcher will be less likely to consider the negative consequences they 
could face for signing someone else’s name to a consent form than participants who 





Hypothesis Va: Participants who are asked to comply with the explicit unethical 
request to sign someone else’s name to a consent form will be more likely to consider 
the negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked to agree 
to a non-explicit unethical request.  
 
Hypothesis VIa: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and 
the explicitness of the unethical act that is requested.   Specifically, participants will 
consider the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request 
to sign someone else’s name to a consent form less when they receive a favor, and 
the request is not explicitly unethical.  Stated differently, a request being explicitly 
unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor. 
 
Hypotheses IVa, Va and VIa were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no 
favor) × 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for how much they considered the negative consequences 
they could face for complying with the request to sign someone else’s name to a consent 
form (1 to great extent – 7 not at all). The means and standard deviations are presented in 
Table 25. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 26. Contrary to the 
prediction in Hypothesis IVa, the analysis did not yield a significant main effect for how 
much they considered the negative consequences they could for complying with the 
request to sign someone else’s name to the consent form in the favor condition (M = 3.57, 
SD = 2.01) than in no favor condition (M = 3.48, SD = 2.15), F(1,304) = 0.15 p =.70.  
The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly sated as 
unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis Va. How much a 
participant considered the negative consequences they could face for complying with the 
request to sign someone else’s name to the consent form in explicit condition (M = 3.36, 
SD = 2.10) was not significantly different than how much a participant considered the 
negative consequences they could face by complying with the request in the not explicit 




Hypothesis VIa predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the 
explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant considered the negative 
consequences they could face by complying with the request. More specifically 
participants will consider the negative consequences of complying with the request less 
when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor.  The 
same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between 
favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant 
considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request to 
sign someone else’s name to a consent form F(1,304) = 0.45 p = .51. Stated differently, 
the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from 
receiving a favor in how much a participant considered the negative consequences they 
could face by complying with the request. 
The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative 
consequences they could face if they complied with the request, for all four scenarios, are 
displayed as a graph in Figure 16. 
Table 25 
Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Bogus Consent Form 
Note. Consideration of negative consequences: 1- To great extent to 7- Not at all 
  Favor Condition No Favor Condition 








Dependent variable (n=76) (n=77) (n=77) (n=78) 
Consideration of 
negative consequence 3.49 3.65 3.23 3.72 






Analysis of Variance for Consideration of Negative Consequences for Signing Someone 
Else’s Name by Favor and Explicit Conditions 
 Source SS df MS F 
 Favor Condition 0.66 1 0.66 0.146 
 Explicit  8.05 1 8.05 1.799 
Favor Condition * 
Explicit 1.99 1 1.99 0.445 
Error 1360.11 304 4.474  
 
Hypothesis IVb: Participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their 
driveway will be consider the negative consequences they could face for complying 
with the request to sign the neighbor’s community service hours form less than 
participants who did not receive a favor. 
 
Hypothesis Vb: Participants who are asked to comply with the explicit unethical 
request to sign the neighbor’s community service hours form will be more likely to 
consider the negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked 
to agree to a non-explicit unethical request.  
 
Hypothesis VIb: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and 
the explicitness of the unethical act that is requested.   Specifically, participants will 
consider the negative consequence they could face for complying with the request to 
sign the neighbor’s community service hours form less when they receive a favor, 
and the request is not explicitly unethical.  Stated differently, a request being 
explicitly unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.  
 
 
Hypotheses IVb, Vb and Vb were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no 
favor) × 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for how much they considered the negative consequences 
they could face for complying with the request sign the neighbor’s community service 
hours form (1 to great extent – 7 not at all). The means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 27. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 28. 
Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis IVb, the analysis did not yield a significant main 




with the request to sign the neighbor’s community service hours form in the favor 
condition (M = 3.71, SD = 1.94) than in no favor condition (M = 3.72, SD = 2.07), 
F(1,304) = 0.005 p =.95.  
The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly sated as 
unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis Vb. How much a 
participant considered the negative consequences they could face for complying with the 
request to sign the neighbor’s community service hours form in explicit condition (M = 
3.80, SD = 2.07) was not significantly different than how much a participant considered 
the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request in the not 
explicit condition (M = 3.63, SD = 1.94), F(1,304) = 0.54 p = .46. 
Hypothesis VIb predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the 
explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant considered the negative 
consequences they could face by complying with the request. More specifically 
participants will consider the negative consequences of complying with the request less 
when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor.  The 
same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between 
favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant 
considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request to 
sign the neighbor’s community service hours form F(1,304) = 0.22 p = .64. Stated 
differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the 
effect from receiving a favor in how much a participant considered the negative 




The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative 
consequences they could face if they complied with the request, for all four scenarios, are 
displayed as a graph in Figure 16. 
Table 27 
Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Neighbor’s Form 




Analysis of Variance for Consideration of Negative Consequences for Signing 
Neighbor’s Form by Favor and Explicit Conditions 
 Source SS df MS F 
 Favor Condition 0.02 1 0.02 0.005 
 Explicit 2.17 1 2.17 0.538 
Favor Condition * 
Explicit 0.87 1 0.87 0.216 
Error 1227.77 304 4.04  
 
Hypothesis IVc: Participants who receive a favor of a free meal from their former 
co-worker will be consider the negative consequences they could face for complying 
with the request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker less than 
participants who did not receive a favor. 
 
Hypothesis Vc: Participants who are asked to comply with the explicit unethical 
request to agree to send referrals to their former co-worker will be more likely to 
consider the negative consequences they could face than participants who are asked 
to agree to a non-explicit unethical request.  
 
  Favor Condition No Favor Condition 








Dependent variable (n=76) (n=77) (n=78) (n=77) 
Consideration of 
negative consequence 3.74 3.68 3.86 3.58 




Hypothesis VIc: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and 
the explicitness of the unethical act that is requested.   Specifically, participants will 
consider the negative consequence they could face for complying with the request to 
agree to send referrals to their former co-worker less when they receive a favor, and 
the request is not explicitly unethical.  Stated differently, a request being explicitly 
unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.  
 
 
Hypotheses IVc, Vc and VIc were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no 
favor) × 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for how much they considered the negative consequences 
they could face for complying with the request to agree to send referrals to their former 
co-worker (1 to great extent – 7 not at all). The means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 29. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 30. 
Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis IVc, the analysis did not yield a significant main 
effect for how much they considered the negative consequences they could for complying 
with the request to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker in the favor condition 
(M = 3.09, SD = 1.96) than in no favor condition (M = 3.15, SD = 1.96), F(1,304) = 0.06 
p =.81.  
The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly sated as 
unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis Vc. How much a 
participant considered the negative consequences they could face for complying with the 
request to agree to send referrals to the former co-worker in the explicit condition (M = 
2.96, SD = 1.99) was not significantly different than how much a participant considered 
the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request in the not 




Hypothesis VIc predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the 
explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant considered the negative 
consequences they could face by complying with the request. More specifically 
participants will consider the negative consequences of complying with the request less 
when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor.  The 
same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between 
favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant 
considered the negative consequences they could face by complying with the request to 
agree to send referrals to the former co-worker F(1,304) = 0.05 p = .83. Stated 
differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the 
effect from receiving a favor in how much a participant considered the negative 
consequences they could face by complying with the request. 
The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative 
consequences they could face if they complied with the request, for all four scenarios, are 
displayed as a graph in Figure 16. 
Table 29 
Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Former Co-Worker 
Note. Consideration of negative consequences: 1- To great extent to 7- Not at all 
 
  Favor Condition No Favor Condition 








Dependent variable (n=77) (n=76) (n=77) (n=78) 
Consideration of 
negative consequence 2.91 3.28 3.01 3.28 






Analysis of Variance for Consideration of Negative Consequences for Sending 
Referrals to Former Co-Worker by Favor and Explicit Conditions 
 Source SS df MS F 
 Favor Condition 0.23 1 0.23 0.060 
 Explicit 7.79 1 7.79 2.028 
Favor Condition * 
Explicit 0.19 1 0.19 0.048 
Error 1168.34 304 3.84  
 
 
Hypothesis IVd: Participants who receive a favor of free work on their brick 
retaining wall from a contractor will consider the negative consequences they could 
face for complying with the request to provide the contractor with the price 
necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s roofing project less than 
participants who did not receive a favor. 
 
Hypothesis Vd: Participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical 
request to provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the 
condo association’s roofing project will be more likely to consider the negative 
consequences they could face than participants who are asked to agree to a non-
explicit unethical request.  
 
Hypothesis VId: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition and 
the explicitness of the unethical act that is requested.   Specifically, participants will 
consider the negative consequence they could face for complying with the request to 
agree to send referrals to their former co-worker less when they receive a favor, and 
the request is not explicitly unethical.  Stated differently, a request being explicitly 
unethical will reduce the effects of receiving a favor.  
 
 
Hypotheses IVd, Vd and VId were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, no 
favor) × 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for how much they considered the negative consequences 
they could face for complying with the request to provide the contractor with the price 
necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s roofing project (1 to great extent – 7 
not at all). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 31. An analysis of 




IVd, the analysis did not yield a significant main effect for how much they considered the 
negative consequences they could for complying with the request to provide the 
contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s roofing 
project in the favor condition (M = 4.18, SD = 1.84) than in no favor condition (M = 4.26, 
SD = 1.93), F(1,304) = 0.15 p =.70.  
The analysis found a main effect for if the request was explicitly sated as 
unethical or not, as what was predicted by Hypothesis Vd. How much a participant 
considered the negative consequences they could face for complying with the request to 
provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s 
roofing project in the explicit condition (M = 3.92, SD = 1.89) was significantly different 
than how much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by 
complying with the request in the not explicit condition (M = 4.52, SD = 1.84), F(1,304) 
= 8.01 p = .005. The results suggest the explicitly unethical requests were less likely to be 
carried out by the participants than the same request that was not stated as explicitly 
unethical. 
Hypothesis VId predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the 
explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant considered the negative 
consequences they could face by complying with the request. More specifically 
participants will consider the negative consequences of complying with the request less 
when the requested act is not explicitly stated as unethical, and they receive a favor.  The 
same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between 
favor condition and explicitness of the ethics violation in how much a participant 




provide the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s 
roofing project F(1,304) = 1.94 p = .17. Stated differently, the request being stated as 
explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor in how 
much a participant considered the negative consequences they could face by complying 
with the request. 
The mean scores for how much a participant considered the negative 
consequences they could face if they complied with the request, for all four scenarios, are 
displayed as a graph in Figure 16. 
Table 31 
Experiment 4 Means and Standard Variations by Condition: Contractor 




Analysis of Variance for Consideration of Negative Consequences for Giving Price to 
Contractor Necessary to Win Condo Roofing Project by Favor and Explicit Conditions 
 Source SS df MS F 
 Favor Condition 0.52 1 0.52 0.151 
 Explicit  27.77 1 27.77 8.014* 
Favor Condition * 
Explicit 6.73 1 6.73 1.94 
Error 1053.38 304 3.47  




  Favor Condition No Favor Condition 








Dependent variable (n=77) (n=77) (n=76) (n=78) 
Consideration of 
negative consequence 3.73 4.62 4.11 4.41 





Mean Scores for Consideration of Negative Consequences a Participant Could Face if 
They Complied with Request in Each of the Four Conditions and Scenarios 
 
 
Hypothesis VIIa: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by the 
researcher for participants who receive a favor of a Diet Coke and bag of pretzels 
from the researcher than participants who do not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis VIIIa: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for 
participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to sign 
someone else’s name to a consent form than participants who are asked to agree to 
the same unethical request that is not explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis IXa: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of 
receiving a can of Diet Coke and bag of pretzels and how explicit the unethical act is 
that is requested.   Specifically, participants will find it less important to be 
perceived as cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is 
explicitly unethical.  Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will 
reduce the effects of receiving a favor in the importance of being perceived as 
cooperative. 
 
Hypotheses VIIa, VIIIa and IXa were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, 
no favor) × 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects 




researcher (1 not important – 7 very important). The means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 33. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 34. 
Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis VIIa, the analysis did not yield a significant 
main effect for importance to be perceived as cooperative by the researcher in the favor 
condition (M = 2.81, SD = 1.81) than in no favor condition (M = 2.46, SD = 1.76), 
F(1,304) = 3.02 p =.08.  
The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly sated as 
unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis VIIIa. The importance to 
be perceived as cooperative by the researcher in the explicit condition (M = 2.60, SD = 
1.76) was not significantly different than importance to be perceived as cooperative by 
the researcher in the not explicit condition (M = 2.66, SD = 1.82), F(1,304) = 0.09  p = 
.76. 
Hypothesis IXa predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the 
explicitness of the ethics violation in the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the 
researcher. More specifically participants would consider the importance to be perceived 
as cooperative by the researcher less when the requested act is explicitly stated as 
unethical, and they do not receive a favor.  The same ANOVA analysis as above did not 
yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics 
violation in how important it was for the participant to be perceived as cooperative by the 
researcher F(1,304) = 0.127 p = .26. Stated differently, the request being stated as 
explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor how 




The mean scores for how important it was for a participant to be perceived as 
cooperative by the requester, for all four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 17. 
Table 33  








Analysis of Variance for Importance to be Perceived as Cooperative by the Researcher 
by Favor and Explicit Conditions 
 Source SS df MS F 
 Favor Condition 9.64 1 9.64 3.023 
 Explicit  0.29 1 0.29 0.092 
Favor Condition * 
Explicit 4.04 1 4.04 1.268 
Error 969.63 304 3.19  
 
Hypothesis VIIb: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by a 
neighbor for participants who receive a favor of their neighbor shoveling their 
driveway than participants who do not receive a favor.  
 
Hypothesis VIIIb: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for 
participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to sign the 
neighbor’s community service hours form to than participants who are asked to 
agree to the same unethical request that is not explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis IXb: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of 
the neighbor shoveling the participant’s driveway and how explicit the unethical act 
is that is requested.   Specifically, participants will find it less important to be 
  Favor Condition No Favor Condition 








Dependent variable (n=76) (n=77) (n=77) (n=78) 
Importance to be 
perceived as 
cooperative 2.89 2.73 2.31 2.60 




perceived as cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the request is 
explicitly unethical.  Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical will 
reduce the effects of receiving a favor in the importance of being perceived as 
cooperative. 
 
Hypotheses VIIb, VIIIb and IXb were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, 
no favor) × 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the 
neighbor (1 not important – 7 very important). The means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 35. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 36. 
Consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis VIIb, the analysis yielded a significant main 
effect for importance to be perceived as cooperative by the neighbor in the favor 
condition (M = 4.12, SD = 1.63) than in no favor condition (M = 3.24, SD = 1.68), 
F(1,304) = 22.11 p < .001.  
The analysis found no main effect for if the request was explicitly sated as 
unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis VIIIb. The importance to 
be perceived as cooperative by the researcher in the explicit condition (M = 3.53, SD = 
1.82) was not significantly different than importance to be perceived as cooperative by 
the researcher in the not explicit condition (M = 3.82, SD = 1.59), F(1,304) = 2.30  p = 
.13. 
Hypothesis IXb predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the 
explicitness of the ethics violation in the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the 
neighbor. More specifically, participants would consider the importance to be perceived 
as cooperative by the neighbor less when the requested act is explicitly stated as 
unethical, and they do not receive a favor.  The same ANOVA analysis as above did not 




violation in how important it was for the participant to be perceived as cooperative by the 
neighbor F(1,304) = 1.39 p = .24. Stated differently, the request being stated as explicitly 
unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor how important it 
was for the participant to be perceived as cooperative by the neighbor. 
The mean scores for how important it was for a participant to be perceived as 
cooperative by the requester, for all four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 17. 
Table 35  








Analysis of Variance for Importance to be Perceived as Cooperative by the Neighbor 
by Favor and Explicit Conditions 
 Source SS df MS F 
 Favor Condition 60.12 1 60.12 22.106* 
 Explicit 6.26 1 6.26 2.300 
Favor Condition * 
Explicit 3.77 1 3.77 1.386 
Error 826.72 304 2.72  
Note. * = p < .001 
 
Hypothesis VIIc: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by a 
former co-worker for participants who receive a favor of a free meal from the 
former co-worker than participants who do not receive a favor.  
  Favor Condition No Favor Condition 








Dependent variable (n=76) (n=77) (n=78) (n=77) 
Importance to be 
perceived as 
cooperative 4.09 4.16 2.99 3.49 





Hypothesis VIIIc: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for 
participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to send 
referrals to the former co-worker than participants who are asked to agree to the 
same unethical request that is not explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis IXc: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of 
the former co-worker buying dinner for the participant and how explicit the 
unethical act is that is requested.   Specifically, participants will find it less 
important to be perceived as cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the 
request is explicitly unethical.  Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical 




Hypotheses VIIc, VIIIc and IXc were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, 
no favor) × 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the 
former co-worker (1 not important – 7 very important). The means and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 37. An analysis of variance summary table is included 
as Table 38. Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis VIIc, the analysis did not yield a 
significant main effect for importance to be perceived as cooperative by the former co-
worker in the favor condition (M = 3.32, SD = 1.68) than in no favor condition (M = 3.56, 
SD = 1.76), F(1,304) = 1.52  p = .29.  
The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly sated as 
unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis VIIIc. The importance to 
be perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker in the explicit condition (M = 3.27, 
SD = 1.65) was not significantly different than importance to be perceived as cooperative 
by the former co-worker in the not explicit condition (M = 3.62, SD = 1.78), F(1,304) = 




Hypothesis IXc predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the 
explicitness of the ethics violation in the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the 
former co-worker. More specifically, participants would consider the importance to be 
perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker less when the requested act is 
explicitly stated as unethical, and they do not receive a favor.  The same ANOVA 
analysis as above did not yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition 
and explicitness of the ethics violation in how important it was for the participant to be 
perceived as cooperative by the former co-worker F(1,304) = 0.08 p = .77. Stated 
differently, the request being stated as explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the 
effect from receiving a favor how important it was for the participant to be perceived as 
cooperative by the former co-worker. 
The mean scores for how important it was for a participant to be perceived as 
cooperative by the requester, for all four scenarios, are displayed as a graph in Figure 17. 
Table 37 




Note. Importance to be perceived as cooperative: 1- Not important to 7- Very important 
 
 
  Favor Condition No Favor Condition 








Dependent variable (n=77) (n=76) (n=77) (n=78) 
Importance to be 
perceived as 
cooperative 3.42 3.71 3.12 3.53 






Analysis of Variance for Importance to be Perceived as Cooperative by the Former Co-
Worker by Favor and Explicit Conditions 
 Source SS df MS F 
 Favor Condition 4.50 1 4.50 1.524 
 Explicit 9.53 1 9.53 3.228 
Favor Condition * 
Explicit 0.25 1 0.25 0.084 
Error 897.73 304 2.95  
 
Hypothesis VIId: It will be more important to be perceived as cooperative by the 
contractor for participants who receive a favor of the contractor fixing the 
participants brick retaining wall for free than participants who do not receive a 
favor.  
 
Hypothesis VIIId: It will be less important to be perceived as cooperative for 
participants who are asked to comply with an explicit unethical request to provide 
the contractor with the price necessary to win the bid for the condo association’s 
roofing project than participants who are asked to agree to the same unethical 
request that is not explicitly stated as unethical. 
 
Hypothesis IXd: There will be an interaction effect between the favor condition of 
the contractor fixing the participants brick retaining wall for free and how explicit 
the unethical act is that is requested.   Specifically, participants will find it less 
important to be perceived as cooperative when they do not receive a favor, and the 
request is explicitly unethical.  Stated differently, a request being explicitly unethical 




Hypotheses VIId, VIIId and IXd were analyzed with a 2 (Favor condition: favor, 
no favor) × 2 (Explicitness of ethics violation: explicit, not explicit) between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the 
contractor (1 not important – 7 very important). The means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 39. An analysis of variance summary table is included as Table 40. 
Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis VIId, the analysis did not yield a significant 




condition (M = 3.44, SD = 1.64) than in no favor condition (M = 3.08, SD = 1.65), 
F(1,304) = 3.65 p = .06.  
The analysis also found no main effect for if the request was explicitly sated as 
unethical or not, contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis VIIId. The importance to 
be perceived as cooperative by the contractor in the explicit condition (M = 3.08, SD = 
1.63) was not significantly different than importance to be perceived as cooperative by 
the contractor in the not explicit condition (M = 3.43, SD = 1.66), F(1,304) = 3.54  p = 
.06. 
Hypothesis IXd predicted an interaction effect between favor condition and the 
explicitness of the ethics violation in the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the 
contractor. More specifically, participants would consider the importance to be perceived 
as cooperative by the contractor less when the requested act is explicitly stated as 
unethical, and they do not receive a favor.  The same ANOVA analysis as above did not 
yield a significant interaction effect between favor condition and explicitness of the ethics 
violation in how important it was for the participant to be perceived as cooperative by the 
contractor F(1,304) = 2.79 p = .10. Stated differently, the request being stated as 
explicitly unethical did not significantly impact the effect from receiving a favor how 
important it was for the participant to be perceived as cooperative by the contractor. 
The mean scores for how important it was for a participant to be perceived as 






Table 39  








Analysis of Variance for Importance to be Perceived as Cooperative by the Contractor 
by Favor and Explicit Conditions 
 Source SS df MS F 
 Favor Condition 9.70 1 9.70 3.645 
 Explicit  9.41 1 9.41 3.537 
Favor Condition * 
Explicit 7.43 1 7.43 2.792 









  Favor Condition No Favor Condition 








Dependent variable (n=77) (n=77) (n=76) (n=78) 
Importance to be 
perceived as 
cooperative 3.42 3.45 2.75 3.41 





Mean Scores for Importance to be Perceived as Cooperative by the Requester in Each of 
the Four Conditions and Scenarios 
 
Discussion- Experiment 4 
The aim of Experiment 4 was to build on Experiments 3 and investigate how the 
explicitness of the ethics violation impacts compliance, the consideration of negative 
consequences, and the importance of being perceived as cooperative. There were also 
four different scenarios used to investigate the research questions to have results that 
could be generalizable. The focus theory of normative conduct suggests there can be 
competing norms that potentially guide behavior.  The norm that is most salient is 
ultimately the norm that influences the behavior.  The explicit conditions in this 
experiment made it clear to the participant that the requester knew their request was 




of the injunctive norm to comply with the unethical request?  Would the fact that ethics 
were addressed by the requester trigger a moral schema in the participant driving them to 
act in ethical ways?  
The results were largely not significant with a few exceptions which make the 
findings difficult to interpret. When investigating compliance based on receiving a favor 
or not, the only significant main effect was for receiving a favor in the neighbor’s 
community service form scenario. This scenario was also the only one which saw a 
significant main effect for the importance to be perceived as cooperative by the requester 
when receiving a favor. When looking at the results together, it is possible the type of 
favor drove these findings. The favor in the neighbor’s community service form scenario 
was the only favor that saved the participant from physical labor (shoveling snow), 
something that was stated the participant dreaded to do.  The other scenarios’ initial 
favors were receiving a snack, free meal, or repair work to a brick wall. Future research 
should investigate to see if a favor that is reduces the workload for an individual, 
including physical labor, is more powerful in gaining compliance than receiving an 
unexpected gift or snack. 
The only significant result that was directly related to the explicitness of the ethics 
violation was the likelihood to consider negative consequences in the contractor scenario. 
This was the only scenario that stated the requested act was “probably illegal”, while the 
other scenarios stated the request was wrong or against company policy.  It is possible the 
statement that the act is probably illegal drove the differences in the consideration of 
negative consequences between the explicit and not explicit conditions. Despite this 




negative consequences in every condition when compared to the other scenarios.  As 
discussed in experiment 3, a possible reason for this pattern of results is that the 
contractor scenario was the only scenario where the participant had something to gain by 
complying.  This should be explored in future research in the context of how explicitly 
the ethics violation is conveyed. 
General Discussion 
This dissertation set out to investigate reciprocity and fraud.  Would receiving a 
small initial favor make people more susceptible to being victims of fraud. Would a small 
initial favor keep people from asking clarifying questions that could identify the fraud? 
Would receiving a small favor make people more susceptible to being influenced to be a 
party to fraud?  Would a small favor induce people to act against their self-interest? The 
author drew on theoretical models in three key areas: normative decision models, ethical 
decision models and social normative decision models to attempt to answer these 
questions. Four empirical studies were conducted to test the predictions of these theories 
in the context of reciprocity, fraud, and ethics.  
Following the predictions of the norm of reciprocity, injunctive norms and the 
focus theory of normative conduct, it was hypothesized in experiments 1 and 2 that 
individuals who received an initial favor would be susceptible to sign a bogus consent 
form stating they owed a “research fee”, ask less questions about the fee, want to be 
perceived as more cooperative by the requester, irrespective of their level of trust in the 




One, small favors do make people more susceptible to complying with a 
fraudulent request as predicted by norm of reciprocity. This is in line with prior 
reciprocity findings that the favor creates an obligation to repay the favor (Cialdini, 2009; 
Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; Gouldner, 1960). The fact that there was 100% 
compliance in people agreeing to pay a $10 fee, that they should not have to pay, is 
alarming. This would suggest that small stakes fraud very rarely gets reported, giving 
unscrupulous con artists a license to rip people off a few dollars at a time. These findings 
support AARP’s (1994) report that estimates 85% of individuals have been defrauded or 
deceived in some way with the vast majority going unreported.  
Two, when the stakes are small, potential victims are less likely to ask any 
clarifying questions about the fraud.  This is the first study, to the author’s knowledge, 
that has empirically studied the effects of reciprocity and its impact on asking questions 
of a subsequent request and the findings are consistent with injunctive norms and the 
focus theory of normative conduct. There is a salient expectation for social approval and 
not question the requester. The potential victim will adjust their behavior to align with 
this expectation (Cialdini et al, 1990; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; White & Simpson, 
2013).  The larger $89.56 fee condition did not see a significant difference in questioning 
rates based on favor condition. Like the small stakes’ fraud, compliance discussed in the 
previous paragraph, this finding is also troubling.   Providing an initial favor in smalltime 
fraud is a recipe for a swindler to take advantage of people.   
Three, the more important it is for an individual to be perceived as cooperative the 
more likely they were to comply with the fraudulent request.  When the need to be 




focus theory of normative conduct and self-discrepancy theory. It is important to 
understand what leads people to believe it is important to be perceived as cooperative.  
Future research directions are discussed below. 
Experiment 3 and 4 investigated reciprocity, fraud, and ethics by pitting two 
ethical standards against each other. One, an ethical standard to not commit fraud and 
two, the ethical standard to give back to someone who has given to you. Experiment 4 
explored if the fraudulent request was explicitly called out as being wrong by the 
requester would it impact compliance, the importance to be perceived as cooperative and 
consideration of negative consequences for complying with the request. There are several 
key takeaways from experiments 3 and 4.  
One, the pattern of results between experiments 3 and 4 saw participants comply 
with unethical requests, in the contractor scenario, at higher rates than the other scenarios.  
While the differences between scenarios was not part of these experiments, it is worth 
noting this type of analysis should be conducted in future research.  The contractor 
scenario was the only scenario where the participant had something to gain from 
complying with the request: a lower price tag for the association’s roof project.  
Two, experiment 4 found main effects for compliance and importance to be 
perceived as cooperative when comparing favor vs no favor conditions only in the 
neighbor’s community service form scenario.  This scenario was the only one in which 
the favor reduced the participant’s workload by shoveling their driveway.  It could be 
possible that the type of favor (i.e., doing someone else’s physical labor vs giving a 




the favor took care of something that was stated the participant “dreaded doing”. The 
importance of the initial favor, not just monetary considerations, could play a role in the 
power of reciprocity. 
Three, the importance to be perceived as cooperative was found to predict 
compliance.  This is a robust finding that has been observed several times in these 
experiments.  This result is in line with injunctive norms, focus theory of normative 
conduct and self-discrepancy theory.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
A limitation to experiments 1 and 2 was it utilized a sample drawn completely 
from undergraduate college students.  This is potentially problematic for two reasons: 
One, a more diverse sample could make the results more generalizable.  Two, the 
researcher who ran the experiments was older than the student participants. It is possible 
there could have been authority effects, that have been shown to increase compliance 
(Cialdini, 2009). Future research should draw on a more diverse participant pool and 
have multiple and diverse researchers running the experiments that limit the potential 
authority confound.  
Experiments 3 and 4 had each participant read all four scenarios.  It is possible 
participants were conditioned or primed with reciprocity and/ or ethics when reading the 
second, third and fourth vignettes. This has the potential for their later responses to be 
biased based on previous vignettes. Future studies should consider having participants 




Experiments 3 and 4 were conducted entirely online via MTurk because the 
pandemic did not allow for an in-person studies due to social distancing requirements. 
The experiments utilized vignettes and asked participants to imagine they were in a 
particular scenario. After reading each vignette they answered survey questions about 
how they would behave.  Future studies should utilize a paradigm similar to experiments 
1 and 2 where participants were actually in the scenario, not just imagining themselves in 
the situation, making real life decisions akin to a field study.   
Based on the robust findings that the importance to be perceived as cooperative 
predicted the likelihood an individual would comply with the fraudulent request, future 
research should investigate differences in susceptibility to reciprocity and fraud based 
individual differences, such as people who score high on agreeableness on the Big Five 
Personality Inventory (Goldberg, 1992).  
Conclusion 
 The Federal Trade Commission had 2.1 million reports of fraud totaling losses of 
$3.3 billion in 2020 (Federal Trade Commission, 2021). Although this figure is only a 
fraction of the total estimated consumer fraud in the United States, with some estimates at 
over $100 billion per year (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001). These statistics outline just 
how prevalent fraud is, with much of the unscrupulous acts never being reported.   This 
dissertation aimed to understand the underpinnings of reciprocity and ethics in the 
context of fraud. This was first empirical study (to the author’s knowledge) to investigate 
the likelihood to question fraudulent requests in a reciprocity framework. Through the 
lens of social normative decision models and ethical decision models, several insights 




victims fall prey to con artists and to one day influence policy and create interventions to 
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Experiments 1 & 2 Survey Questions 
1) How did you feel towards the researcher?   
1- somewhat negative, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- very positive 
 
2) What was your level of trust in the researcher?  
1- very low, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- very high 
 
3) Did you feel free to question the researcher?  
1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Yes 
 
4) Did you feel that you could negotiate the terms of the bogus consent form?  
1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Yes 
 
5) Did you feel rushed?  
1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Yes 
 
6) How important was it to you that the consent form be consistent with what you 
originally understood the costs to be in participating in the experiment?  
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very important 
 
7) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to the researcher?  
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very important 
 
8) How important was it to you that you were perceived as trustworthy by the researcher?  
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very important 
 
9) How carefully did you read the bogus consent form that you received?  
1- Did not read, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very carefully 
 
10) Did the description and terms of the study in the bogus consent form match the 
description and terms from the online registration system?   
Yes, No, Not sure 
 
11) Did you notice the $10 research fee in the bogus consent form?  
Yes, No 
 
12) I know what to be looking for when reading and before signing a consent form.  
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely 
 
 
13) I feel that I am not expected to read all of the words in a consent from before signing 
one.  





14) In deciding whether to read and sign the bogus consent form, I was influenced by 
what I had previously read on the experiment registration system.  
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely 
 
15) In deciding whether to sign the bogus consent form, I was influenced by the fact that 
I felt I was expected to sign the consent form.  
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely 
 
16) In deciding whether to read the bogus consent form, I was influenced by the length of 
the consent form.  
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely 
 
17) In deciding whether to read and sign the bogus consent form, I was influenced by the 
fact I was already sitting there to participate in the experiment.  
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely  
 
18) Did you receive a beverage or snack from the researcher? 
 Yes, No 
 
19) (If answered yes to question 18) In deciding whether to read the bogus consent form, 
I was influenced by the fact I received a beverage or snack from the researcher.  
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely 
 
* Only participants who answered question 9 with a 1 or 2 will receive the following 
seven questions. 
 
*20) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because I was lazy.  
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely 
 
*21) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because it was boring.  
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely 
 
*22) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because I have read other consent forms and I 
presumed that they all read the same.  
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely 
 
*23) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because I presumed that there was nothing 
problematic in the form because all experiments at DePaul must conform with federal 
standards and be approved by the IRB (Institutional Review Board).    
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely 
 
*24) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because I didn't think it contained anything 
important for me to know or agree to.  





*25) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because I have never heard of anyone having a 
problem with the consent forms they have signed.  
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely 
 
*26) I didn't read the bogus consent form, because it was too long.  
1- Do not agree, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Agree completely 
 





1) What is your age? (open ended response) 
 
2) What gender do you identify as?  






















































Experiment 2- Additional Demographic Questions 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
       Nursery, kindergarten, and elementary (grades 1-8) 
High school (grades 9-12, no degree) 
High school graduate (or equivalent) 
Some college (1-4 years, no degree or in process) 
Associate degree (including occupational or academic degrees) 
Bachelor’s degree (BA, BS, etc...) 
Master’s degree (MA, MS, etc...) 
Doctoral or Professional degree (JD, MD, PhD, etc...) 
 
What was your total household income before taxes during the past 12 months? 
Less than $10,000 
$10,000 to $14,999 
$15,000 to $24,999 
$25,000 to $34,999 
$35,000 to $49,999 
$50,000 to $74,999 
$75,000 to $99,999 
$100,000 to $149,999 
$150,000 to $199,999 
$200,000 or more 
 
What is your race and ethnicity (Check all that apply) 
African American 
American Indian/Alaskan Native 
Asian 
Hispanic/Latino 
Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander 
White 











Full Vignettes from Experiment 3  
 
Bogus consent from/ Diet Coke and pretzels 
 
Favor  
You agree to volunteer for a survey study at a local university.  When you arrive, 
you meet the researcher running the study and she says, “Thank you for coming in. 
Please have a seat.  Hold on one second while I grab some materials from the next 
room.”  When she returns, she is holding a folder, two diet cokes and two bags of 
pretzels.  They hand one of each to you say,” I needed a snack and don’t want to be rude 
and eat in front of you without giving you something.”  You accept the snack and 
beverage. 
  
You fill out some paperwork, sign a consent form and take a survey answering 
questions about consumer electronics. 
  
You finish the survey in five minutes and notify the researcher that you are done 
with the survey.  They thank you for your time and say you are free to go. 
 
While you are packing up your things, including the pretzels the beverage, the 
researcher says, “Would you mind helping me out?  I am really behind on getting data 
and need to have all my data collected by tomorrow.  Can you sign the name ‘Morgan 
Jones’ on this consent form?  I will complete the survey for Morgan. I just can’t have all 
the signatures in my handwriting." 
 
No favor  
You agree to volunteer for a survey study at a local university.  When you arrive, 
you meet the researcher running the study and she says, “Thank you for coming in. 
Please have a seat.  Hold on one second while I grab some materials from the next room.”  
She returns with holding a folder with some papers.  
 
You fill out some paperwork, sign a consent form and take a survey answering 
questions about consumer electronics. 
 
You finish the survey in five minutes and notify the researcher that you are done 




While you are packing up your things the researcher says, “Would you mind 




by tomorrow.  Can you sign the name ‘Morgan Jones’ on this consent form?  I will 
complete the survey for Morgan. I just can’t have all the signatures in my handwriting." 
 
 
Neighbor’s community service form/ Snow shoveling 
 
Favor  
Imagine you work as a supervisor at community center for older adults.  It has snowed all 
day and you dread shoveling your driveway. You return home to see your next-door 
neighbor, who is in high school, finishing shoveling snow from your driveway and 
sidewalk.    
Later that evening, you are taking your garbage out and run into your neighbor doing the 
same thing.  They say hi and ask how work at the community center is going.  You say, 
it’s is good, despite the long hours and thank them for shoveling your driveway.  
 
Your neighbor then pulls out a piece of paper and says “Can you do me a favor?  I am 
behind on my schoolwork and one of my assignments was to volunteer 15 service hours 
in the community by tomorrow.  Would you mind signing this form saying I volunteered 
at the community center?” 
 
No favor  
Imagine you work as a supervisor at community center for older adults.  It has snowed all 
day and you dread shoveling your driveway. You return home and shovel your driveway 
and sidewalk.  
   
Later that evening, you are taking your garbage out and run into your neighbor doing the 
same thing.  They say hi and ask how work at the community center is going.  You say 
it’s is good, despite the long hours. 
 
Your neighbor then pulls out a piece of paper and says “Can you do me a favor?  I am 
behind on my schoolwork and one of my assignments was to volunteer 15 service hours 
in the community by tomorrow.  Would you mind signing this form saying I volunteered 
at the community center?” 
 
 
Fromer banking co-workers referrals/ Free meal 
   
Favor 
You are a personal banker at a neighborhood bank.  You used to refer anyone looking for 
a mortgage to Terry, the home loan specialist in your branch. Terry left the bank two 
months ago to work for another mortgage lender. You are now required to refer anyone 
interested in a mortgage to Jamie, who works in the corporate headquarters in the next 
state over.  
 
Last week, you met Terry for a nice dinner and drinks to catch up and celebrate Terry’s 




position. When the waiter drops off the check, Terry insists on picking up the entire tab 
for the expensive dinner.  
 
On your way out, Terry says if you have any ideas on how they can get more customers 
they could really use it.  Hopefully, we can get together for more dinners on an ongoing 
basis, my treat. 
 
No Favor 
You are a personal banker at a neighborhood bank.  You used to refer anyone looking for 
a mortgage to Terry, the home loan specialist in your branch. Terry left the bank two 
months ago to work for another mortgage lender. You are now required to refer anyone 
interested in a mortgage to Jamie, who works in the corporate headquarters in the next 
state over.  
 
Last week, you met Terry for a nice dinner and drinks to catch up and celebrate Terry’s 
new job.  Terry mentions it has been a struggle to generate new customers in her new 
position. When the waiter drops off the check, you divvy up the bill and each pay your 
portion.  
 
On your way out, Terry says if you have any ideas on how they can get more customers 




Homeowner association contractor price request/ Free brick work 
 
Favor 
You are the president of a condo association consisting of 30 townhomes. There is a 
company who has done small maintenance and construction projects for residents in the 
past.  
 
One day you return home from work to see the owner of the company fixing your small 
rock retaining wall. You tell the owner; you didn’t order this work. They say, don’t 
worry, there is no charge for this work. I was already here doing a project for your 
neighbor and saw a few stones loose on your wall, so I secured them with some adhesive.  
It only took about 10 minutes.”   
 
The owner then inquiries about the project up for bid to replace the roofs for the entire 
complex and says, Where does my price need to be in order to get the business? 
 
No Favor 
You are the president of a condo association consisting of 30 townhomes. There is a 






One day you return home from work to see the owner of the company fixing your small 
rock retaining wall at your neighbors.   
 
The owner then inquiries about the project up for bid to replace the roofs for the entire 





















Experiment 3- Survey Questions  
Questions 1- 10- asked after first vignette 
1) How likely are you to sign Morgan’s name to the form? 
1- Definitely Sign 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Sign 
 
2) How much do you agree that you have an ethical obligation to give back to 
those that have given to you?   
1- Agree Strongly 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7-  
 
3) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to sign Morgan’s name 
to the second consent form?  
1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation  
 
4) While deciding to sign someone else’s name to the second form or not, did you 
think about negative consequences you could face for signing the form?  
1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All  
 
5) How ethical do you feel it is to sign someone else’s name to a consent form?  
1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical 
 
6) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to the 
researcher?  
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely important 
 
7) How awkward would it be to say “no” to the request to sign Morgan’s name?  
1- Not awkward, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely awkward 
 
8) How embarrassed would it be to say “no” to the request to sign Morgan’s 
name? 
1- Not embarrassed, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely embarrassed 
 
9) How much did you act like you trusted the researcher? 
1- Not at all , 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely 
 
 10) How much did you actually trust the researcher? 
  1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely 
 
Questions 11- 19 asked after second vignette 
11) How likely are you to sign your neighbor’s form? 







12) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to sign your 
neighbor’s form?  
1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation  
 
 
13) While deciding to sign your neighbor’s form, did you think about negative 
consequences you could face for signing the form?  
1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All  
 
14) How ethical do you feel it is to sign your neighbor’s form stating that the 
volunteer work was completed?  
1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical 
 
15) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to your 
neighbor?  
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely important 
 
16) How awkward would it be to say “no” to the request to sign your neighbor’s 
form?  
1- Not awkward, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely awkward 
 
17) How embarrassed would it be to say “no” to the request to sign your 
neighbor’s form? 
1- Not embarrassed, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely embarrassed 
 
18) How much did you act like you trusted your neighbor? 
1- Not at all , 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely 
 
19) How much did you actually trust your neighbor? 
  1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely 
 
Questions 20- 28 asked third vignette 
20) How likely are you to agree to send referrals to Terry? 
1- Definitely Send Referrals 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Send 
Referrals 
 
21) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to agree to send Terry 
referrals?  
1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation  
 
 
22) While deciding to agree to send Terry referrals, did you think about negative 
consequences you could face for doing so?  






23) How ethical do you feel it is to agree to send Terry referrals?  
1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical 
 
24) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to Terry?  
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely important 
 
25) How awkward would it be to say “no” to the request to send Terry referrals?  
1- Not awkward, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely awkward 
 
26) How embarrassed would it be to say “no” to the request to send Terry 
referrals? 
1- Not embarrassed, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely embarrassed 
 
27) How much did you act like you trusted Terry? 
1- Not at all , 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely 
 
28) How much did you actually trust Terry? 
  1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely 
 
Questions 29- 42  asked fourth vignette 
29) How likely are you to tell the contractor where is roof price needs to be to win 
the business? 
1- Definitely Give Price 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Give Price 
 
30) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to give a price to the 
contractor?  
1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation  
 
31) While deciding to give the price to the contractor, did you think about 
negative consequences you could face for doing so?  
1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All  
 
32) How ethical do you feel it is to give the price to the contractor?  
1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical 
 
33) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to the 
contractor?  
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely important 
 
34) How awkward would it be to say “no” to giving a price to the contractor?  
1- Not awkward, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely awkward 
 
35) How embarrassed would it be to say “no” to the request to give the contractor 
a price? 





36) How much did you act like you trusted the contractor? 
1- Not at all , 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely 
 
37) How much did you actually trust the contractor? 
  1- Not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Completely 
 
38) What is your age? (open ended response) 
 
39) What gender do you identify as?  
Female 
Male 
Non-binary/ third gender 
Prefer not to say 
 
40) What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
        Nursery, kindergarten, and elementary (grades 1-8) 
High school (grades 9-12, no degree) 
High school graduate (or equivalent) 
Some college (1-4 years, no degree or in process) 
Associate degree (including occupational or academic degrees) 
Bachelor’s degree (BA, BS, etc...) 
Master’s degree (MA, MS, etc...) 
Doctoral or Professional degree (JD, MD, PhD, etc...) 
 
41) What was your total household income before taxes during the past 12 
months? 
Less than $10,000 
$10,000 to $14,999 
$15,000 to $24,999 
$25,000 to $34,999 
$35,000 to $49,999 
$50,000 to $74,999 
$75,000 to $99,999 
$100,000 to $149,999 
$150,000 to $199,999 
$200,000 or more 
 
42) What is your race and ethnicity (Check all that apply) 
African American 
American Indian/Alaskan Native 
Asian 
Hispanic/Latino 
Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander 
White 
Other (please specify) 





Full Vignettes from Experiment 4 
 
Bogus consent from/ Diet Coke and pretzels 
 
Explicit/ Favor  
You agree to volunteer for a survey study at a local university.  When you arrive, 
you meet the researcher running the study and she says, “Thank you for coming in. 
Please have a seat.  Hold on one second while I grab some materials from the next 
room.”  When she returns, she is holding a folder, two diet cokes and two bags of 
pretzels.  They hand one of each to you say,” I needed a snack and don’t want to be rude 
and eat in front of you without giving you something.”  You accept the snack and 
beverage. 
  
You fill out some paperwork, sign a consent form and take a survey answering 
questions about consumer electronics. 
  
You finish the survey in five minutes and notify the researcher that you are done 
with the survey.  They thank you for your time and say you are free to go. 
  
While you are packing up your things, including the pretzels the beverage, the 
researcher says, “Would you mind helping me out?  I am really behind on getting data 
and need to have all my data collected by tomorrow.  I know it is wrong to do this, but 
can you sign the name ‘Morgan Jones’ on this consent form?  I will complete the survey 
for Morgan. I just can’t have all the signatures in my handwriting.” 
 
Explicit/  No favor 
You agree to volunteer for a survey study at a local university.  When you arrive, 
you meet the researcher running the study and she says, “Thank you for coming in. 
Please have a seat.  Hold on one second while I grab some materials from the next 
room.”  She returns with a folder and hands you some papers. 
  
You fill out some paperwork, sign a consent form and take a survey answering 
questions about consumer electronics. 
  
You finish the survey in five minutes and notify the researcher that you are done 
with the survey.  They thank you for your time and say you are free to go. 
  
While you are packing up your things the researcher says, “Would you mind 
helping me out?  I am really behind on getting data and need to have all my data collected 
by tomorrow.  I know it is wrong to do this, but can you sign the name ‘Morgan Jones’ 
on this consent form?  I will complete the survey for Morgan. I just can’t have all the 






Non-Explicit/ Favor  
You agree to volunteer for a survey study at a local university.  When you arrive, 
you meet the researcher running the study and she says, “Thank you for coming in. 
Please have a seat.  Hold on one second while I grab some materials from the next 
room.”  When she returns, she is holding a folder, two diet cokes and two bags of 
pretzels.  They hand one of each to you say,” I needed a snack and don’t want to be rude 
and eat in front of you without giving you something.”  You accept the snack and 
beverage. 
  
You fill out some paperwork, sign a consent form and take a survey answering 
questions about consumer electronics. 
  
You finish the survey in five minutes and notify the researcher that you are done 
with the survey.  They thank you for your time and say you are free to go. 
 
While you are packing up your things, including the pretzels the beverage, the 
researcher says, “Would you mind helping me out?  I am really behind on getting data 
and need to have all my data collected by tomorrow.  Can you sign the name ‘Morgan 
Jones’ on this consent form?  I will complete the survey for Morgan. I just can’t have all 
the signatures in my handwriting." 
 
Non-Explicit/  No favor  
You agree to volunteer for a survey study at a local university.  When you arrive, 
you meet the researcher running the study and she says, “Thank you for coming in. 
Please have a seat.  Hold on one second while I grab some materials from the next room.”  
She returns with holding a folder with some papers.  
 
You fill out some paperwork, sign a consent form and take a survey answering 
questions about consumer electronics. 
 
You finish the survey in five minutes and notify the researcher that you are done 
with the survey.  They thank you for your time and say you are free to go. 
 
While you are packing up your things the researcher says, “Would you mind 
helping me out?  I am really behind on getting data and need to have all my data collected 
by tomorrow.  Can you sign the name ‘Morgan Jones’ on this consent form?  I will 









Neighbor’s community service form/ Snow shoveling 
 
Explicit/ Favor  
Imagine you work as a supervisor at community center for older adults.  It has 
snowed all day and you dread shoveling your driveway. You return home to see your 
next-door neighbor, who is in high school, finishing shoveling snow from your driveway 
and sidewalk.    
 
Later that evening, you are taking your garbage out and run into your neighbor 
doing the same thing.  They say hi and ask how work at the community center is going.  
You say, It’s is good, despite the long hours and thank them for shoveling your driveway. 
 
Your neighbor then pulls out a piece of paper and says “Can you do me a favor?  I am 
behind on my schoolwork and one of my assignments was to volunteer 15 service hours 
in the community by tomorrow.  Would you mind signing this form saying I volunteered 
at the community center for 15 hours even though I haven’t?” 
 
Explicit/  No favor 
Imagine you work as a supervisor at community center for older adults.  It has 
snowed all day and you dread shoveling your driveway. You return home and shovel 
your driveway and sidewalk.   
  
Later that evening, you are taking your garbage out and run into your neighbor doing the 
same thing.  They say hi and ask how work at the community center is going.  You say 
it’s is good, despite the long hours. 
 
Your neighbor then pulls out a piece of paper and says “Can you do me a favor?  I am 
behind on my schoolwork and one of my assignments was to volunteer 15 service hours 
in the community by tomorrow.  Would you mind signing this form saying I volunteered 
at the community center for 15 hours even though I haven’t?”  
 
Non-Explicit/ Favor  
Imagine you work as a supervisor at community center for older adults.  It has snowed all 
day and you dread shoveling your driveway. You return home to see your next-door 
neighbor, who is in high school, finishing shoveling snow from your driveway and 
sidewalk.    
Later that evening, you are taking your garbage out and run into your neighbor doing the 
same thing.  They say hi and ask how work at the community center is going.  You say, 
it’s is good, despite the long hours and thank them for shoveling your driveway.  
 
Your neighbor then pulls out a piece of paper and says “Can you do me a favor?  I am 
behind on my schoolwork and one of my assignments was to volunteer 15 service hours 
in the community by tomorrow.  Would you mind signing this form saying I volunteered 






Non-Explicit/  No favor  
Imagine you work as a supervisor at community center for older adults.  It has snowed all 
day and you dread shoveling your driveway. You return home and shovel your driveway 
and sidewalk.  
   
Later that evening, you are taking your garbage out and run into your neighbor doing the 
same thing.  They say hi and ask how work at the community center is going.  You say 
it’s is good, despite the long hours. 
 
Your neighbor then pulls out a piece of paper and says “Can you do me a favor?  I am 
behind on my schoolwork and one of my assignments was to volunteer 15 service hours 
in the community by tomorrow.  Would you mind signing this form saying I volunteered 
at the community center?” 
 
 
Fromer banking co-workers referrals/ Free meal 
 
Explicit / Favor 
You are a personal banker at a neighborhood bank.  You used to refer anyone looking for 
a mortgage to Terry, the home loan specialist in your branch. Terry left the bank two 
months ago to work for another mortgage lender. You are now required to refer anyone 
interested in a mortgage to Jamie, who works in the corporate headquarters in the next 
state over.  
 
Last week, you met Terry for a nice dinner and drinks to catch up and celebrate Terry’s 
new job.  Terry mentions it has been a struggle to generate new customers in her new 
position. When the waiter drops off the check, Terry insists on picking up the entire tab 
for the expensive dinner.  
 
On your way out, Terry says, “I know it is against company policy, but any potential 
customers you can send my way would be much appreciated.  Hopefully, we can get 
together for more dinners on an ongoing basis, my treat.” 
 
 
Explicit /No favor  
You are a personal banker at a neighborhood bank.  You used to refer anyone looking for 
a mortgage to Terry, the home loan specialist in your branch. Terry left the bank two 
months ago to work for another mortgage lender. You are now required to refer anyone 
interested in a mortgage to Jamie, who works in the corporate headquarters in the next 
state over.  
 
Last week, you met Terry for a nice dinner and drinks to catch up and celebrate Terry’s 
new job.  Terry mentions it has been a struggle to generate new customers in her new 






On your way out, Terry says, “I know it is against company policy, but any potential 
customers you can send my way would be much appreciated. Hopefully, we can get 
together for more dinners on an ongoing basis.” 
   
Non-explicit/ Favor 
You are a personal banker at a neighborhood bank.  You used to refer anyone looking for 
a mortgage to Terry, the home loan specialist in your branch. Terry left the bank two 
months ago to work for another mortgage lender. You are now required to refer anyone 
interested in a mortgage to Jamie, who works in the corporate headquarters in the next 
state over.  
 
Last week, you met Terry for a nice dinner and drinks to catch up and celebrate Terry’s 
new job.  Terry mentions it has been a struggle to generate new customers in her new 
position. When the waiter drops off the check, Terry insists on picking up the entire tab 
for the expensive dinner.  
 
On your way out, Terry says if you have any ideas on how they can get more customers 
they could really use it.  Hopefully, we can get together for more dinners on an ongoing 
basis, my treat. 
 
Non-explicit / No Favor 
You are a personal banker at a neighborhood bank.  You used to refer anyone looking for 
a mortgage to Terry, the home loan specialist in your branch. Terry left the bank two 
months ago to work for another mortgage lender. You are now required to refer anyone 
interested in a mortgage to Jamie, who works in the corporate headquarters in the next 
state over.  
 
Last week, you met Terry for a nice dinner and drinks to catch up and celebrate Terry’s 
new job.  Terry mentions it has been a struggle to generate new customers in her new 
position. When the waiter drops off the check, you divvy up the bill and each pay your 
portion.  
 
On your way out, Terry says if you have any ideas on how they can get more customers 




Homeowner association contractor price request/ Free brick work 
 
Explicit/ Favor 
You are the president of a condo association consisting of 30 townhomes. There is a 
company who has done small maintenance and construction projects for residents in the 
past.  
 
One day you return home from work to see the owner of the company fixing your small 




worry, there is no charge for this work. I was already here doing a project for your 
neighbor and saw a few stones loose on your wall, so I secured them with some adhesive.  
It only took about 10 minutes.”   
 
The owner then inquiries about the project up for bid to replace the roofs for the entire 
complex and says, It’s probably illegal for you to tell me but, where does my price need 
to be in order to get the business? 
 
Explicit/ No Favor 
You are the president of a condo association consisting of 30 townhomes. There is a 
company who has done small maintenance and construction projects for residents in the 
past.  
 
One day you return home from work to see the owner of the company fixing your small 
rock retaining wall at your neighbors.   
 
The owner then inquiries about the project up for bid to replace the roofs for the entire 
complex and says, It’s probably illegal for you to tell me but, where does my price need 
to be in order to get the business? 
 
Non-Explicit/ Favor 
You are the president of a condo association consisting of 30 townhomes. There is a 
company who has done small maintenance and construction projects for residents in the 
past.  
 
One day you return home from work to see the owner of the company fixing your small 
rock retaining wall. You tell the owner; you didn’t order this work. They say, don’t 
worry, there is no charge for this work. I was already here doing a project for your 
neighbor and saw a few stones loose on your wall, so I secured them with some adhesive.  
It only took about 10 minutes.”   
 
The owner then inquiries about the project up for bid to replace the roofs for the entire 
complex and says, Where does my price need to be in order to get the business? 
 
Non-Explicit/ No Favor 
You are the president of a condo association consisting of 30 townhomes. There is a 
company who has done small maintenance and construction projects for residents in the 
past.  
 
One day you return home from work to see the owner of the company fixing your small 
rock retaining wall at your neighbors.   
 
The owner then inquiries about the project up for bid to replace the roofs for the entire 







Experiment 4- Survey Questions 
 
Questions 1- 7- asked after first vignette 
 
11) How likely are you to sign your neighbor’s form? 
2- Definitely Sign 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Sign 
 
 
2) How much do you agree that you have an ethical obligation to give back to 
those that have given to you?   
1- Agree Strongly 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Disagree Strongly  
 
 
3) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to sign your 
neighbor’s form?  
1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation  
 
 
4) While deciding to sign your neighbor’s form, did you think about negative 
consequences you could face for doing so?  
1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All  
 
5) How ethical do you feel it is to sign your neighbor’s form stating that the 
volunteer work was completed?  
1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical 
 
6) Was it clear you were asked to do something that was wrong? 
1- Not clear at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very Clear 
 
7) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to your 
neighbor?  
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Extremely important 
 
 
Questions 8- 13- asked after second vignette 
 
8) How likely are you to agree to send referrals to Terry? 
2- Definitely Send Referrals 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Send 
Referrals 
 
9) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to agree to send Terry 
referrals?  





10) While deciding to agree to send Terry referrals, did you think about negative 
consequences you could face for doing so?  
1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All  
 
11) How ethical do you feel it is to agree to send Terry referrals?  
1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical 
 
12) Was it clear you were asked to do something that was wrong? 
1- Not clear at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very Clear 
 
13) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to Terry?  
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very important 
 
 
Questions 14- 19 asked third vignette 
 
14) How likely are you to tell the contractor where is roof price needs to be to win 
the business? 
2- Definitely Give Price 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Definitely Not Give Price 
 
15) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to give a price to the 
contractor?  
1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation  
 
16) While deciding to give the price to the contractor, did you think about 
negative consequences you could face for doing so?  
1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All  
 
17) How ethical do you feel it is to give the price to the contractor?  
1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical 
 
18) Was it clear you were asked to do something that was wrong? 
1- Not clear at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very Clear 
 
19) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to the 
contractor?  
1- Not important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very important 
 
 
Questions 20- 30  asked fourth vignette 
 
20) How likely are you to sign Morgan’s name to the form? 





21) How much of an ethical obligation did you feel you had to sign Morgan’s 
name to the second consent form?  
1- Strong Ethical Obligation 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- No Ethical Obligation  
 
22) While deciding to sign someone else’s name to the second form or not, did 
you think about negative consequences you could face for doing so?  
1- To a Great Extent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Not at All  
 
23) How ethical do you feel it is to sign someone else’s name to a consent form?  
1- Totally unethical 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Perfectly ethical 
 
24) Was it clear you were asked to do something that was wrong? 
1- Not clear at all, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7- Very Clear 
 
 
25) How important was it to you that you were perceived as cooperative to the 
researcher?  





26) What is your age? (open ended response) 
 
27) What gender do you identify as?  
Female 
Male 
Non-binary/ third gender 
Prefer not to say 
 
28) What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
        Nursery, kindergarten, and elementary (grades 1-8) 
High school (grades 9-12, no degree) 
High school graduate (or equivalent) 
Some college (1-4 years, no degree or in process) 
Associate degree (including occupational or academic degrees) 
Bachelor’s degree (BA, BS, etc...) 
Master’s degree (MA, MS, etc...) 
Doctoral or Professional degree (JD, MD, PhD, etc...) 
 
29) What was your total household income before taxes during the past 12 
months? 
Less than $10,000 
$10,000 to $14,999 
$15,000 to $24,999 




$35,000 to $49,999 
$50,000 to $74,999 
$75,000 to $99,999 
$100,000 to $149,999 
$150,000 to $199,999 
$200,000 or more 
 
30) What is your race and ethnicity (Check all that apply) 
African American 
American Indian/Alaskan Native 
Asian 
Hispanic/Latino 
Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander 
White 
Other (please specify) 
 
[End of survey] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
